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The 2010 General Election and subsequent coalition government brought groundbreaking 
changes to the conduct of UK politics, challenging recent British political history’s 
encapsulation within the dominant paradigm of the majoritarian ‘Westminster model’, and 
raising the prospect of further indecisive elections, not least evident in the uncertainty 
surrounding the upcoming 2015 General Election. These developments have also encouraged 
a rereading of past British minority governments, previously relegated to a status of either 
inherent weakness or aberration. Seminal works in the study of minority governments (Kaare 
Strom, 1990, 2006) have tended to concentrate on international experience, and even more 
recent studies by the Constitution Unit in London which have sought to act as a guide to 
current political parties (‘Making Minority Government Work’ (2010)) have not considered 
past British administrations in any great depth. 
 
This thesis provides a historico-political study of the two main parties’ strategic response to 
minority government during the Callaghan Administration of 1976-1979. The twin 
conclusions of this work are that both the Labour Government and Conservative Opposition 
showed greater consideration of strategies for dealing with minority government than has 
previously been appreciated by scholars, and that their actions are indicative of a distinct 
British tradition of minority government hitherto relatively unrecognised. 
 
The first two chapters establish the study’s theoretical framework, chronological context of 
the Callaghan Government, and strategy-making process within the main parties. 
 
Chapters 3-4 take in the alternative courses of action during Government formation and the 
changing approaches to managing legislative defeats, while Chapters 5-6 examine formal and 
informal interparty cooperation. 
 
Chapters 7-8 consider strategies of electoral timing, as well as planning by both parties for 
future minority or coalition governments, while the remaining two chapters revisit the 
confidence vote that brought down the Government, and place Callaghan’s Administration 
within a wider reconceptualising of British minority government history. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  2 
Rationale 
 
At a time when many countries are continuing to struggle with economic crises, many are 
also facing crises of government, even in long-established democracies; elections more 
regularly produce indecisive outcomes and have compelled political parties to form 
minority governments, being unable to construct majority coalition arrangements with 
other parties. Even traditional notions of Britain as a bastion of single-party majority 
government have been challenged by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government, formed at Westminster in 2010, as well as by the uncertainty and prospect of 
further minority or coalition government following future electoral results. 
A recent British Minority Administration whose experience has been largely 
overlooked is that of the Callaghan Government between 1976 and 1979. Through its 
action or inaction, Callaghan’s Administration laid the political groundwork acted upon by 
British governments over the last three decades, in areas ranging from Macroeconomic 
policy to Devolution. As will be outlined in this study, the influence of experiences gained 
by both Government and Opposition parties during the Callaghan Administration may be 
seen even in the formation of Britain’s post-2010 Coalition Government. In the same way 
that the indecisive nature of the result in 2010 presented a situation not faced in a 
generation, the period of non-majority governance from 1976-79 compelled the main 
parties to adapt to a largely unfamiliar political environment, having become used to single 
party majority governance. Prior to the short-lived Wilson Minority Government 
(February-October 1974), Britain had last experienced minority governance more than 
forty-three years earlier in 1929-31 under Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. In 
this respect, the experience of the 1976-79 Government provides perhaps one of the best 
comparators with the post-2010 Coalition in the UK Parliament. 
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate two aspects of the Callaghan 
Government and Opposition that have received less scholarly interest. The first of these 
aspects is that the two main political parties within Britain showed greater strategic 
thinking than has previously been appreciated by scholars, and sought to adapt to the 
different challenges posed by minority government at a national level between 1976 and 
1979. The second aspect is that these trends of attempted adaptation were reflective of a 
distinctively British tradition of minority government, in which the main participants 
sought primarily to adhere to a majoritarian political system, while contemplating and 
embracing pragmatic changes. This British tradition of minority government was also 
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reflected in seeking guidance for formulating strategy. Participants and papers on the 
subject in both main parties referenced Britain’s own historic experience with minority 
administrations, rather than those more recently occurring in other countries. In addition to 
a rereading of late 1970s British politics, charting of the development of political strategy 
will provide: an insight into how parties adapt to new political circumstances; a greater 
understanding of the challenges facing future minority and coalition governments and how 
these may be confronted; and a framework for evaluating strategic developments of other 
minority, majority and coalition governments in Britain and internationally. 
In spite of the many historical experiences of minority government, this area of 
research has been largely under-explored, particularly in Britain, with only a handful of 
recent works providing a corrective to this omission, domestic and international minority 
government scholarship being discussed below. Even in terms of a general overview, 
within a broader international context, minority government as a concept and practice has 
not been as widely studied as that of coalition government. Some other countries’ 
experiences of minority government, primarily confined to article-length case-studies or 
subsumed into larger works, have also begun to be subject to more detailed examination.
1
 
Full monograph studies of the subject of minority government in its own right have only 
more recently been produced in certain cases, such as Russell’s Two Cheers for Minority 
Government, which examines Canada’s historic experience with minority administrations, 




It is only more recently that this field has begun to garner greater scholarly 
attention in countries facing fresh experiences with minority administrations, in some cases 
for the first time ever at a national level. It is clear that minority government will be an 
increasingly prominent feature of national politics in democracies across the world in the 
years ahead. Continued trends of declining membership of, and identification with, 
traditional governing parties, the rise of new party movements challenging conventional 
notions of interparty cooperation, and the need to reconcile a myriad of political groups in 
newly emergent democracies, such as those of the Arab Spring, have led to more frequent 
occurrences of minority administrations. 2010 to 2011 saw the existence of a number of 
minority governments at a national level across three different continents. Several of these 
                                                 
1
 For an example of a previous Canadian study which includes a useful discussion of different considerations 
relating to minority governments, see, for example, R. G. Landes, ‘The Canadian General Election of 1980’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1981), pp. 95-109. See infra, pp. 12-21. 
2
 C. Nikolenyi, Minority Governments in India: The Puzzle of Elusive Majorities (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2010); P. Russell, Two Cheers for Minority Government: The Evolution of Canadian Parliamentary 
Democracy (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008). See infra, pp. 12-21. 
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examples, including, amongst others, Australia in 2010, had no recent experience of this 
form of government at a national level. Even countries with more deep-rooted traditions of 
minority government have had to meet new political challenges requiring changes to 
existing governing arrangements, which may be seen not least in the three minority 






The first step will be to set out the assumptions and particular understandings of the 
concepts that are used in this study, seeking to avoid confusion in the terminological 
framing of the question. When referring to the position of the Callaghan Government after 
losing its majority in April 1976, the term ‘minority government’ will be used. Minority 
government occurs in a democracy when a political party forms a government, whose 
power is dependent upon controlling a legislative majority in a parliament, but does not 
itself have a majority of the parliamentary seats, thereby having to rely on the cooperation 
or abstention of other parties for survival. Prior to the late nineteenth century emergence of 
disciplined political parties in Britain, and of national elections acting as the decisive factor 
in establishing or changing governments, many, if not all governments, could be regarded 
more loosely as ‘minority’ governments. These governments were mainly concerned with 
managing executive governance independent of Parliament. Where parliamentary approval 
was required for a Budget or for legislation, it often resulted in the assembly of ad hoc 




Minority governments since the late nineteenth century have thereby emerged as a 
contrast with what has been identified as the increasing ‘norm’ of single-party majority 
government. This is as distinct from the one or two other cases in which the term ‘minority 
government’ has sometimes been appropriated when referring to Britain, either as a 
discussion of class-based conflict between the citizenry and a ‘minority’ elite in political 
                                                 
3
 B. E. Rasch, ‘Why Minority Governments? Executive-Legislative Relations in the Nordic Countries’, in T. 
Persson and M. Wiberg (eds), Parliamentary Government in the Nordic Countries at a Crossroads. Coping 
with Challenges from Europeanisation and Presidentialisation (Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press, 2011), 
pp. 1-31; T. Bergman, Constitutional Rules and Party Goals in Coalition Formation: An Analysis of Winning 
Minority Governments in Sweden (Department of Political Science: Umeå University, 1995). See infra, pp. 
12-15.  
4
 A. Blick & S. Wilks-Heeg, ‘Governing without Majorities: Coming to Terms with Balanced Parliaments in 
UK Politics’, Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No.1 (2010), pp. 2-3; K. Strom, Minority 
Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 4-8; A. Beattie, ‘British 
Coalition Government Revisited’, Government and Opposition, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1966), pp. 4-6. 
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institutions, or as a reference to the electoral system, and the ability of a political party to 
achieve a majority of parliamentary seats on a ‘minority’ of the vote.5 
The scope of the types of political systems which have allowed minority 
governments to exist has also been subject to debate. The term ‘minority government’ has 
sometimes been applied to Presidential or Semi-Presidential systems, in which a separately 
appointed Executive, such as a President, does not hold a corresponding majority in the 
country’s legislature. This definition is sui generis and creates possible confusion with the 
more widespread meaning of ‘minority government’ as usually occurring in a 
parliamentary system. While alternative terms such as ‘minority Presidential Government’ 
may serve as clarification, these are not currently widely used. For the purpose of this 
study, such a ‘minority’ state in any Presidential system will be identified using the 
conventional label of ‘cohabitation’ rather than ‘minority government’, ‘cohabitation’ 
being a situation in which two political powers within a country are elected under different 
mandates and are held by different opposing political parties. As a result of this 
institutional insulation, one of the critical dynamics of pure parliamentary minority 
government is removed, that of an Executive being totally dependent on their position in a 
parliament for the continuation of their office.
6
 
The term for describing the state of a parliament without a majority has, in recent 
years, been subject to some debate. The commonly accepted lexicon of ‘hung parliament’, 
first widely used in response to the 1970s experience of minority governments in Britain, 
has recently been challenged by commentators because of its negative connotations; 
alternative terms advanced have included ‘no overall control’ and that of ‘a balanced 
parliament’. However, these labels are themselves indicative of a normative approach to 
politics, ‘balanced’ implying the absence of a single party majority as more favourable. 
There is also potential confusion with the term ‘balanced parliament’ being used by 
commentators to describe constitutional concepts such as the balance of powers between 
different parts of the legislature, referring to longstanding works on parliamentary 
democracy such as Walter Bagehot’s, The English Constitution. The phrase ‘minority 
government’ or ‘state of minority government’ will primarily be used as a factual 
descriptor of the institution. When referring to the particular participants of leaders and 
                                                 
5
 H. J. Perkin, The Third Revolution: Professional Elites in the Modern World (London: Routledge, 1996), 
pp. 65-6; G. Dietze, America's Political Dilemma: From Limited to Unlimited Democracy (London: 
University Press of America, 1985), p. 191. 
6
 R. Elgie, Semi-Presidentialism: Sub Types and Democratic Performance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), pp. 179-82; J. A. Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 5, 11-12, 60-2; K. Strom, W. C. Muller, and T. Bergman (eds), 
Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 
328. 
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parties in the late 1970s, the terms used may include: ‘Callaghan Government’, 
‘Government’, or ‘Labour’, when addressing the Labour Government of 1976-79, and 
‘Thatcher’, ‘Opposition’, or ‘Conservatives’, when talking about the Official Opposition 
Conservative and Unionist Party. Others terms, including ‘hung parliament’ or ‘balanced 
parliament’, will be used in reference to their employment by contemporaries reflecting 




Scholarship – 1970s British Political History 
 
Although much space has been dedicated to the political history of late 1970s Britain, 
existing scholarship is subject to significant limitations, whether concerning the 
Government or the different political parties. Previous analyses of the Callaghan 
Government have ranged from scathing criticism of failures to praise for surviving in the 
face of adverse circumstances. The absence of a majority is seen as an important 
contributory factor, but it is only occasionally the focus for particular scrutiny in these 
works. Studies of the Callaghan era have also tended to be incorporated into larger meta-
narratives reflecting contemporary political developments and projects. Conservatives, 
fighting to enact their policies in the face of opposition from both within and outside their 
party in the 1980s, sought to buttress their position through accounts of the late 1970s as a 
period of political weakness and failure. Politicians and activists on the Left wing of 
Labour, and those who later supported the modernising agenda of ‘New Labour’, also 
frequently criticised their political forebears when writing histories of the Callaghan 
Government, to add intellectual credence to their own political agendas to reshape the 
party, and to reposition it ideologically further to the left or right.
8
  
Even where academic histories have sought to avoid being drawn in by these 
political agendas, the focus has often been on either the major extra-parliamentary events 
faced by the Callaghan Government, from the IMF crisis to the ‘Winter of Discontent’, or 
                                                 
7
 ‘Balanced parliament: No need to rush’, The Guardian, 5 May 2010; A. Blick & S. Wilks-Heeg, 
‘Governing without Majorities’, pp. 1-2; A. Brazier and S. Kalitowski (eds), No Overall Control (Hansard 
Society, 2008), pp. 1-4; W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1997), p. 
ix. 
8
 M. Pugh, Speak for Britain!: A New History of the Labour Party (London: Vintage, 2011), pp. 354, 389; G. 
Rosen, Old Labour to New: The Dreams that Inspired, the Battles that Divided (London: Politico’s, 2005), p. 
383; P. Diamond, New Labour's Old Roots: Revisionist Thinkers in Labour's History, 1931-97 (Exeter: 
Imprint Academic, 2004), pp. 4, 168; A. Seldon and K. Hickson (eds), New Labour, Old Labour: The Wilson 
and Callaghan Governments (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. i, 1, 321-2; P. Gould, ‘The Land that Labour 
Forgot’ in A. Chadwick, The New Labour Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), pp. 39-42; P. Whitehead, 
The Writing on the Wall: Britain in the Seventies (London: Joseph, 1985); P. Whiteley, The Labour Party in 
Crisis (London: Methuen & Co., 1983), pp. 1-5, 129, 185, 207. See infra, pp. 7-12, 29-34. 
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on the Labour party’s internal ideological conflicts, rather than on strategies of managing 
the absence of a parliamentary majority.
9
  
One of the most comprehensive reflections on the actions and plans drawn up by 
political actors during the period remains that of Butler and Kavanagh’s 1979-80 work on 
the 1979 General Election, and their account of activities during the preceding Parliament. 
Although many of their conclusions have become largely accepted as orthodox, Butler and 
Kavanagh’s study suffers from obvious limitations in terms of source availability and the 
absence of critical distance.
10
 Similarly, there are contemporary narratives and political 
commentaries, including quarterly reflections on preceding sessions of Parliament by John 
Beavan, occurring until 1977, which, although capturing day-to-day issues and political 
concerns across a whole year-long session during the Parliament, lack a holistic overview, 
and were based upon similarly limited sources.
11
  
Some interesting insights into the experience of contemporary political actors may 
be found in the preponderance of biographies or personal reflections in the form of 
political diaries and memoirs. These works form an increasingly regular feature in British 
politics and have been much cited as supplementary sources for the period. While 
providing some interesting insights, however, their limitations (as with any personal 
reflection or biography) must be borne in mind. Particularly notable are their 
understandable lack of an overall specific focus on the minority government question, and 
their principal aim being to put into the public domain their recollections of the events, 
with the view sometimes being to revise popular perceptions of the author him/herself or 
that of his/her biographical subject.
12
  
                                                 
9 T. Martin-López, The Winter of Discontent: Myth, Memory and History (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 2014); J. Tomlinson, ‘British Government and Popular Understanding of Inflation in the Mid-1970s’, 
Economic History Review, Vol. 67, No. 3 (2014), pp. 750-768; C. Hay, ‘The Winter of Discontent Thirty 
Years On’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 4 (2009), pp. 545-552; A. Thorpe, A History of the British 
Labour Party, 3
rd
 edition (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 195-208; D. Hayter, Fightback!: 
Labour's Traditional Right in the 1970s and 1980s (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); K. 
Hickson, The IMF crisis of 1976 and British Politics (London: I. B. Tauris & Co., 2005); S. Ludlam, ‘The 
Gnomes of Washington: Four Myths of the 1976 IMF Crisis’, Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1992), pp. 
713-27; W. Rodgers, ‘Government under Stress. Britain’s Winter of Discontent 1979’, The Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 2 (1984), pp. 171-9; A. Warde, Consensus and Beyond: The Development of Labour 
Party Strategy since the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), pp. 1-6. 
10
 D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1979 (London: Macmillan, 1980). 
11
 For example: I. Burton, and G. Drewry, ‘Public Legislation: A Survey of the Sessions 1977/8 and 1978/9’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1979), pp. 173-209; J. Beavan, ‘The Westminster Scene’, The 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1976), pp. 203-14. 
12
 See, for example, C. Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorised Biography, Volume One: Not For 
Turning, vol. i (London: Allen Lane, 2013); D. Torrance, David Steel: Rising Hope to Elder Statesman 
(London: Biteback Publishing, 2012); K. O. Morgan, Michael Foot: A Life (London: Harper Collins, 2007); 
R. Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (London: Politico’s Publishing, 2006); B. Donoughue, Downing Street 
Diary: With James Callaghan in No. 10, vol. ii (London: Jonathan Cape, 2008); K. O. Morgan, Callaghan: A 
Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); T. Benn, Conflicts of Interest: Diaries, 1977-80 (London: 
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Academic scrutiny of the actions and plans of political leadership, which may be 
thought of as a traditional locus for strategy-making, do not give significant consideration 
to the state of minority government during this period. The several analyses that there have 
been of Callaghan as Prime Minister over the years have generally been particularly 
critical of his failures, or have praised his management with faint damns, suggesting that he 
did his best given the adverse circumstances. The concluding emphasis of both approaches 
often appears to be that Callaghan was an ‘unfortunate’ Prime Minister, at the mercy of 
events beyond his control. Although aspects of his management of certain crises are 
discussed, such as the IMF loan, and elements of the challenges he faced in Parliament 
woven in, there is no single work concentrating on Callaghan’s approach to the challenge 
of a minority government and his relations with Parliament. Philip Norton’s work on 
Parliament and MP rebellions during the 1970s addresses the parliamentary relations part 
of this question, albeit from a more statistical perspective. The Government’s 
parliamentary position and defeats on legislation have, as such, been considered more as an 
element within an historical narrative of events, or as part of more overarching quantitative 




An important rereading of the Callaghan Government, drawing upon both recently 
released sources and scholarship, may be found in Andrew Thorpe’s A History of the 
Labour Party. Well-established events both within and outside Parliament are neatly 
encapsulated within the chapter dedicated to the 1970s, while at the same time providing 
new insights into long-established views of the Government. Understandably, given the 
overarching nature of the work, there is not the scope to consider in greater detail the 
Callaghan Government’s parliamentary situation as a minority government.14 
The essays contained in Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson’s New Labour, Old 
Labour, published on the thirtieth anniversary of Wilson’s return to office in 1974, offer a 
particularly thorough reappraisal of these governments, from policies they enacted to their 
                                                                                                                                                    
Arrow Books, 1991); M. Thatcher, The Path to Power (London: Harper Collins, 1995); D. Healey, The Time 
of My Life (London: Penguin Books, 1990); W. Whitelaw, The Whitelaw Memoirs (London: Aurum Press, 
1989); J. Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Harper Collins, 1987); J. Barnett, Inside the Treasury 
(London: André Deutsch Limited, 1982). 
13
 J. Shepherd, ‘The Fall of the Callaghan Government, 1979’, in T. Heppell and K. Theakston (eds), How 
Labour Governments Fall: From Ramsay Macdonald to Gordon Brown (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), pp. 113-41; P. Norton, ‘Parliament’ in A. Seldon and K. Hickson (eds), New Labour, Old Labour, pp. 
190-206; P. Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin Books, 
2001), pp. 378, 386-9, 395-6; K. O. Morgan, Britain Since 1945: The People's Peace (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 382-4, 399-401, 422; D. Tanner, P. Thane and N. Tiratsoo, Labour’s First 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 142, 233; P. Norton, Dissension in the House 
of Commons: 1974-1979 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
14
 A. Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party, pp. 195-208. 
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position in Parliament. They also provide more detail on the efforts of the Callaghan 
Administration to overcome the state of minority government through actions in 
Parliament. However, while the publication of this work may be regarded as a benchmark 
in terms of revisionist accounts, it was published in 2004 and therefore by the editors’ own 
admission, was intended to give a present state of knowledge at the time immediately 
preceding the release of Government and Opposition documents under the thirty-year rule. 
These recently released sources have, however, a significant bearing on understanding the 




Dominic Sandbrook’s Seasons in the Sun, while providing some important insights 
through declassified sources and challenging some of the long-held premises regarding the 
Callaghan Government, similarly does not make the minority status of the Government a 
particular focus, but analyses the political dimension from within a wider socioeconomic 
and global background of life in Britain during the period.
16
 
The Government’s principal parliamentary counterparts, the Conservative 
Opposition in the late 1970s, led by Margaret Thatcher, have also suffered from limited 
scholarly consideration in terms of minority government. The subjects of Thatcher’s rise to 
power and the Conservative Governments of the 1980s and 1990s have elicited 
considerable debate and study in both popular and academic fora, and, at present, continue 
to serve as provocative and highly relevant topics, in political campaigns from Scottish 
Devolution to Britain’s place within the European Union. However, although the period of 
Conservative Opposition in the late 1970s is highlighted in many works, it is often 
perceived as a prologue, an entr’acte to the myriad of political battles and events that 
followed. As such, there are many aspects of this period of opposition, important as 
formative and preparatory experiences for future Conservative Administrations, which 
have received little, if any, significant analysis. In particular, the Conservatives’ political 
approach to minority government has received limited attention.
17
 
This gap in politico-historical scholarship is not isolated, but is rather a recurring 
trend in the study of Official Oppositions in the twentieth century, in which generally not 
much has been contributed to the single work or couple of works which are considered to 
be the original authoritative comment on the subject. While reflecting significant scholarly 
                                                 
15
 A. Seldon and K. Hickson (eds), New Labour, Old Labour, pp. 1-5, 190-206. 
16
 D. Sandbrook, Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974-1979 (London: Penguin UK, 2012). 
17
 J. Campbell, Margaret Thatcher: Grocer's Daughter to Iron Lady (London: Vintage, 2009), pp. 77-94; E. 
A. Reitan, The Thatcher Revolution: Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair, and the Transformation of 
Modern Britain, 1979-2001 (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 16-25, 241-2; R. Blake, The 
Conservative Party: From Peel to Major (London: Arrow Books, 1998), pp. 320-35. 
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contributions, these oppositional studies are necessarily limited, and have often been 
produced prior to the availability of official papers or internal party strategy 
documentation. Increasing interest in the study of Oppositions over the past few years has 
led to new light being shed upon the subject, not least reflected in the overarching 
reconsiderations of the experience of different postwar Opposition leaders in the 2012 
book edited by Timothy Heppell, Leaders of the Opposition: From Churchill to Cameron. 
While this work includes a re-examination of the Conservative Opposition in the late 
1970s by Philip Norton, its focus is, in line with the nature of the study as a whole, more 
on analysing Thatcher’s party leadership, communication, and internal party divisions, 
rather than the minority government aspect.
18
 It is also only in recent years that gaps in the 
study of individual periods of opposition have begun to be addressed, such as through the 
work carried out by Patrick Bell on a previously neglected period of Labour opposition in 
the early 1970s, and Stuart Ball’s multiple works on the Conservative party in opposition 
throughout its history. A particularly interesting revisionist analysis of the opposition led 
by Thatcher in the late 1970s may be found in a chapter of Ball’s work on Recovering 
Power. However, even this study only makes passing reference to the challenges of 
minority government.
19
 The other particularly notable analysis of the Opposition during 
this period was the contemporary account of Behrens’ From Heath to Thatcher. The work 
focuses more upon battles fought within the Conservative Party itself, as well as on 
reshaping its ideological outlook and policy, rather than on parliamentary strategy or 
Conservative MPs’ efforts to bring down the Callaghan Government.20 While the 
Callaghan Minority Government occurred when smaller political parties were increasing 
their parliamentary representation to new record highs in the postwar period, scholarship 
with regard to their contribution also suffers from substantial gaps. These smaller political 
parties, who each held between one and fourteen MPs in Parliament, assumed a critically 
important role by keeping the balance of power between Government and Official 
Opposition. This increased prominence helped to fuel greater academic interest in the 
parties involved, although this scholarship still does not rival that of the space dedicated to 
the two main political parties. Brief discussions of the pivotal role played by the smaller 
parties have featured in major histories of the period, and in studies looking at individual 
                                                 
18
 T. Heppell (ed), Leaders of the Opposition: From Churchill to Cameron (Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), pp. 99-108. 
19
 S. Ball and A. Seldon (eds), Recovering Power: The Conservatives in Opposition Since 1867 (Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); P. Bell, The Labour Party in Opposition, 1970-1974 (London: Routledge, 2004); 
J. D. Hoffman, The Conservative Party in Opposition: 1945-51 (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1964). 
20
 R. Behrens, The Conservative Party from Heath to Thatcher: Policies and Politics, 1974-1979 
(Farnborough: Saxon House, 1980). 
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As with Labour and the Conservatives, considerations of subsequent political 
developments have affected the writing of narratives concerning smaller political parties in 
the Parliament of the late 1970s, whether in terms of the Social Democratic Party/Alliance 
and formation of the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid 
Cymru governing in the Devolved Parliaments of Scotland and Wales, or the development 
and resolution of political turmoil in Northern Ireland.
22
  
There have not been many works dedicated specifically to interaction and 
cooperation between the different parties during the late 1970s. An exception to this may 
be found in discussion of the Lib-Lab Pact, an agreement between the Labour and Liberal 
parties which involved Liberal MPs supporting the Government on key votes between 
March 1977 and September 1978 in return for input into government policymaking. 
Nevertheless, academic study of interparty cooperation remains limited, with existing 
detailed analyses primarily consisting of contemporary political commentary or personal 
reflection. As of 2015, only two books have been published which focus solely on the 
subject of the Lib-Lab Pact, one of which was written prior to the 1979 election, while the 
other was written by the Liberal leader of the time David Steel, an architect of and major 
participant in the Pact. Mark Oaten’s 2007 work Coalition, which examines the history of 
coalition in Britain since 1850 rather than that of minority government, has been one of the 
few works to revisit and reread the Lib-Lab Pact using more recently declassified papers. 
The most authoritative and in-depth rereading of the Pact to date has been given in 
Jonathan Kirkup’s unpublished PhD thesis in 2012.23 
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Similar literature, although smaller in quantity, dominates existing narratives of the 
other political parties. One of the most comprehensive accounts of SNP MPs’ approach to 
parliamentary strategy during this period comes from reflections by a contemporary SNP 
parliamentarian, Gordon Wilson. Consideration of parties such as Plaid Cymru and the 
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) is even less in evidence, being confined to a few pages in one 




Scholarship – Minority Government and Coalition 
 
As highlighted above, the study of minority governments around the world has, 
comparatively speaking, received less scholarly attention from historians and political 
scientists as opposed to that afforded to coalitions or single-party majority governments. 
Earlier theoretical appraisals, rather than studying minority government as a phenomenon 
in itself, examined minority governments as ‘deviant cases’ of unfulfilled potential 
coalitions. Later works have sought to redress this imbalance, looking at minority 
administrations as the product of rational actors and not being inherently weaker than other 
forms of democratic government. The most detailed studies of minority government have 
been produced in countries with relatively commonplace experience of minority 
administrations, including, amongst others, Denmark and Canada. While there are 
similarities between minority governments in different countries, there are also significant 
variations and distinct national political cultures and institutions. Increased occurrences of 
minority governments around the world in recent years have promoted greater scholarly 
interest. However, as indicated above, the UK has been curiously neglected. Minority 
governments in Britain have received even less consideration in their own right than their 
counterparts in other countries, whether by scholars of political history or those working in 
the political science aspects of minority government.
25
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 By looking through some of the developments in minority government theory over 
the past fifty years, it is possible to glimpse a particularly confusing picture. Orthodox 
theories have never fully been discredited, while revisionist and other subsequent 
theoretical considerations often provide only unsteady foundations that continue to be 
much contested by scholars. While it would be impractical to consider all the different 
aspects of this theoretical development, a brief overview will chart something of the 
debates, as well as highlighting aspects that will be relevant for consideration of the 
Callaghan Government and Conservative Opposition in subsequent chapters. 
Early theorised approaches used game-theory models to analyse political leaders as 
rational actors, including the pioneering work of William Riker in the 1950s, The Theory of 
Political Coalitions, which established important foundations for coalition theory and what 
would become the orthodox view of minority governments. This orthodoxy, developed in 
subsequent studies, characterised minority governments in an almost completely negative 
light, in effect representing ‘failed’ coalitions: these are rare deviations from the ‘norm’ of 
majority governments; arising from crises, fractionalization of existing party systems, 
increased political polarization or unresolvable conflicts between parties; inherently weak 
and short-lived; political actors being primarily driven to seek office rather than other goals 
such as enactment of policies; and, as with coalition formation more generally, the view 
that any attempts to construct coalitions will always favour the smallest number of 
MPs/parties needed to get a majority (or ‘minimal-winning coalition’).26 While ‘minimal 
winning’ has been much criticised or modified, not least to include the general preference 
for coalitions of ideologically similar parties, it continues to act as a powerful starting point 
for explaining political behaviour of what are still perceived to be ‘rational actors’. More 
recent revisionist scholarship, led by Kaare Strom’s articles in the 1980s and his seminal 
work Minority Government and Majority Rule, has largely accepted the game-theory 
approach, but challenged the above-cited causes and conclusions about minority 
governments, suggesting that: they are far more common across different countries; they 
may be the product of rational behaviour by political actors; they are not necessarily 
weaker or more short-lived than majority or coalition governments; and parties may pursue 
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Over the past few decades, these scholars have reinterpreted the previously listed 
causes of minority government, as well as looking to other factors that may influence the 
government formation process, a particularly important debate being over the effect of 
institutions on constraining or facilitating particular types of government formation. Some 
of these ideas were widely accepted, not least the notion that minority governments were 
more likely to form in cases of the ‘negative’ framing of parliamentary rules, supposedly 
the case in Britain, so that a new government did not have to win a parliamentary vote to 
establish itself, and could exist merely if tolerated by opposition parties. Even this idea has 
not gone unchallenged, however, an alternative being proposed by Lanny Martin and 
Randolph Stevenson in 2010, suggesting that the probability of a minority government 
forming does not depend on the presence or absence of a formal investiture rule, based 
upon a new data sample of different governments. Furthermore, this study, whose focus 
was on highlighting the importance of parties working together in the past as a guide to 
future cooperation, also serves to reflect the employment of other non-institutional factors, 
including decision-making by individual party leaders and local political history.
28
 
Uncertainty over what constitutes a minority government in practice has led to 
theorists debating the boundaries between minority and majority governments, and how 
these governments should be defined. Taylor and Laver, amongst others, have argued that 
minority governments which ‘almost’ pass the majority threshold are more likely able to 
be able stay in power by relying on the votes of one or two parliamentarians from other 
parties, and even, in some cases, to function similarly to a majority government.
29
 There 
have been a number of developments in recent years aiming to understand the greater 
complexity of political actors that shape minority government and coalition formation, not 
least, for example, Thomas Bergmann’s model of “multiple goals in multiple arenas”, 
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suggesting that different branches of the same party may seek different outcomes at a local 
or national level in terms of forming a minority or coalition government.
30
 
Recent studies have also sought further to challenge well-established notions that 
would, on the face of it, appear to be long held self-evident truths of minority government, 
such as their desirability. One such example may be seen in Yannick Dufresne and Neil 
Nevitte’s study of public perceptions of minority government in Canada going back over 
sixty years, suggesting that, contrary to “conventional wisdom”, “substantial proportions of 
the Canadian public actually prefer minority rather than majority governments”. 
Undoubtedly this is an area of investigation which may well be much explored and debated 
by scholars in the years ahead.
31
 
Some theoretical observations of minority government behaviour also would 
initially appear rather paradoxical, such as those of Christoffer Green-Pederson, arguing 
that particularly contentious legislation in 1980s Denmark, including significant welfare 
reform and tax changes, could only be passed as a result of a minority rather than majority 
government, given the need for elements in different parties to cooperate with one another 
against legislators within their own parties and external pressure groups who would have 
otherwise blocked the measures. Regardless of which perspective is adopted, the absence 
of a guaranteed legislative majority undoubtedly presents the most significant set of 





Scholarship – British Minority Government 
 
Works on minority government around the world, even those which are largely 
comparative and draw on experiences from many different countries, have not tended to 
give much attention to the British minority government experience. One of the best 
reflections of this is Strom’s above-cited Minority Government and Majority Rule, in 
which Harold Wilson’s 1974 experience of minority government is cited as the principal 
introductory example, but is given no more consideration throughout the entire book. 
Britain itself only features in further chapters of the work with passing references, 
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primarily to its majoritarian political culture and the likelihood that this would produce 
minority as opposed to coalition governments.
33
 
 Where Britain does feature in the international literature of minority government 
theory, it tends to be as a briefly cited contrast with countries which experience minority 
and coalition government more frequently. One such example of this usage is Bergmann’s 
1993 consideration of the effect of institutions on minority government formation. This 
work emphasises that Britain and Canada are exceptions to the rules, possessing 
institutions seen as more likely to favour minority over coalition government but having 
fewer instances of minority administrations actually being formed than other countries.
34
 In 
Arend Lijphart’s famous categorisation of political systems as being that of majoritarian 
vs. consensual democracies, Britain is seen very much as a centralised state on the end of 
the spectrum where the political leadership controls a largely unchecked legislature 
(executive-dominated), single-party majority governments are the norm (majoritarian), and 
localities are subordinate to control of the centre (unitary). Even the post-2010 Coalition 
has not, so far, fundamentally changed Lijphart’s conception of the British majoritarian 
system, as highlighted in the updated 2012 edition of Patterns of Democracy, something 
which will, no doubt, be a point of contention among scholars for years to come.
35
 
Where British minority administrations have been considered by historians, these 
works have often been focused on recording and analysing their challenges and political 
achievements, chronicled in narrative histories, or as part of wider studies of the 
development of political parties over a longer period. Much has been written, for example, 
on the first Labour Government (a minority government) in 1924, although the emphasis 
has more often been placed on the groundbreaking achievement for organised labour or 
electoral strategy, with references to its minority status primarily indicating a hindrance to 
Government plans. Richard W. Lyman’s authoritative 1957 work on the first Labour 
Government does feature a chapter entitled ‘The Problems of Minority Government’ which 
captures something of the strategies being employed by different political parties. 
However, most of the work concentrates on the years preceding 1924 and the aftermath of 
defeat in the December 1924 Election, placing the government within in a much wider 
framework of Labour Party history. Lyman also had to rely mainly on published rather 
than internal party sources. John Shepherd and Keith Laybourn’s rereading of this 
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Administration in 2006, which had access to a wide range of private papers amongst other 
sources, has produced a more comprehensive consideration of the implications of minority 
government during this period.
36
 The second Labour Government in 1929, also a minority 
administration, has similarly recently been re-examined, not least in a 2011 volume edited 
by John Shepherd, Jonathan Davis, and Chris Wrigley, along with David Redvaldsen’s 
article on the 1929 General Election.
37
 Individual aspects of these different governments 
have also been subject to more recent reconsideration, including the collaborative work, 
How Labour Governments Fall, examining in detail the termination of Labour 
Governments historically, including the first two minority governments and the Callaghan 
Administration. While providing important insights, this work is necessarily limited in its 




One of the few contributions over the last thirty years which has specifically 
addressed the history of British minority governments on a national level, David Butler’s 
Dilemmas of a Hung Parliament, has often been overlooked. Butler’s work combines two 
major strands of thought through juxtaposing historical summaries of the experience of 
past British minority governments with discussions of constitutional implications of a 
potential minority parliament. However, in spite of its usefulness as a study of British 
minority government, Butler’s work does not go into the historical experiences of any one 
minority government in significant detail, and was written without access to important 
sources for consideration of minority government strategy development during the 1970s, 




Where there have been other more in-depth scholarly considerations of the minority 
status of an individual British government in the past, these have often focused upon 
constitutional questions raised, not least in terms of the role of the Sovereign in forming a 
government. While such questions are, of course, significantly important in terms of 
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minority governance, a consequence of focusing on them is that such works have devoted 
much less space to examining the political aspects and the development of minority 
government strategy by political parties in Britain.
40
 
The increased likelihood of a ‘hung parliament’ after 2005 fuelled added interest in 
the subject of minority government. Some works produced immediately prior to the 2010 
General Election cited a range of different historical examples of ‘hung parliaments’, both 
from Britain and abroad, with notable contributions being the collaborative works of No 
Overall Control, edited by Alex Brazier and Susanna Kalitowski, on behalf of the Hansard 
Society, and Making Minority Government Work, edited by Roger Hazell and Akash Paun, 
who were, at the time, both serving at University College London’s Constitution Unit. 
Both are thoroughly researched and are very useful in terms of raising and analysing the 
implications of no party having a majority, as well as detailing possible responses which 
party leaders could take. However, the major concern in these works was to inform and 
influence decision-makers in the event of no party gaining a majority at the 2010 election 
and subsequent elections, highlighting particular historical examples in order to justify 
potential recommended actions to policymakers and to educate commentators about issues 
of minority and coalition government, rather than providing a more in-depth historical 




The UK Coalition Government which took office in 2010 prompted an increased 
interest in the study of coalitions in Britain, and a series of fresh considerations of the 
subject by political commentators and scholars, some of which have compared the 
Coalition with the past experience of the Callaghan Minority Government. Although some 
of these works have considered the prospect and implications of minority administrations 
while referencing British historical precedents, these are understandably short references 
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with sparse details. The primary focus of such works has been on coalition and on 
understanding the Cameron-Clegg Government, rather than on the minority government 
aspects.
42
 Some works considering the Coalition have highlighted the Callaghan 
Government and the interparty agreement aspects of the Lib-Lab Pact as precursors, but 
only through brief references, such as the volume edited by Simon Lee and Matt Beech on 
The Cameron-Clegg Government, or Andrew Gamble’s 2015 article examining the 
Coalition’s economic policy, ‘Austerity as Statecraft’.43 Other scholars have drawn upon 
international exemplars rather than the Pact or the 1970s British experiences of minority 
government, such as Tim Bale’s 2012 article considering New Zealand coalition 




A chapter of Hennessy’s Distilling the Frenzy provides some particularly 
interesting historico-political insights into changes in Britain’s process of forming a 
minority government since the 1970s, and a useful contextual guide for considering some 
of the constitutional aspects of elections in 2015. Given the particular focus of the work, 
parliamentary strategy from the 1970s is not explored in detail.
45
 
The recent proliferation of minority administrations in Britain’s Devolved 
Parliaments and local councils has also received greater attention in the past few years, 
through such studies as Tom Lundberg’s comparative analyses of Scotland and New 
Zealand, particularly in terms of institutional rules on the behaviour of MSPs, or Peter 
Cairney’s work on the SNP minority government of 2007.46 Steve Leach’s multiple case 
study analysis provides an insight into the often overlooked area of minority local 
government administrations.
47
 While most of these works act as useful case studies and 
reinforce the contemporary relevance of studying minority and coalition government, their 
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positioning firmly within a framework of current events and very recent political history, 
however, necessarily limits potential detail in terms of accessibility to closed sources, and 




The absence of work on interparty cooperation in Britain, both within the context of 
minority and coalition government, is not confined to the late 1970s. Prior to the 2010 
Coalition being formed, discussions tracing overarching history and experiences of 
interparty agreements or coalitions in British history remained a relatively understudied 
field, with the main works by scholars including Andrew Thorpe, Phillip Williamson and 
Kevin Jefferys, focusing upon detailed case studies of the specific wartime coalitions and 
the cross-party National Governments of the 1930s.
49
 More recent parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary attempts at interparty cooperation have also been given some consideration 
by scholars, including the arrangements to the ‘Project’ in which Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats cooperated over drafting plans for constitutional reform in the 1990s. Some of 
these works have considered more long-term historical trends, including the Lib-Lab Pact, 
but, understandably given the focus and structure of their study, have not dedicated 
significant space to analysis of it.
50
 Oaten’s 2007 work, Coalition, and Searle’s 1995 book, 
Country Before Party, are two of the few recent attempts to challenge prevailing notions of 
a postwar political system in which two-party competition and single-party majority rule 
were accepted as intellectually hegemonic concepts. Although focusing mainly on 
coalition rather than on minority government, these works highlighting the efforts between 
the main parties to fashion agreements with other parliamentary groups over the course of 
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the twentieth century, right up until the 1980s and beyond, provide a counterpoint to 
existing scholarship. Country Before Party also offers some insight when studying the 
context and historical basis for the strategies the parties pursued in the late 1970s, in terms 






This study will be based on an interdisciplinary historico-political approach, encompassing 
empirical historical analysis within a theoretical political science framework. The 
particular focus is on highlighting the two main parties’ development and implementation 
of political strategy, specifically in terms of confronting the exigencies of minority 
government. The site of these exigencies was the arena of Parliament, and specifically how 
far the main political parties were able to develop and successfully implement strategies to 
ensure or challenge government majority control of the House of Commons. The 
interdisciplinary dimension of the study will combine conventional empiricist historicism 
with political scientific investigations with regard to the strategic behaviour of parties 
when confronted with minority government. As highlighted in the above review of 
minority government literature, one of the problems in this area is that much theory is 
devoted to the formation rather than the maintenance of minority government. These 
theoretical models have tended to be based around more consensual European 
democracies, whose institutional structures and governing cultures are more inclined 
towards the possibility of minority government than Britain. Nevertheless, the underlying 
bases of such studies, considering rational choice behaviour by political actors, may be 
applied to the situation which is being considered here. Over the coming chapters, these 
theoretical perspectives and domestic or international exemplars of other minority 
governments will be used to assess the strategic developments in this field that were 
pursued by the Callaghan Government and Conservative Opposition, within a distinct 
British tradition of minority government. This British tradition is one of continued 
preference for single party majority governance, or, where necessary, minority rather than 
coalition government. The tradition, while embracing a level of pragmatic flexibility in 
terms of interparty cooperation, also sought the retention of majoritarian governance.
52
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Traditional comparative approaches to the history of political strategy, such as 
Ball’s juxtaposition of different periods of the Conservatives in Opposition over more than 
a century, or Alan Warde’s charting of the trend of postwar Labour strategy development, 
have tended to focus on one party. Comparisons of different parties’ historical experience 
and strategies have usually been between parties in different countries, such as 
Redvaldsen’s studies of British and Norwegian Labour. Both such comparators are 
valuable scholarly undertakings, but, as distinct from the approach in this study, these do 




Although the word ‘strategy’ often features in political histories, actual detailed 
considerations of political strategy relating to Parliament are less common. Most overt 
considerations of ‘strategy’ during the 1970s in Britain are concerned with either issues of 
policy development or implementation, particularly economic, or alternatively, on electoral 




One of the few studies capturing the development of a political party’s strategy 
specifically concerned with minority government and dealing with Parliament during this 
period is Roger Levy’s 1986 article looking at the conduct of SNP Parliamentarians during 
1974-79, which has a particular focus on their responses to Devolution legislation. By its 
defined scope, the application is necessarily narrowly confined.
55
 
There are numerous challenges which confront attempts to reconstruct the political 
strategy development process during this period. In addition to common historical 
limitations of incomplete sources is the absence of detail in some of the recorded strategy 
discussions. It is also important to distinguish the extent to which particular paper 
‘strategies’ were implemented, or indeed, how far implementation was the product of 
strategic management as opposed to individual initiative. Nevertheless, this study’s 
combining of perspectives from traditional source bases of public records, such as the 
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parliamentary proceedings of Hansard, with recently declassified government papers, 
internal party documentation, memoirs and reflections, allows for better reconstruction of 
strategy development. This public demonstration of the parties’ actions will provide 
context for the recently declassified papers, ranging from minutes and papers of 
committees considering the development of strategy to private correspondence between 
those advising the leaders of both parties on strategy. While interviews with participants in 
the strategy-making process who are still alive may provide the potential for future 
development of studying the Callaghan Government, the particular emphasis of this study 
is on the development of minority government strategy as expressed by contemporaries in 
their newly released correspondence, meetings, and strategy papers, rather than from 
reflections made in the present which might well be affected by the post-2010 Coalition, 
and the experiences in the past few decades of minority government and interparty 
cooperation. In some cases, the sources reflect aspects of strategy that were partly 
influenced by the minority government situation, such as papers on the timing of a General 
Election, prepared at Callaghan’s request by the No. 10 Policy Unit, or Conservative 
discussions over how to manage suspension of cooperation with the Government following 
a dispute over the Bill to nationalise large parts of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding 
Industries.
56
 In other instances, the sources have, in fact, exceeded expectations in terms of 
directly highlighting the internal debates and development of party strategy relating to 
minority government, including more radical ideas that were considered but not enacted. 
Some such examples of unimplemented proposals included: a plan for Callaghan’s 
Administration to recover their majority by inviting the Northern Ireland Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) MP Gerry Fitt to join the Government in April 1976; 
for the Government deliberately to seek its own defeat on a major vote; and secret 
Conservative papers that were drawn up to provide contingency plans for running a future 




This research will be directed towards analysing the life-cycle of the minority 
government, from its formation in 1976 to its final termination in a no confidence vote and 
electoral defeat in 1979. Some of the questions to be asked of the minority government and 
                                                 
56
 (The National Archives) TNA: PREM 16/1621, Bernard Donoughue to Prime Minister, ‘Pre-Election 
Strategy – Prospects, Policies and Options for 1978/9’, 22 December 1977; (Churchill Archive Centre) CAC: 
THCR/2/1/1/42A, Nigel Lawson to Margaret Thatcher, 30 May 1976; (Conservative Party Archive) CPA: 
LCC 1/3/11, 114
th
 Meeting, 9 June 1976; 117
th
 Meeting, 21 June 1976. See infra, pp. 70-2, 152-3. 
57
 TNA: PREM 16/1045, Ken Stowe to Prime Minister, 8 April 1976; Merlyn Rees to Prime Minister, 26 
April 1976; CAC: THCR 2/1/6/194: Appendix E, ‘The Hung Parliament’, 12 April 1978; CPA: 
CRD/L/4/46/6, ‘The Hung Parliament Contingency’, 16 March 1978. See infra, pp. 62-3, 93-6, 181-8. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction  24 
opposition parties in this study will include: why was the government formed as a 
minority, as opposed to the calling of an election or formation of a coalition?; how was 
strategy-making in the two main parties affected by the state of minority government?; 
how was a parliamentary majority ensured for either party on particular legislation?; how 
were institutional tools used to help ensure or prevent a Government majority?; how were 
defeats handled?; how was the timing of a General Election approached?; what plans were 
made to end the state of minority government (whether in agreements with other parties or 
electoral timing)?; and, what plans were made for future minority or coalition government 
by the two main parties? The analysis of previously unpublished documents will lead to the 
revision of perceptions of both the main political parties and their leadership during this 
period. While the other parties present in Parliament during this period will be studied in so 
far as they relate to questions of minority government, the focus will be upon Labour and 
the Conservatives. Both main parties had to confront questions of participation in minority 
government from a similar perspective, either as incumbents or direct challengers for 
office with recent governmental experience, making their roles more readily comparable. 
Source availability for determining internal strategy is also a problem for some of the 
smaller parties, whether in terms of a lack of documentation, internal papers not being 
retained, or most files from the period still being closed to researchers at this time, as is the 
case with the UUP archives. Future research in this area may well examine the 
development of smaller party responses to minority government further, and perhaps over 
a longer time period, not least, for example, the SNP experience of minority government in 
the 2007-11 Administration in Holyrood. 
Chapter 2 will outline the context of key events during the Callaghan Government 
which will be referred to in subsequent discussions, along with the strategy-making 
process in both main parties and how this was affected by the state of minority 
government. Thereafter Chapter 3 will re-examine the formation of the Callaghan 
Government, challenging pre-existing assumptions in terms of its inevitability, not least by 
showing that the Government considered the possibility of an interparty agreement with 
the SDLP to retain its parliamentary majority, and the role of the Opposition in seeking 
changes to parliamentary institutions.  
Chapter 4 will look at how both Government and Opposition managed the issue of 
parliamentary defeats, from seeking to avoid or inflict defeat through institutional 
mechanisms and political management, to the consideration of more radical approaches, 
including the Government actively seeking its own defeat on certain issues, or selectively 
using tools such as motions of confidence to buttress its own position. Chapters 5-6 will 
Chapter 1 – Introduction  25 
move further by looking at both parties’ approaches to questions of formal and informal 
interparty cooperation to ensure their position, from hidden perspectives of the 1977-78 
Pact between the Liberals and Labour and the Government’s agreement with the Ulster 
Unionists, to the Conservatives’ considerations of potential interparty agreements.  
The uncertainty over electoral timing generated by the state of minority 
government will then be looked at in detail in Chapter 7, both in terms of re-examining 
strategic motivations behind the Government’s timing and the preparations made by both 
parties in terms of forecasting potential dates and preparing for contingencies.  
Chapter 8 will look at some of the two main parties’ secret strategic considerations 
from this period that have not previously been appreciated, of both Labour’s, and 
especially the Conservatives’, embryonic plans for future minority or coalition 
governments in the event that an election in 1978/9 produced no overall majority for one 
party.  
The penultimate chapter will re-examine the no confidence vote that brought down 
the Callaghan Government. While this is a well-trodden field, the availability of recently 
released sources allows for a fresh understanding of the effect of minority government on 
both major parties.  
The final chapter will draw together the conclusions from this study: while in some 
cases reactive or unsuccessful in their approaches, both main parties were more strategic in 
their consideration of the problems of minority government than has previously been 
appreciated by scholars, and that their efforts were situated firmly within a distinctive 
British tradition of minority government. This chapter will also seek to set the Callaghan 
Government’s experience into a broader context of the subsequent experiences of minority 
and coalition government in Britain at a national level, up to the post-2010 Coalition and 
future prospect of indecisive election results. This study provides a foundation for further 
research through a new historical minority government perspective which may lead to 
fresh insights into major aspects of British history that are currently the subject of much 
scholarly debate, from the domestic politics of World War One to fundamental notions of 
British traditions of majoritarian democracy throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and early 



























Chapter 2: Contextualising the Callaghan 






















Chapter 2 – Contextualising the Callaghan Government 27 
Having established the scholarly context and methodological approach for this study in the 
Introduction, this chapter will begin by setting out briefly the historical context of the 
Callaghan Government, in terms of the British experience of minority and coalition 
government up until 1974 and also the 1974-79 parliamentary term.  
Following on from this foundation will be an examination of the strategy-making 
process within the two main parties during the Callaghan Government, identifying those 
who contributed and how the state of minority government affected their work and 
methods of operating. Study of these different areas will serve to identify contemporary 
actors’ views of minority government as a distinctly different entity from majority 
governance. Consideration will also be given to how the strategy-making process reflected 
the British tradition of minority government as self-referencing, even when set against an 
international context of minority administrations.  
 
British Minority/Coalition Government before 1974 
 
The British tradition of minority government particularly referenced examples from 
Britain’s own history of minority government when seeking to determine political strategy, 
as illustrated by some of the papers produced during the Callaghan Administration, taking 
in both nineteenth- and twentieth-century precedents. One such paper, produced by the 
Conservatives, drew upon a 1961 textbook on Cabinet Government by Sir Ivor Jennings, 
which highlighted “no less than eleven cases of minority governments since the 1832 
Reform Act”.1 
Although nineteenth-century Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s stricture that 
“England does not love coalitions” has been frequently drawn on when discussing the 
British system of government, political coalitions of different forms have, in fact, played 
significant roles in shaping both the historic experience of minority government and 
modern British politics. Labour and the Conservatives are themselves both historic 
interparty coalitions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century: Labour was formed 
from the trade union movement and was (and still is) allied to the Co-operative party, 
while the Conservatives combined with different parties over time including the Liberal 
Unionists and later the National Liberals. Nevertheless, no new unions had occurred within 
the main parties after the Second World War up to the time of the Callaghan Government 
in 1976, other than the final merger between Conservatives and National Liberals in 1947, 
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While it is debatable as to how far some of the earlier governments in the 
nineteenth century would be comparable as minority administrations to their twentieth-
century counterparts, there is no question that by the late nineteenth century, the 
emergence of disciplined two-party competition, reduction of the monarch’s role in 
choosing government leaders, and reforms including extension of the franchise by the 1867 
Reform Act, significantly increased the importance of securing a legislative majority in 
order to govern. Recurrent features of these minority governments tended to include 
reliance upon tacit or more formalised cooperation with smaller parties and the 
Administrations often being brought down before the end of their term by no confidence 
votes. The twentieth-century British experience of minority governments up to the 1970s 
shared something of these traits, but tended to resolve more into forming coalition 
governments out of perceived emergency situations of wartime or economic crisis. These 
included the Liberal Minority Administration of 1910-15 (which relied tacitly on smaller 
party support before being turned into a wartime coalition) and the first two Labour 




During the late 1970s, political elites and the public were increasingly interested in 
interparty coalition government. However, there was also significant parliamentary 
opposition to formalised cooperation. In Labour and the Conservatives, this opposition was 
something of a deep-seated hostility, partly prompted by the above-cited historic 
experiences of coalition, such as that of the 1930s National Governments, which were still 
largely perceived as a betrayal by Labour MPs and party members. The wartime coalitions 
that had taken place were not usually raised as exemplars, being seen very much as 
exceptional products of necessity which were not comparable to governing in a time of 
peace. Hostility to interparty cooperation was also fostered by a negative view of coalitions 
in other European countries, which were considered to have produced weak governments. 
These countries were, and continue to be, regarded as more consensual than Britain in their 
political culture. While a postwar political consensus on certain issues had existed in 
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Britain, by the 1970s, there was increasing political polarisation and antagonism between 
Labour and the Conservatives. Some of the smaller parties, including the SNP and Plaid 
Cymru, sought to overturn the existing form of governance in their given areas, born out of 
national opposition to the established parties. While the Northern Ireland Unionist parties 
had formed a coalition, this was primarily a platform to contest the 1974 elections, again in 
opposition to the policies of the established parties, with whom they did not wish to be 
seen doing formal deals. Even within the Liberals, the party perhaps most favourably 
disposed to formalised cooperation, there was opposition to interparty deals, expressed, not 





The Wilson and Callaghan Administrations 1974-79 
 
It was particularly Labour’s return to power in 1974 that established the context within 
which the Callaghan Minority Government and opposition parties operated. Edward 
Heath’s Conservative Government of 1970-74 faced significant problems towards its final 
days in office, including the adverse economic effects of the oil crisis which had 
quadrupled prices in 1973, and the political crisis of trade unions striking against 
Government pay restraint policies aimed at curbing inflation. The most noticeable effects 
of the strike were that of limiting electricity supplies for homes and businesses to what 
infamously became known as the ‘3-day week’. Heath called an early General Election in 
February 1974 in an effort to buttress his authority to govern. The result was the first 
Westminster Parliament since 1929 in which no one party had an overall majority. This 
situation led to abortive coalition talks between the Conservatives and the smaller Liberal 




While limited in its ability to take action, the Government nevertheless evolved 
some strategies for coping with being in a minority. They were also able to achieve certain 
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successes in terms of negotiating an end to the strikes, passing some legislation favourable 
to their supporters, and setting out the plans a majority Labour Government would pursue. 
From the outset, Wilson and his advisers, both in Cabinet and in the No. 10 Policy Unit, 
had not regarded minority government as a workable long-term solution, and recognised 
the need for another early election in order to try to obtain a majority. An unprecedented 
number of parliamentary defeats for the Government before the summer recess, seventeen 
in the space of two months, further reinforced this imperative. The election, called by 
Wilson for October 1974, may only have given Labour a majority of three, but this proved 
sufficient to pass a significant amount of legislation over the course of the next two years, 
some of which continues to have significant impact upon present politics, such as the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 or the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
6
 This period also 
marked changes in the leadership and composition of opposition parties. Thatcher replaced 
Heath as Conservative leader on 11 February 1975, while the emergence of scandals in 
1975 forced Liberal leader Jeremy Thorpe to resign during the early days of Callaghan’s 
Ministry on 9 May 1976, and to be replaced by Steel on 7 July. Growing dissatisfaction 
with the two main parties, the rise of nationalism in Scotland and Wales, and increased 
political and civil unrest in Northern Ireland, led to a substantial increase in parliamentary 
representation for smaller political parties, some of which gained seats for the first time in 
1974. These parties held 38 out of the 650 seats, and influenced the options available to 
and challenges faced by the subsequent minority governments.
 7
 
A referendum in 1975 that Labour had promised to hold, concerning Britain’s 
continued membership of the European Economic Community, posed a particular threat to 
the Government’s parliamentary position, being an issue over which the Labour party was 
bitterly divided. Skilful management by Wilson, allowing Labour MPs to take different 
sides, and the support from members of other parties in campaigning, helped to secure a 
decisive victory in the referendum on 6 June 1975, approving Britain’s remaining in the 
Community by more than a two thirds majority, while also holding the Government 
together.
8
 The Government did suffer several parliamentary defeats through rebellions 
during this time, perhaps the most significant of which was on 10 March 1976, when a 
group of left-wing Labour MPs voted with opposition parties to defeat the White Paper 
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detailing the Government’s Expenditure Plans. This defeat was considered as calling into 
question Labour’s ability to govern, and was only settled after Wilson organised and 
successfully managed to win a subsequent confidence vote. Not long after this, Wilson 
shocked both colleagues and commentators by announcing his retirement, triggering a 
contest for a new Labour leader.
9
 
Callaghan became Prime Minister on 5 April 1976, after winning this contest voted 
on by Labour MPs, defeating five other candidates over three ballots. Although new to the 
job, Callaghan could draw upon a wealth of experiences, moving from his humble 
beginnings in Portsmouth (born in 1912), joining the Inland Revenue aged seventeen as a 
clerk, working his way up to tax inspector, helping establish a trade union for tax 
inspectors, being employed as a full time union official from 1936, and serving in World 
War 2 in the Royal Navy. His experience within formal politics up until 1976 was also 
substantial, consisting of thirty years continuous service as a Labour MP, and a long 
ministerial career which had ranged across the whole spectrum of Government, as the only 
person to have held all three Great Offices of State (Chancellor, Home Secretary and 
Foreign Secretary) before becoming Prime Minister. The Government which he headed in 
1976 was similarly very experienced, including Ministers who had served in the Wilson 
Governments of the 1960s and 1970s. From 1974 to 1976, Callaghan was also particularly 
involved with managing Government business and the passage of parliamentary 




Within a day of Callaghan taking office, the defection of sitting Labour MP John 
Stonehouse removed the Government’s de facto majority in Parliament. Although there 
were times thereafter when the Government was more secure than others, whether through 
political manoeuvring, its use of institutional powers, or its agreements with smaller 
parties, it would never again hold a majority in its own right for the remainder of the 
Parliament, up until its eventual defeat in the General Election of 3 May 1979.
11
 
 While summaries of the Callaghan Government have rightly discussed major 
economic or policy events with which leaders had to grapple, it is important always to 
juxtapose these with the precarious parliamentary situation. From April until December 
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1976, the UK faced a worsening economic crisis through devaluation of the currency, 
culminating in Chancellor Denis Healey needing to apply to the International Monetary 
Fund for a bailout in September. Negotiation of the precise terms and a fear that the 
Government could split over the issue led to Callaghan devoting significant time and 
energy to talking the problem through in a marathon series of Cabinet meetings across two 
months. Although the emphasis was primarily extra-parliamentary, seeking a viable 
solution which would prevent the party from splitting, questions over whether an economic 
package would obtain the requisite parliamentary approval in light of the Government not 
having a majority did feature in these discussions.
12
 In May 1976, the finely balanced 
situation in Parliament had led to the breaking of a Pairing agreement on a particularly 
contentious piece of legislation that sought to nationalise the aircraft and shipbuilding 
industries. The resulting breakdown of cooperation between Labour and Conservatives led 
to an environment of uncertainty, where MPs had constantly to be in attendance to avoid or 
attempt to ensure Government defeats in parliamentary votes. An agreement was 
eventually reached in July to restore normal relations. In spite of there not being many 
actual vote losses during this period, Government business had been significantly delayed, 
leading to further conflicts with opposing parties.
13
 
Labour’s unexpected loss of two by-elections in November heightened the 
Government’s vulnerability to parliamentary defeat. Although significant legislation, 
including the Government’s flagship Devolution Bill, had been passed successfully, the 
timetable motion for debates on the Devolution legislation, considered as essential to 
ensure it could be passed without using up what was regarded as too much parliamentary 




A further Government climb down over a vote on Child Benefits led to the 
Conservatives tabling a no confidence motion for 23 March. Facing the prospect of losing 
such a vote, and thereby being forced into an early election which would likely result in 
defeat, the Callaghan Government sought a more formal deal with other smaller parties in 
Parliament, establishing a Pact with the Liberals that would last until the middle of 1978, 
as well as a more informal and publicly denied understanding with some MPs from the 
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UUP.
15
 An internal row in May 1977 broke up the grouping of Northern Ireland Unionists 
(UUUC) into its constituent parties, the culmination of a series of internal divisions.
16
 
The Lib-Lab Pact itself initially had a shaky start, not least in a conflict over 
increasing petrol duty in the Budget, but subsequently held together and allowed the 
Government to survive, not least in a no confidence vote in July. The Pact, initially agreed 
for only a few months, was renewed in the summer of 1977 for a further year. Increasingly 
over time some Liberal party MPs and members became frustrated with the apparent lack 
of Liberal successes within the Pact, other than perhaps that of a scheme to encourage 
profit sharing. These frustrations led to a Special Liberal Conference on 21 January 1978 
which considered ending the Agreement with the Government, but ultimately supported 
Steel’s desire to continue, with the caveat of a majority of the Government supporting a 
Proportional Representation system when deciding on how Direct Elections to the 
European Assembly would be conducted. The PR system was rejected on 26 January 1978 
with a large number of Labour MPs voting against, albeit the Government fulfilling the 
letter of its commitment to consider the proposal. Partly as a result of this decision, the 
Liberals did not renew the Pact in May, and it ended in July 1978.
17
 
The Pact had not completely protected the Government’s legislative programme, 
which suffered a particularly bad spate of defeats during the early months of 1978 as a 
result of rebellions by Labour backbenchers, particularly on Devolution legislation. The 
most notable defeat was perhaps the amendment on 25 January, imposing a 40% minimum 
population turnout of those voting in favour in Scotland and Wales if the result were to be 
considered valid. Government attempts to overturn such changes were unsuccessful, and 
would ultimately wreck their plans for Devolution. In May, some further damaging 
Conservative amendments to the Finance Bill were successfully passed, including cuts to 
income tax and the raising of tax thresholds.
18
 
Throughout 1977 to 1978 especially, both main parties sought to anticipate the 
possible date of an election, taking into account a variety of factors, including the state of 
the economy, local or national holidays, the implementation of politically desirable 
legislation, the proximity of other elections, whether local, European or the Devolution 
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Referenda, and the effect of sporting events such as the Football World Cup in June 1978 
(particularly the fear of SNP gains if Scotland were to be successful).
19
 
A number of factors, including an improving economic situation through late 1977 
into early 1978, the end of the Pact, and Labour gaining in the polls, suggested that 
Callaghan would call an autumn election. There was near universal shock among 
commentators and even within the Government itself when Callaghan went on television 
on 7 September to announce that there would be no autumn election. The Prime Minister’s 
fear was that the best result would not bring Labour a clear Government majority, and that 
it was better to aim for an election in either spring or summer 1979, near the end of the five 
year Parliamentary term. There has been particularly intense speculative debate over 
whether or not Callaghan should have called the election at this point, and whether the 
result in autumn 1978 would have been more favourable to Labour, given the subsequent 
events of late 1978 to early 1979.
20
 
What began as an unofficial strike by workers at the Ford Motor company factories 
in Britain on 22 September later became an official union-backed strike and eventually 
ended two months later with a 16.5% pay rise, far in excess of the recommended 5% 
guidelines published as part of the Government’s Income Policy in July and originally 
stated by Callaghan as early as January. The Government’s proposed response six days 
later, that of imposing sanctions on Ford and other companies who had broken the limit, 
was put to Parliament on 13 December and defeated, resulting in the public abandonment 
of sanctions as an option. Although sanctions may have been seen as questionable in their 
effectiveness, even by contemporaries, the parliamentary defeat and the example set by 
Ford and other firms opened the way for further industrial action by workers in the public 
and private sector, demanding settlements far above the Government’s notional target. A 
series of strikes or threatened strikes from December 1978 to February 1979, described by 
contemporaries and encapsulated in popular folklore as the ‘Winter of Discontent’, had 
significant impact, compounded by harsh weather of snow drifts and blizzards across the 
country in what was the coldest winter for sixteen years. Official and unofficial strikes of 
professions whose work had particularly tangible impact on people’s everyday lives – 
petrol tanker drivers, lorry drivers, ambulance drivers, grave diggers, refuse collectors, to 
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name but a few – and the Government’s apparent inability to respond, served significantly 
to undermine Labour’s political support. Even where these strikes were perhaps more 
localised, as with the Liverpool and Tameside grave diggers, media coverage gave them 
nationwide impact, such as the emotive television pictures of coffins remaining unburied. 
Although an agreement between Government and Unions was eventually reached by 14 
February, it did not significantly help to regain voters’ trust over the following months, 
with some strikes continuing to occur into April, not least, for example, those of 




Against such a backdrop, the Devolution Referenda were conducted on 1 March, 
leading as was widely expected to a No Vote in Wales, but, perhaps surprisingly given 
hostility to the Government and Callaghan, whose image had been widely used in the 
campaign, a small majority Yes Vote in Scotland. Nevertheless, this result was insufficient 
to reach the 40% turnout criteria established by backbench Labour rebels, requiring the 
Government to repeal the Act. Attempts by Government leaders to talk with other parties 
and to find some way of continuing to bring in Scottish Devolution were not considered 
satisfactory by the SNP, who subsequently ceased their support for the Government, 
leaving Labour without a majority, and called for a vote of no confidence. The 




The resulting vote came on 28 March 1979, preceded by frantic efforts of the 
Opposition to marshal their supporters and by Government Ministers and Whips 
attempting to make last-minute deals that would stave off defeat. In the end, the 
Government lost by one vote, 311 to 310, becoming the first Administration since the 
Labour Minority Government of 1924 to lose a vote of no confidence and thereby be 
forced out of office. After what has been described as a largely uneventful election 
campaign, the Conservative Opposition won the General Election on 3 May 1979 with 
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Strategy-Making Process 
Labour and the Conservatives 
 
It is against this backdrop of the Government’s lifecycle as a minority that this study seeks 
to consider the development of strategy. In many cases, parties developed responses or 
methods for dealing with given parliamentary situations that were never codified, or there 
are instances of written strategy papers which remained unimplemented or even 
unconsidered by a party’s leadership. The myriad of different individuals and organisations 
within both parties participating in the formulation of plans and policies also serves 
sometimes to confuse studies of strategy. 
Nevertheless, by examining the strategy development processes and responses to 
the Callaghan Minority Government, this study will demonstrate that both main parties did, 
in fact, attempt to develop more formalised strategies to deal with the state of no one party 
having a majority. 
The implementation of parliamentary strategies and electoral planning were largely 
centred upon the leadership of the respective parties. While the discussion below will detail 
the different decision-making bodies in both main parties, a few individuals or groups will 
be singled out as the primary directors of parliamentary strategy and those considering the 
issues surrounding minority government. This is not to disparage the important work done 
by other individuals and groups in the two parties during this period, but rather to 
concentrate upon the particular minority government focus of this study. There were a 
number of other political actors providing significant input into the process of forming 
strategy for coping with particular aspects of minority government, but not necessarily 
other areas, who will be referred to either in the discussion below or in subsequent 
chapters. In addition, there were groups who also sometimes advanced competing 
strategies within the two main parties, but who primarily were either not involved directly 
in deciding upon Parliamentary strategy, or else did not have their strategies used by the 
respective party leaderships. This study will seek to highlight some of these approaches 
where they served as a counterpoint to the more established strategic discourse, and, in 
some cases, influenced the strategies pursued. 
Given the 1974 experience of minority government in Britain, it is worth briefly 
considering the impact of this and other above-cited events in terms of the formulation of 
strategy during the Callaghan Administration. The 1974 Wilson Government, the first 
minority government in Britain for more than forty-five years, had presented both Labour 
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and the Conservatives with significant gaps in terms of their own recent experience, and a 
comparatively sparse theoretical scholarship to draw on. To some extent, these experiences 
and investigations provided a useful foundation for those working during the Callaghan 
Administration. It is, however, difficult to ascertain precisely how much of the material 
developed during 1974 was made use of from 1976 onwards. Some of the leading figures 
on both sides who had confronted questions of strategy in 1974 had retired or been 
replaced in the interim, including both party leaders, the Government Chief Whip, the 
Leader of the House of Commons, both Party Chairmen and figures from the different 
internal party strategy-making bodies. Significant differences in the formation and 
parliamentary experiences of the Wilson and Callaghan Governments further limited the 
possibility for strategic crossover. While occasional references were made to the 
experience of 1974 decision-makers, there are only one or two citations of previous papers 
being directly consulted when formulating minority government strategy.
24
  
One of the methods typically used by political parties to adapt strategically to a new 
situation has been the tasking of an individual or formation of a committee or unit to aid 
with planning responses, such as the establishment of the Conservatives’ Tactical Staff 
Committee in 1947, following Labour’s historic landslide electoral victory of 1945. In 
spite of the prolonged period of minority government in the Callaghan Administration, 
there is no evidence to suggest that either main party established any special unit that was 
dedicated specifically to addressing questions of minority government. The only instance 
of a body being established which most closely approaches this model is that of the 
Conservative ‘Party Strategy Group’, created by Heath during 1974. The stated aim of the 
group was to facilitate consideration of longer-term political issues, considering, amongst 
other things, minority government questions and radical ideas of interparty cooperation 
with the Liberals, such as through establishing an electoral pact. The group was disbanded 
for largely political reasons shortly after Thatcher became leader in 1975.
25
 
On the Government side in 1976, the overall direction of parliamentary strategy 
was decided upon by the Prime Minister in consultation with Cabinet ministers, either on 
an individual or small committee basis, or in regular meetings of the full Cabinet. As 
Leader of the House of Commons, Michael Foot was principally responsible for 
formulating the details of the Government’s legislative programme, which would then be 
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approved by the Cabinet. Foot then also helped to set and manage the timetable of 
legislation in Parliament, along with the Government’s Chief Whip, Michael Cocks. The 
party Whips were largely responsible for ensuring the implementation of the Government’s 
legislative programme, through communication with and monitoring of the activities of 
MPs and opposition parties. Other individuals and groups had particular input into the 
strategic process through providing advice to Government leaders; including the then 
recently formalised incorporation of Special Advisers for Ministers.
26
 
There were a number of innovations relating to these traditional strategy-making 
arrangements, changing the way in which they operated to accommodate the exigencies of 
minority government. While the setting up of some of these groups and arrangements pre-
dated the Callaghan Administration and were significantly influenced by other factors, 
their operation in the strategy-making process was conditioned, altered by, and often 
concerned with, the problems posed by minority government. Cabinet discussions spent an 
increasing amount of time considering parliamentary strategy, and how to approach the 
problems of minority government, something of which is captured by the recording of 
debates in minutes and memoranda, as well as by contemporary recollections, such as a 
1976 entry in the diary of the Head of the No. 10 Policy Unit, Dr Bernard Donoughue: 
 
“Thursday, 24 June 1976 
Cabinet, mainly on ‘Parliamentary Business’. It is quite striking how, compared to 
two years ago, this item has expanded in Cabinet business. Discussing how to 
manage our Commons minority now sometimes takes over an hour.”27 
 
Foot’s formulation of the parliamentary legislative programme included chairing 
discussions of the Government’s Future Legislation Committee, which assumed an 
increasingly important role in considering how to tailor the legislative programme to the 
problems of not having a majority. Alongside the traditional liaison between Government 
leaders and the Chief Whip, a series of direct meetings were set up between Callaghan and 
the Whips to discuss strategies for maintaining a majority. The possibility of these 
meetings had already been discussed under Wilson in 1975, but were first realised under 
Callaghan and assumed increasing importance in the situation of minority government, 
also taking in wider aspects of strategy, such as electoral timing. When Special Advisers 
were first introduced in 1974, the Government leadership was particularly hostile to their 
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participation in policymaking outwith their respective Departments. In stark contrast, the 
latter stages of the Callaghan Government saw the establishment of formal meetings 
between the Special Advisers to Ministers from all Departments, chaired by Foot, in order 
to discuss, amongst other matters, broader questions of Government strategy, including 
aspects relating to minority government and electoral timing. In addition, Callaghan made 
significant use of the No. 10 Policy Unit, introduced under Wilson in 1974 as a group of 
Government-appointed experts, who continued to produce papers for the Prime Minister on 
issues facing the Government, including on questions of policy and strategy. Being created 
at the inauguration of the 1974 Wilson Minority Government, the Policy Unit had been put 
to work on maintaining a Government majority and on the particulars of legislative 
strategy. A number of the papers that were produced by the Unit under Callaghan sought to 
address questions posed by minority government, such as the prospect of greater interparty 
cooperation and the forecasting of the likely future survival of the Government. An 
important illustration of the work on minority government done by the Policy Unit is given 
by one of its members, David Lipsey, who had previously served as a Government Special 
Adviser until mid-1977. His papers for the Prime Minister included analysing the possible 
implications of the Lib-Lab Pact, as well as considering potential courses of action 
following a further indecisive General Election.
28
 
 It is sometimes difficult precisely to differentiate between the traditional civil 
service role of providing non-political advice to the Government and what effectively 
amounts to political strategy. This has become something of an issue among 
commentators, not least when considering Britain’s 2010 coalition formation. The Prime 
Minister’s support from the civil service in 1976 was most notably that from Kenneth 
Stowe, the Cabinet Secretary, and John Hunt, Callaghan’s Principal Private Secretary. For 
the most part, the advice provided by Stowe and Hunt represented the traditional setting 
out of options in a non-political way, rather than specifically becoming involved in 
political strategy. At the same time, both give a window into the strategy development 
process for minority government, not least through the recording of conversations and 
meetings, such as those between Callaghan and Steel during the Lib-Lab Pact, or in 
discussions about the minority situation with Callaghan themselves.
29
 Another body of 
civil servants which had a particular contribution was the Central Policy Review Staff 
(CPRS), created by Heath in 1971. Callaghan found the CPRS to be particularly useful in 
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terms of producing long-term and detailed considerations of issues and potential policies, 
not least responses to the economic crisis in 1976. However, while the work of the CPRS 
was affected by the state of minority government, their contribution towards what was 
specifically political strategy was limited. In one of the few instances where a CPRS paper 
discussed future questions that had implications for minority government strategy, 
considered in Chapter 5, it was largely passed over by the Cabinet.
30
 
The main alternative strategy-making body in the Labour party was that of the 
National Executive Committee, elected by the party membership, whose duties included 
monitoring policymaking and drawing up the manifesto. During this period, the frequent 
conflicts between the Labour Government leadership and the NEC over issues of policy 
and party management led to the emergence of alternative strategies in a number of 
different areas. For the most part, the Government leadership pursued its own strategies in 
terms of parliamentary management and the NEC’s emphasis was on policy 
implementation rather than minority government. In spite of this focus, the NEC and its 
subcommittees, particularly Labour’s International Department, did spend some time 
considering questions of minority government, although, as discussed further below, they 




There were also bodies within or attached to the Labour Party, which, in addition to 
serving as alternative sources of power or sometimes conflict with the leadership, acted as 
focal points for strategy-making. While these groups were primarily concerned more with 
policymaking and implementation, questions relating to minority government were 
sometimes raised. These groups included bodies formally constituted by Labour, including 
the Backbench Liaison Committee and TUC-Liaison Committee involving trade union 
leaders, as well as groups of MPs pursuing the implementation of a particular ideological 
agenda within the Labour party, including the more long-established left-wing Tribune 
Group and more right-wing Manifesto Group (which was set up in December 1974 
following Wilson’s Minority Government). The membership of these different groups also 
sometimes overlapped with that of decision-makers in other bodies more directly involved 
in minority government strategy, including Cabinet Ministers. Weekly meetings of all the 
Parliamentary Labour Party MPs served to provide a forum for groups within the party to 
air their respective strategic approaches to minority government. There are one or two 
insights that may be gained from these discussions, although often contributions were more 
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as expressions of frustration with legislative concessions made to other parties, or with 
decisions over Government policy that fitted into wider pre-existing divisions and conflicts 
over philosophy, rather than necessarily arising from the minority government situation.
32
 
While the Party Conference and affiliated Trade Unions had an important role and 
provided significant input into Government policymaking, their contributions did not 
normally address minority government questions beyond general endorsement or criticism 
of the Government’s approach, along with the desire for implementation of particular 
policies. Labour’s Research Department similarly concentrated largely on policymaking 
and did not apparently consider strategic questions of minority government.
33
 
After the inauguration of the Lib-Lab Pact in 1977, Government strategy-making 
also had to incorporate the Consultative Committee, bilateral meetings between ministers 
and Liberal spokespersons, and the private meetings between the party leaders Callaghan 




Although the Conservative Opposition did not face the same challenges of 
attempting to get legislation passed, the state of minority government posed unique 
challenges which also served to affect their process of strategy formation. Conservative 
leaders typically had fewer formal restrictions placed upon their conduct than that of the 
institutions faced by Labour party leaders. Nevertheless, there were a number of different 
groups and organisations within and outside the Conservative Party that contributed to the 
formulation of strategy. 
When first confronted with the new reality of minority government in 1974, the 
Conservative Research Department (CRD) and other individuals had been tasked to search 
for academic literature on the subject of minority government. Very few useful guides 
were found by these individuals, the most relevant identified within a month as being an 
article published in 1973 on Canadian minority government, which does not appear to have 
featured thereafter in subsequent planning. Alongside this, the earliest meetings of the new 
Steering Committee sought to consider strategic questions ranging from whether or not to 
stress the minority nature of the government, the balancing of backbench Conservative 
desire for confrontation with a public mood of giving the Government ‘a chance to 
govern’, and comparable historical precedents. The resulting approach was one of mainly 
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opposing through speeches and avoiding voting against the government, building on the 
withdrawal from confrontation over the Queen’s Speech.35 
In 1976, there does not appear to have been the same initial search for a minority 
government strategy. Thatcher largely shaped the direction of overall parliamentary 
strategy, in discussion with small numbers of parliamentary colleagues or in the full 
Shadow Cabinet (formally known as the Leaders Consultative Committee while in 
Opposition) on a weekly or more regular basis. In addition, there was a formalised 
Leader’s Steering Committee, something of an inner Shadow Cabinet, that also included 
other figures from within the Conservative leadership, and met to consider wider questions 
of strategy, addressing such issues as how to respond to specific Government policy 
decisions, studying internal briefing papers, and deciding on the focus of campaigns and 
publicity. The CRD contributed significant work to the strategy-making process, both in 
terms of the detail of policymaking and papers on broader strategy. Although it was largely 
staffed by those loyal to the previous Administration and distrusted by the Thatcher 
leadership, the CRD continued to play an important role during the Conservatives’ time in 
opposition in the late 1970s. Prior to Conservative electoral victory, Thatcher’s hold on the 
party remained tenuous, and her own pragmatic style limited far-reaching organisational 
changes in the early stages. As a result, CRD input to strategy-making could still prove 
important in certain areas, not least in providing briefing in terms of parliamentary 
strategy, and establishing frameworks for Shadow Cabinet discussions. There were, in 
addition, other committees within the Conservative Party, whose work came to involve 
aspects of minority government strategy, including that of the Directors’ meetings and the 
Party Chairman’s committee. 36 
As with the Government, a number of additional groups were also formed or re-
formed during this period in the Conservatives, including the Co-ordinating Committee 
chaired by Thatcher’s close ally Keith Joseph. Although not specifically created to deal 
with minority government, this committee was tasked to examine, amongst other things, 
Conservative contingency plans in the event of a future ‘hung parliament’ and possibilities 
for minority government or coalition.
37
  
Other bodies from outside the Conservative Party that were more ideologically 
aligned with Thatcher, including the Centre for Policy Studies, particularly instrumental in 
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formulating future Conservative policymaking, were not involved so much in day-to-day 
parliamentary management, although some of their contributions had relevance to planning 
for a future minority government.
38
 
Some Labour Party bodies and internal groupings were mirrored within the 
Conservative Party. These groups similarly did not tend to address questions of minority 
government directly, focusing more on policies and electoral success, whether in terms of 
the Party Conference, or internal groupings of MPs pursuing the fulfilment of particular 
political programmes. The regular meetings of the powerful Conservative 1922 committee, 
containing all the party’s backbenchers, may similarly be regarded as a counterpart to PLP 
meetings, in terms of expressing views regarding party management, while not necessarily 
focusing particularly on the minority government question. The committee did, however, 
have added influence in terms of the contacts maintained with the Conservative leadership 
by its proactive executive members. The largely undocumented nature of these contacts 
makes it more difficult to assess their contribution to the strategy-making process.
39
 
 Both main political parties’ strategies for dealing with minority government were 
also affected by the smaller parties with MPs in Parliament. Although the emphasis of this 
study is on the strategy-making of the two main parties, these other parties play an integral 
role in the following chapters, particularly those on interparty cooperation and plans for 
future minority or coalition government. Some of these parties did themselves engage in 
significant discussion and codification of strategies relating to minority and coalition 
government, particularly the Liberals, which has to some extent been explored by scholars 
examining the history of the Liberal Party as a whole or the history of coalition 
government in the UK. At the same time, for some of these parties, who had only gained 
parliamentary seats in the 1970s, strategy-making processes were still very much in their 
early stages of development, lacking the resources for the same record-making and keeping 
of the major parties. Where such records are available, these do not necessarily examine 
the question of minority government as a distinct entity. More detailed examination of 
these parties’ strategy-making across modern British political history, and their approach to 
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International inspiration  
 
While both main parties during the Callaghan Administration had greater interaction with 
their international counterparts than their predecessors, and conducted greater observation 
of minority governments in other countries than is commonly recognised, the records of 
their discussions concerning how to cope with the minority government situation appear 
only to have drawn upon their own recent history and past British experiences when 
formulating strategy.  
In other countries, a state of minority or coalition government has frequently 
pushed parties to draw upon the history of their country’s previous traditions and 
experiences of minority or coalition administrations as a source of precedents and to 
provide lessons for strategy formulation. Where such a tradition has not previously existed 
or is not considered relevant to present circumstances, party leaders or strategists may try 
to examine comparable recent experiences in the politics of other countries. There was 
certainly no shortage of instances of centre-left minority governments occurring in the 
early 1970s which may have served as potential exemplars, from that of Trygve Bratteli’s 
minority Labour Governments in Norway between 1971-72, and 1973-76, to that of Pierre 
Trudeau’s Liberal Canadian Administration in 1974.41  
Both Labour and the Conservatives had well-established International Departments 
within their party bureaucracies which monitored political developments in other countries 
and produced reports. Tom McNally, who served as Callaghan’s political adviser and head 
of the Political Office in No. 10, was himself a former head of Labour’s International 
Department. There were also many instances during this period in which party leaders and 
those advising them met with their counterparts from other countries. The 1970s witnessed 
a period of growing cooperation among parties internationally, partly facilitated by the 
reduced costs of interaction through increasing advancements in air travel and 
telecommunications, as well as the growing importance of transnational bodies including 
the European Economic Community. Both Labour and the Conservatives were important 
participants in the setting up or maintaining of party organisations in this context, whether 
within the European Parliament or at an extra-parliamentary level globally. However, 
while there are some recorded instances of the Government and Opposition leaders raising 
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the question of minority government in their discussion or correspondence with their 
international counterparts, these show little more than acknowledgement of the situation, 
rather than indicating any desire to seek or to engage in strategic exchange. In spite of 
occasional references in Government and Opposition official papers and diaries which 
recognised some of the above-cited minority governments in other countries, there is no 
indication that these translated into any significant impact on their subsequent 
contributions to strategy-making. There were some instances recorded of parties seeking 
greater cooperation with their counterparts in terms of strategy-making, whether in the 
European Parliament or globally, but, again, there is no direct indication of these 
interactions providing input into the process of strategy-making for domestic minority 
government. Such examples are conspicuously absent from strategy papers dealing directly 
with questions of minority government. In these cases, almost all examples drawn upon are 
of previous British experiences during the twentieth century.
42
 
When Labour and the Conservatives considered facilitating transnational 
cooperation with ideologically similar parties, discussions were always framed as distinct 
and separate from the interparty cooperative dimension of domestic politics. A possible 
reason for this division may have been the fear that drawing comparisons with other 
political systems where minority or coalition governments were an accepted norm would 
give greater legitimacy to such alternative governing arrangements in Britain.
43
 One such 
example of this mindset may be seen during the Lib-Lab Pact in April 1977. While 
debating plans for Direct Elections to the European Parliament, initial notions of the 
Government making a positive recommendation of PR for these elections were shelved, 
not least reflecting the fear of some Cabinet members that:  
 
“Substantial Liberal representation in the Assembly would greatly strengthen the 
pressure for proportional representation in our national elections”44 
 
Such fears were further elaborated at a subsequent meeting: 
 
                                                 
42
 See, for example, CAC (Churchill Archives Centre): THCR 2/1/6/194: Appendix E, ‘The Hung 
Parliament’, 12 April 1978; CPA: CRD/L/4/46/6, ‘The Hung Parliament Contingency’, 16 March 1978; LCC 
1/3/15, 200
th
 Meeting, 19 April 1978; Callaghan Papers, Box 19, 2737: Lab/Elec: 78-79, David Lipsey to the 
Prime Minister, 2 May 1979; ‘In the Event of Deadlock’, 2 May 1979; A. Brazier, and S. Kalitowski (eds), 
No Overall Control?, pp. 83-93; N. J. Crowson, The Conservative Party and European Integration Since 
1945: At the Heart of Europe (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 125, 192-4; A. Seldon and K. Hickson (eds), 
New Labour, Old Labour, pp. 176-7; T. Benn, Against the Tide, p. 150. See infra, pp. 107, 141. 
43
 TNA: CAB 128/61, 5
th
 Meeting, 10 February 1977; 8
th
 Meeting, 25 February 1977; G. R. Searle, Country 
Before Party, pp. 251-4, 259. See infra, pp. 46, 93. 
44
 TNA: CAB 17
th
 Meeting, 28 April 1977. 
Chapter 2 – Contextualising the Callaghan Government 46 
“a recommendation in favour of proportional representation for European 
Assembly elections would inevitably be regarded as foreshadowing proportional 
representation at Westminster. It would accordingly provoke united opposition 
from opponents of the system and from opponents of our membership of the 
Community, and it would be seen as gravely damaging to the interests of the 
Labour Party. It would transform the British Party system paving the way for 
coalitions and the undermining of the legitimacy of Governments. These 
consequences were too high a price to pay for Liberal support”.45  
 
It is noteworthy that the term ‘hung parliament’, often adopted as a descriptor or title of the 
relevant internal party papers concerning strategy, was first created and used during the 
1970s in response to the Wilson and Callaghan Minority Governments, as a derogatory 
reference to the perceived powerlessness and weakness of these Administrations. It is also 
worth noting that those parties, including the Liberals, who most favoured the idea of 
‘hung’ or, as they described them ‘balanced’ parliaments, were also the ones who were 
unafraid to draw upon and acknowledge international examples in their internal strategy 





The Wilson Minority Government of 1974 compelled both main parties to confront the 
challenges of non-majority governance, as well as establishing the only recent British 
experience available to the Callaghan Administration and Opposition. The events of 1974-
76 further set up the overarching political and economic conditions within which the 
Callaghan Government was formed and which affected their planning. The subsequent life 
cycle of the Callaghan Government cited above, provides the structure for the subsequent 
chapters of this study, from the Government’s formation in 1976 to its dissolution in 1979. 
While the existence of minority government from 1976 onwards did not lead to the 
establishment of new dedicated strategy-making bodies in the two main parties, it 
contributed to the methods of operation for other newly established strategy-making 
groups and had a significant effect on long-established groups when considering strategic 
questions. 
Although utilising the experience of international political counterparts and seeking 
to facilitate greater transnational cooperation, both Labour and the Conservatives showed a 
continued reluctance during this period to draw comparisons with, and experience from, 
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other political systems when framing their responses to strategic questions of minority or 
coalition government, possibly fearing the idea of these then being legitimised as norms in 
the British system. As such, Government and Opposition tended to draw upon examples 
exclusively, whether consciously or subconsciously, from the British tradition of minority 
government when presenting their papers to decision-makers, encapsulating an 
understanding of the British experience and political system as being exceptional and 
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Several assumptions across the academic literature concerning 1970s British politics have 
affected the understanding of the unique British experience of minority government. Three 
assumptions in particular have served to shape analysis of Callaghan’s Minority 
Administration of 1976-79:  
 Labour’s continuing in office as a minority government was inevitable after first 
losing their majority in April 1976; 
 some of the preceding Labour majority governments during the 1960s and 1970s 
were essentially similar to minority administrations because of their small 
majorities and internal party divisions; 
 there was a general absence of strategy-making by Labour and the Conservatives 
for dealing with the state of minority government.  
Even some of the more recent works that have given greater recognition to the importance 
of the minority status of the Callaghan Government do not engage in significant analysis of 
the government formation process, nor do they consider potential alternative outcomes.
1
 
Having established the context for this study in the two preceding chapters, it is 
important to begin by interrogating and correcting the assumptions set out in the bullet 
points above regarding the formation of the Callaghan Government. In this analysis, 
contrary to first impressions, Callaghan’s Administration actually does not fit neatly either 
into either orthodox or revisionist theoretical models of minority government. The 
Callaghan Government is, therefore, an important case study in its own right, highlighting 
the often unrecognised and unique British tradition of minority government. The chapter 
will consider in detail the process of the Callaghan Government’s formation in April 1976 
and possible alternative outcomes to a minority government.
2
  
Confusion over the precise dates of Callaghan’s Administration as a Minority 
Government, both in theory and in practice, has contributed to the notion of the 
inevitability with regard to its formation: Stonehouse’s defection on 7 April 1976 is often 
identified as the formal beginning of the Minority Government, while other scholars cite 
Labour’s actual loss of a working majority as resulting from defeats in by-elections during 
December 1976. However, the formal entry into a state of minority began on 7 April 1976, 
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and remained thereafter until the fall of the Government in a confidence vote on 28 March 
1979 and subsequent defeat in the General Election on 3 May 1979. As such, this study 
will take the defection of Stonehouse as the starting point, because it is the first moment 
when the Government was identified by opposition parties as having lost the parliamentary 
majority that it previously had, on paper, and in the minds of contemporary commentators. 
Although the Government was able to command a majority through opposition parties’ 
disunity, the non-voting of certain MPs, or interparty deals including the Lib-Lab Pact, 
none of these arrangements, in practice, altered the Government’s position of being 




Forming the Callaghan Government 
 
The above-cited assumptions have helped negate analysis of the important process of 
government formation, beyond considering Callaghan’s election as party leader, his 
character, and some of the aspects of his early days as the new Prime Minister. Analysis of 
these early days has included such areas as reshuffling ministerial portfolios, particularly 
those of the Cabinet, and dealing with an emerging economic crisis. While more recent 
works have given some greater recognition to Callaghan’s loss of a parliamentary majority, 
the formation process is still unquestioningly regarded as inevitable.
4
 
 In part, this scholarly omission understandably reflects the greater focus on the 
change of government leader immediately preceding the loss of a government majority, the 
surprise resignation of Wilson and the politics of the fiercely contested Labour party 
leadership election which followed. The omission is also reflective of a perception of there 
being little real difference between a government with a very slim majority and a 
government lacking a theoretical or working majority by only a handful of seats. Labour’s 
governing experiences in 1964-66 and 1974-76 would appear to lend credence to this idea; 
a majority of up to only four seats in the House of Commons, along with arguments within 
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Testing Callaghan’s Administration against both the Riker-led orthodox and Strom-
led revisionist scholarship established in the Introductory Chapter, would, at first glance, 
appear to confirm the idea that Labour’s continuation as a minority government was 
inevitable. The Government appeared to fulfil conditions set out in these theoretical 
approaches that predisposed it toward minority administration rather than any alternative 
form of government such as a coalition.
6
 In many ways the Callaghan Government and 
political system within which it operated reflected the orthodox position on minority 
administrations, not least that of representing an unusual (deviant) case in a country which 
had normally produced single-party majority governments over the preceding decades. 
Decision-makers in the main parties also did not regard themselves as having any 
established British tradition of coalition formation outside of wartime. Indeed, the only 
reference made by an MP in Parliament to a possible British coalition government in April 
1976 was in Conservative backbencher Sir Raymond Gower’s denial that he was 
advocating one in the face of economic turmoil.
7
 Britain’s one major instance of peacetime 
coalition up until that point, responding to economic emergency through a National 
Government in the 1930s, was frequently cited by contemporary policymakers in both 
main parties as an experience to avoid repeating. Britain also appeared to fit the criteria of 
party fractionalization, smaller parties seeking to challenge the established political 
settlement, having gained a significant number of seats in Parliament after the 1974 
elections. When trying to secure a parliamentary majority for passing legislation, whether 
on a vote-by-vote basis or in formation of the Lib-Lab Pact, the Callaghan Government 
mindset appears to have been one of securing a rational choice ‘minimal winning’ position, 
even on legislation of major constitutional importance.
8
 
At the same time, the Callaghan Government’s formation also clearly shared some 
characteristics identified by more revisionist theoreticians of minority government. In 
many cases, minority governments formed in other countries may be a significant number 
of seats short of having a legislative majority, possessing only 40% of parliamentary seats, 
or, even, in some cases, as little as 15-20%.
9
 By contrast, Labour in 1976 was only, at 
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most, a few seats short of an overall majority in a Parliament of 635 members, echoing 
Taylor and Laver’s theory of being ‘almost a majority government’ in practice.10  
Other structural aspects of the revisionist models were also present. The opposition 
in the British Parliaments of the 1970s was divided between Conservatives, Liberals, and a 
combination of parties including nationalists from Scotland and Wales, and unionists and 
republicans from Northern Ireland, making it less likely to be able to form an alternative 
coalition to the government. Britain’s institutional setups would also appear to have 
favoured minority rather than coalition government in the case of indecisive electoral 
results. The negative framing of investiture rules allowed for a government to exist merely 
if tolerated by the opposition, while de facto near-absolute government control over 
timetabling business in the House of Commons, committee appointments, the absence of 
independent bodies capable of vetoing policies, and significant administrative powers 
granted to Ministers through the crown prerogative, strengthened the Government’s 




Callaghan Government – A Special Case 
 
However, while all these factors had an important influence, they by no means inevitably 
determined the formation and operation of the Government. Callaghan’s Administration 
actually differed significantly from these theoretical norms and even from previous British 
experience of minority governments, making it particularly important as a case study, not 
only for British history, but also for the study of wider minority government theory and the 
formation of minority administrations internationally. Unlike most administrations 
considered throughout minority government theory, Callaghan’s Administration formed 
after losing its majority during a parliamentary term through by-elections and the defection 
of MPs, rather than as a result of a General Election or coalition break-up. The 
Government’s formation actually ran contrary to twentieth-century British precedents, all 
four instances of minority governments up until 1976 having been formed in the period 
immediately following General Elections, whereas the formation of a new Government 
mid-way through a parliamentary term had, on five occasions, resulted in coalitions, in 
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spite of certain sections of the main political parties standing opposed to such an outcome. 
Much theoretical discussion has concentrated purely on the political leadership, 
considering parties as united actors, with an assumed high level of homogeneity. Party 
leaderships acted as the main coordinators of parliamentary strategy during this period, 
and, as such, will be the primary focus of this study. At the same time, however, parties 
represented in Parliament during the Callaghan Administration, whether in Government or 
opposition, suffered from deep-seated divisions which frequently manifested themselves, 
and served to influence the power dynamics and political interactions. The approaches 
pursued thereby did not necessarily represent the rational considerations of a single 
political actor, but were rather the end product of a complex series of negotiations between 
actors within the same party pursuing their own particular set of objectives. Different 
actors also considered alternative strategies which, even if not enacted, formed part of the 
debate and remained as potential options in the event of the situation changing.
12
 
Labour’s continuance as a minority government in April 1976 was the most likely 
course of action, but was not inevitable. A number of alternatives existed, some of which 
were given greater consideration by the Government while others were rejected. These 
potential alternatives included that of Callaghan calling an early election, an agreement 
between opposition parties to bring down the Government in a confidence vote or even to 
form an alternative government, or the formation of a coalition by the incumbent 
Government to retain their majority. Examining why these courses of action were not 
pursued will give something of an insight into the formulation of strategy, and establish the 
context within which subsequent responses to the situation of minority government were 




Minority governments in other countries have often pursued the escape route of calling an 
early election, when their strategists calculate there to be an opportunity to win a 
legislative majority, whether or not this actually turns out to be the case. Alternatively, the 
loss of a majority may compel a government to seek an early election, if it leaves them 
unable to continue passing the legislation necessary in order to govern. While it is certainly 
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the case that governments with small majorities in postwar Britain tended to experience 
difficulties in passing controversial legislation and facing the prospect of early General 
Elections, minority government as experienced in 1976 was recognised as a different 
entity, reflected in both the perceptions and practices of contemporary political actors. The 
minority government definition was initially resisted by the Government, who continued 
largely to adhere to majoritarian principles, as discussed further in the chapter on ‘Defeats 
and Legislative Management’. However, Government leaders were forced to acknowledge 
the changed situation. These perceptions of a distinct difference appear not only in the 
public language of parliamentary debates or press releases from early April 1976 onwards, 
but also in the subsequent private correspondence between Callaghan and other world 
leaders, the Prime Minister having to explain the loss of the Government’s majority, as 
well as in Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet discussions beginning in April 1976 of how to deal 
with the ‘new’ minority situation.13 When faced with difficulties of getting a major piece 
of legislation through in June, the Cabinet emphasised that “the first need was to restore 
the Government’s majority”. A Cabinet Memorandum in May by Foot on the 
Government’s Legislative Programme recognised that the absence of a majority would 
make it more difficult to get certain legislation passed, providing detailed charts that 
prioritised some Bills, while also providing an assessment of some possible compromises 
that could be made.
14
 
Callaghan’s message upon entering office did not, contrary to some perceptions, 
completely reject the possibility of an early election, although it was framed very much 
within a traditional British majoritarian view of the parliamentary system, emphasising the 
Government’s relative strength over opposing parties and mandate to govern. Callaghan’s 
public address to Labour MPs on becoming Prime Minister on 6 April 1976 included 
highlighting that, in spite of their overall majority being small, their position relative to the 
main opposition party was strong, possessing “a majority over the Tories of 40” and “We 
can and we shall continue to govern”.15 On 8 April, in a debate following the defection 
which had taken away Labour’s majority, Callaghan responded to an interruption in his 
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answer to a question by baiting the Opposition with an ambiguous jibe about their fears of 
his calling an early election.
16
 Answering a further question on 29 April, Callaghan’s 
apparent denial of a possible early election was not emphatic, but rather made conditional 
on the Government’s ability to continue to get its legislation passed. These statements and 
others were not a categorical rejection of an early poll, certainly not when contrasted with 
Callaghan’s clear message two years later which ended speculation of an election in the 
autumn of 1978. Callaghan’s public acknowledgement of the conditional state of 
governance, albeit in a manner aiming for the greatest room for manoeuvre, showed 
recognition of changes in the political reality and the possible need for contingency 
planning in light of his precarious parliamentary situation. Although most among the 
Government leadership leaned away from embarking upon an early election, some were 
considering the possibility in April 1976, weighing up a number of different factors. Foot’s 
remarks to a local election rally on 5 May 1976, seeking an early election “as speedily as 
we can get it sensibly, in which we can get a full and proper majority in the House of 
Commons”, prompted calls by the Opposition for an early election and a denial by the 
Prime Minister two days later.
17
 It is difficult to ascertain whether this was a genuine 
reflection of Foot’s view, or a remark taken out of context. As cited above, Foot was 
already recognising and emphasising potential challenges when discussing legislative 
strategy in April and May Cabinet meetings, and bore great responsibility for dealing with 
these issues, not least in his role managing the already difficult passage of legislation 
which had been compounded by the absence of a majority.
18
 
When considering electoral timing in more detail, as shall be seen in a subsequent 
chapter, those formulating strategy in both parties tended to attach particular weight to 
recent British political history, which, in April 1976, offered something of a mixed set of 
results for governments calling early elections. Wilson had successfully used early 
dissolutions to bolster his majority in 1966 and to transform a minority government into a 
majority in October 1974, but, equally, had lost after going early in 1970, as had Heath 
after an early election in February 1974 (albeit as much on account of the Government’s 
handling of the industrial crisis as the earliness of the election itself).
19
 Although the loss of 
the Government majority was from the outset portrayed by opposition parties as a sign of 
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failure, Labour’s leadership election and Callaghan’s recent takeover as Prime Minister 
had been greeted as a positive change, and potentially provided both a momentum for a 
campaign and a legitimate reason for an election. Eden had sought an immediate election 
upon becoming Prime Minister in 1955, albeit later on in the parliamentary term and 
already possessing a sizeable majority. Nevertheless, this precedent was cited by 
contemporary commentators when considering the possibility, not least in speculation by 
The Times political editor about potential outcomes of the Labour leadership contest. A 
new leader deciding to seek the legitimacy of a fresh mandate in such an instance could 
have perhaps been regarded as showing both statesmanship and political strength, and, as 
acknowledged by the Government themselves, a large proportion of legislation promised 
by the October 1974 manifesto had already been passed into law. There appeared to be a 
temporary lull in the emerging economic crises of 1975 and 1976. There had been a 
Conservative poll lead in the preceding months, but this was by no means assured of 
surviving an electoral campaign, the Opposition particularly suffering continued questions 
of internal divisions and problems over policy for Thatcher, the then relatively new leader. 
In fact, following Callaghan being selected as leader, Labour briefly enjoyed a lead of 6% 
to 7%, as highlighted in an Ipsos Mori poll of 8-9 April 1976.
20
  
However, the change to a minority in April did not lead the Callaghan Government 
to give any serious consideration to an immediate election in their formal meetings 
considering strategy. The above-indicated brief poll lead was not sustained in subsequent 
soundings of public opinion, and did not provide a solid enough basis for the Government 
to risk an election. Callaghan’s fear of winning an election but not achieving an overall 
majority was perhaps one of the strongest reasons for not seeking a snap dissolution, which 
would also dominate his decision-making over future electoral timing, as will be seen in a 
subsequent chapter.
21
 A particularly interesting insight into Callaghan’s mindset in the 
early stages of his Government may be gained from a transcribed extract of a call held with 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on 28 April 1976. Schmidt had heard about the loss 
of the Government’s majority and asked Callaghan “does it mean anything?”. Callaghan 
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not only restated his public pronouncements about having a party majority of 40 over the 
Conservatives, but also indicated more clearly his position on not needing an early 
election, as well as forecasting the potential lifespan of the Government: 
 
“My view is unless we lose by-elections and have obviously lost the confidence of 
the people we can carry on for a couple of years if we want to. […] there’s no need 
for me to feel that I’ve got to rush to the country in order to try and do something. I 
want a period of steady government if we can get it”.22 
 
Other reasons for the Government fearing an early election at this stage included concerns 
over electoral fatigue among both the populace in terms of lack of interest, and the party in 
terms of exhausted resources, having fought two General Elections and a nationwide 
referendum campaign in the space of the previous two years. Although much legislation 
had been passed, there were significant manifesto commitments which had not been 
realised and difficult unresolved political questions including Devolution, which, it was 
calculated, could lead to significant Labour losses in any elections in Scotland and Wales. 
In spite of making calls for an early election and enjoying greater polling success, the 
Opposition were similarly not expecting a dissolution at this stage, and were still working 






In some cases, the loss of a government majority or attempted formation of a minority 
government following an election has led opposing parties to respond either by vigorous 
attempts to defeat the government in the legislature, and thereby force its dismissal through 
an election, or even to establish an alternative majority or minority coalition of opposition 
parties and replace the incumbent government without the need for an election. The latter 
approach occurred in Germany in 1982, following the collapse of a centre-left Social 
Democrat/Free Democrat coalition and replacement of the resulting Social Democrat 
Minority Government with a centre-right governing coalition of opposition parties.
24
 In 
contrast to some of the more consensual democracies, the traditional adversarial approach 
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characterising British politics has led to an Official Opposition which generally desires to 
defeat the Government in parliamentary votes and ultimately to replace it in office. 
Stonehouse, whose defection gave the opposition parties a majority in April 1976, 
followed his change of party with calls for an immediate election. The Opposition had, in 
the preceding month, been particularly vociferous in their calls for the Government’s 
resignation and for a General Election. These calls were further encouraged in March 1976 
by Labour rebels inflicting a significant defeat on the Government over public expenditure 
when it still had an overall majority. This defeat was subsequently reversed by Labour’s 
winning of a confidence vote. Thatcher continued to call for an early election, with 
particular emphasis upon the resignation of the Prime Minister, and, later on in May, as a 
reaction to sentiments expressed from within the Government, primarily in response to the 
previously cited suggestion put forward by Foot. However, while publicly critical of 
Labour’s loss of a majority in April 1976 as removing their legitimacy to govern, and 
periodically calling publicly for an early election, the Conservatives did not consider 
preventing the minority government from taking office by forcing their defeat over a 
confidence vote and subsequent General Election at this stage. Although there were one or 
two public comments from Opposition MPs mentioning the prospect of an early election, 
the Conservatives’ internal strategic discourse in April was focused much more upon 
immediate parliamentary considerations in terms of trying to change party representation 
on committees.
25
 In the first Shadow Cabinet that followed the loss of the Government 
majority on 7 April, the main response to the Stonehouse defection was “pressing for an 
Opposition majority of one on all Standing Committees which were set up on future Bills” 
to reflect the new political balance of the House of Commons. While removal of the 
Government majority formed an important consideration, this was only one topic of the 
meeting, other discussions focusing on local government, how to respond to aspects of the 
Budget, and to the Government publishing its Devolution proposals in June. No indication 
was made during the meeting of any notion of trying to force an early election.
26
 
Shadow Cabinet references to a possible early election only occurred in July 1976, 
and even these were speculative, “in the event of an election this Autumn”, rather than as a 
result of any initiative to force an election on the part of the Opposition. The Conservatives 
were still revising policy throughout 1976, and making preparations for a future campaign, 
not least through the reporting of policy groups so as to enable the acceleration of electoral 
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preparations if necessary. Correspondence between Patten and other researchers considered 
an autumn election as a remote possibility, but not sufficient to warrant any significant 
acceleration of preparations, such as the rapid production and regular updating of 
emergency manifestos, as had been the case during 1974.
27
 Although votes were tabled 
against the Government, no single issue presented itself as likely to unite opposition parties 
and enable them to force an early election through a no confidence vote.
28
 
Additionally, there was no indication that the Conservatives in April 1976 thought 
that it would be appropriate to form any kind of voting agreement with other parties in 
Parliament toward defeating and/or replacing the Government without an election. Indeed, 
it is unlikely that such an alliance would have been possible, having to rely on a disparate 
mix of opposition parties, including Liberals, different nationalist parties, republicans, 
unionists, and independent socialists, as well as potential Labour rebels, there being 
significant lines of division between these groups. There have been cases in the past of so-
called ‘rainbow coalitions’ formed in other countries which incorporate counterintuitive 
groupings of parties across the political spectrum. However, these instances tend to occur 
only when there is no alternative, and rely to some degree on the different parties accepting 
certain pre-existing norms of coalition in their domestic political culture. Britain’s 
experience of such Unity governments has, up until 2015 at least, been limited to cross-
party coalitions during the two World Wars, and those of the National Governments during 
the economic crisis of the 1930s. There have also been two (depending on the definition 
used) more recent unsuccessful attempts to form particularly broadly-based coalition 
governments. The first was that of a proposed coalition between Welsh nationalists Plaid 
Cymru, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats in the Welsh Assmbly following the 
2007 election, while the second was an attempt at a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition 
including nationalist and Green MPs, following the 2010 General Election.
29
 While the 
confidence vote which eventually brought down the Callaghan Government in 1979 did 
involve many of the different opposition groups voting on the same side, this situation was 
a case of parties choosing for different reasons to oppose the Labour Administration, rather 
                                                 
27
 CPA: CRD/D/7/20, Chris Patten to Angus Maude, 29 October 1976; /21, Charles Bellaire to Chris Patten, 
23 July 1976; LCC 1/3/11, 122
nd
 Meeting, 7 July 1976; 1/3/11-12, 123
rd
 Meeting, 12 July 1976; OG 52: 50
th
 
Meeting, 21 March 1974; 51
st
 Meeting, 4 April 1974; OG74/145, ‘Preparing for a June Election: Notes 
towards a new part I’, 19 April 1974; 52nd Meeting, 25 April 1974; MF: Reel 95, 00211-30, Letter from 
Michael Fraser to Heath, 23 April 1974. 
28
 CPA LCC 1/3/11, 113
th
 Meeting, 7 June 1976. See infra, footnotes 25-7. 
29
 A. Boulton & J. Jones, Hung Together, pp. 168-9, 230-1, 242-3; R. B. Andeweg, L. De Winter, and P. 
Dumont (eds), Puzzles of Government Formation, pp. 131-6, 143-4, 165-6; J. Osmond, Crossing the 
Rubicon: Coalition Politics Welsh Style (Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 2007), pp. 27-42; D. Arter, 
Democracy in Scandinavia: Consensual, Majoritarian or Mixed?, pp. 26-7, 96-7; G. R. Searle, Country 
Before Party, pp. 242-5; K. Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule, p. 91. See infra, pp. 27-31. 
Chapter 3 – Government Formation Assumptions  60 
than as a result of actively cooperating with one another. The 1979 confidence vote defeat 
of the Government was only brought about by a specific set of conditions not yet present in 
1976. Although some of the smaller parties appeared more willing to challenge the 
Government, others were in politically unfavourable positions in April 1976 in terms of 
their electoral prospects, not least the Liberals, their ongoing poll ratings falling to around 
half their of previous electoral result, and with the then recent revelation of scandals 
surrounding their leader Thorpe.
30
 There is no evidence to suggest that negotiating an 
alternative Opposition coalition government was even being contemplated by the 
Conservatives following Callaghan’s loss of a majority.31 The Conservative Steering 
Committee had briefly considered the coalition question over a couple of meetings almost 
a year earlier in May 1975, suggesting that “if the Government were ready to drop 
damaging measures such as nationalisation, a basis for discussing the possibility of a 
coalition might exist”. Conservative Chair Lord Thorneycroft had also suggested that 
facing any crisis election, the best plan would be to campaign for a “Doctor’s Mandate”, 
along the lines of the National Governments in the 1930s.
32
 The CRD was tasked to 
prepare a paper on the possible ‘crisis scenarios’ for the Steering Committee meetings 
which helped to inform the discussion. It was written by Patten, and raised a number of 
potential questions to be considered, as well as courses of action for the Opposition in the 
event that the economic crisis forced the Government to seek Conservative support, 
including:  
 
“(i) to abstain – this would probably not be politically possible or desirable; 
(ii) to support the Government on their terms – unless we take an initiative 
ourselves we may be driven into this position; 
(iii) to bargain our support in return for dropping the nationalisation programme 
[…] 
(iv) to insist on a General Election – but could we govern if we won? And do we 
really want to do all the dirty work on our own? 
(v) to seek to bring about a coalition or national government” 33 
 
The discussion at these meetings was, however, not concerned with formulating a strategy 
for minority or coalition government, but rather was framed against the perceived 
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escalating financial crisis in mid-1975 to early 1976, parallels being drawn with the 
emergence of a National Unity Government during the financial and political crises of the 
1930s. The discussion was therefore very much one of considering the worst-case scenario, 
if, as seemed possible, the Labour Party were to split, and how the Conservatives would 
respond. The Steering Committee were not ruling out becoming part of a Unity 
Government in these circumstances, but considered it as very much something to be 
avoided if possible.  
Discussions in late 1975 also considered a prospective minority government caused 
by a by-election/defection of one or two Government MPs, and whether or not this would 
prompt a General Election. When such a prospect was raised at the Conservative Steering 
Committee in November 1975, it was viewed as very unlikely to lead to an early poll, 
citing ongoing economic conditions as unfavourable to the Government. In response to 
concern about a possible election, Thorneycroft suggested that the Conservatives could 
“move into General Election gear at short notice if necessary”. Other preparations during 
this time included the July production of a supplement to the standard campaign guide for 
candidates, which, it was suggested, could rapidly be sent by photocopy to candidates if 
required (though even at this stage caution was urged).
34
 
The Government’s successful navigating through the European Referendum in 
early June 1975 without lasting internal divisions helped to reduce the perceived threat of a 
Labour split and need for any Unity Government. In this context, the June meeting of the 
Steering Committee was particularly critical of the role of Labour moderates in supporting 
the policies of their more radical colleagues, along with Thatcher subsequently seeking to 
deny leaked newspaper reports of these discussions on coalition ever having occurred, 
fearing that they would do damage to the party’s primary goal of electoral victory.35  
By contrast, in the Steering Committee meeting in May 1976, following the loss of 
the Callaghan Government’s majority, the primary parliamentary concern was the battle 
over achieving greater Opposition representation on Committees in Parliament. There was 
no discussion of coalition, nor a call for any paper similar to that of the 1975 ‘crisis 
scenarios’, the Conservative emphasis clearly being upon seeking to follow the traditional 
role of opposing the Government where appropriate, as well as making the policy and 
campaign preparations necessary to win an outright victory at a subsequent election.
36
  
                                                 
34
 CPA: CRD/D/7/16, Letter from Humphrey Atkins to Chris Patten, 13 June 1975; CRD/D/7/20, ‘State of 
Readiness for an Election’, 25 April 1975; CRD/D/7/20, Chris Patten to Angus Maude, 26 July 1976; LCC 
1/3/15, 199
th
 Meeting, 17 April 1978; SC 14, 35
th
 Meeting, 3 November 1975. 
35
 CPA: SC 14, 26
th
 Meeting, 12 May 1975; 27
th
 Meeting, 13 May 1975; 28
th
 Meeting, 9 June 1975. 
36
 CPA: SC 14, 42
nd
 Meeting, 3 May 1976. See infra, footnote 35. 
Chapter 3 – Government Formation Assumptions  62 
 
Government Coalition/Interparty Agreement 
 
An alternative strategy which Governments have frequently pursued to avoid a minority 
government is that of forming a coalition or making agreements with other parties.
37
 While 
ultimately ruling out an early election, and not facing an opposition coalition, the use of 
interparty cooperation to secure a majority was given some consideration from the outset 
by the Callaghan Government, although it did not ultimately yield any substantive results. 
The only seriously considered proposal was that of inviting Gerry Fitt MP (Leader of the 
SDLP) to take the Labour whip, and, in effect, be counted as part of the Government. Such 
a move would have addressed the one seat gap needed for a majority, and theoretically 
secured the Government’s position in confidence votes, as well as the retention of 
Government majorities in the composition of legislative committees. In one sense, this 
initiative was more a search for psychological legitimacy than an attempt at an interparty 
voting agreement or coalition: Fitt already either abstained on many votes, or tended to 
vote with the Government. No mention was made of any negotiations, formal or informal, 
nor any specific incentives to be offered other than general commitment to continued 
informal consultation between the SDLP and Labour. This action would appear very much 
in line with the traditional theoretical position of minority governments seeking a ‘minimal 
winning’ position, the smallest number of MPs required to secure a majority, in return for 
the least amount of political concessions to other parties. However, this plan was never 
brought before the Cabinet, being ultimately rejected by the Government leadership. The 
idea was particularly opposed by the then Northern Ireland Secretary, Merlyn Rees, who 
feared that the costs of the move would outweigh the benefits: 
 
 “for the Labour Party to be dependent on the SDLP at Westminster would put us in 
the Catholic camp in Northern Ireland […] Our stance in Northern Ireland must be 
that of a party which is not sectarian but socialist”  
 
It was also feared that alignment with what was regarded by some voters as an ostensibly 
Catholic party could have undermined efforts to resolve the then ongoing problems of 
security and governance in Northern Ireland. The initiative would, in addition, be 
perceived badly in the country as a whole, as being a deceitful backroom deal on the part 
of the Government, thereby diminishing rather than reinforcing any sense of legitimacy 
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Any perceived coalition with the SDLP would probably have led to greater opposition to 
legislation by the eleven UUUC MPs. Rees was, to some extent, also thinking of long-term 
potential political gains, positing the possibility “that one day we will have a strong Labour 
Party in Northern Ireland”, although this appears as much to have been an aspiration, part 
of a plea to avoid Labour reducing their political funding to the very small associated 
Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), which had no parliamentary seats, rather than 




The particular political culture and history within the Labour Party helped to 
discourage other suggestions of interparty cooperation. The experience of the leading 
political figures during the Callaghan Administration was shaped not only, as has often 
been identified, by the Wilson and Heath Governments of the mid-1960s to 1970s, but also 
by the previous experiences of minority government in the 1920s, which they had either 
lived through, or else were very much aware of because of their place in the history of the 
Labour Party in its first experiences of government. Although few of the direct participants 
from the 1920s remained in leading political positions fifty years later, there is no doubt 
that the impression made by those early governments on their 1970s political counterparts 
was significant. This contributed not only to both main political parties’ views of minority 
government as weak and unstable, but also to a distrust of interparty cooperation. Labour’s 
First Minority Government in 1924 was brought down by a no confidence vote, in spite of 
having survived initially by relying on Liberal support, while the Second Labour Minority 
Government in 1929-31 ultimately ended in a major disagreement which split the Party 
and was compounded by leader Ramsay MacDonald’s subsequent decision to form a 
coalition with Conservatives and elements of the Liberals. MacDonald’s perceived 
‘treachery’ made him one of the most reviled figures within the party when accounts were 
written of Labour’s history during this period. That this view continued to be prevalent 
throughout the political system in the 1970s is evident not least from the wording of a 
Labour Party Conference Motion in 1973 that was passed as a condemnation of forming 
any future coalition, alongside the private references made regarding the event in the 
meetings and papers of party leaders, who feared emulating the coalition approach.
39
 In 
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both Labour and Conservative strategy papers during this period that considered questions 
of minority and coalition government, there are references to MacDonald’s experience as 





In contrast to previous academic assumptions, the Callaghan Government’s transition to a 
minority status marked a fundamental change from that of a majority administration. This 
change was recognised by leaders of the Labour Government and Conservative 
Opposition, even where this was not expressed in their public discourse, as well as by 
contemporary political commentators. The continuation of the Callaghan Administration as 
a minority government was the most likely outcome, but was by no means the only option, 
historical precedents favouring coalition, and alternative courses of action being 
considered from the outset by some within the Government in April 1976, including the 
prospect of an interparty agreement with the SDLP to maintain a parliamentary majority. 
The Conservatives, having considered the option of a coalition in 1975 did not revisit this 
possibility in April 1976 as a means to unseat the Callaghan Minority Government. The 
Opposition similarly did not view an early election as either desirable or likely to occur at 
this point, not taking action to attempt to force the Government from office in a no 
confidence vote. The government formation process in April 1976 raised questions and 
potential governmental alternatives for contemporaries which would influence their 
thinking from 1976 onwards when facing further challenges imposed by the state of 
minority government. 
The Callaghan Government’s formation is an atypical case, not fitting neatly into 
existing theoretical models of minority governance, not least in terms of its beginning mid-
way through a parliamentary term as opposed to following an election, and not resulting 
from any coalition break-up. This minority government embodied some of the orthodox 
notions of being formed against a background of economic crises and constituting ‘almost 
a majority’. However, at the same time, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, the 
Government also displayed traits belonging to some of the models put forward by 
revisionist scholarship, arising from rational choices made by decision-makers consciously 
choosing an alternative to coalition, seeking to capitalise upon a divided opposition, and 
using institutional resources to maintain control of a parliamentary majority. In its 
formation, it acted very much as an embodiment of the British tradition of minority 
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government, seeking to adhere to a majoritarian mindset and practices, while 
simultaneously contemplating, and, where necessary, adopting, pragmatic changes to adapt 
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Passing legislation through a parliamentary chamber and handling the problems posed by 
legislative defeats represent crucial strategic tests for the survival of any democratic 
government, particularly one lacking a parliamentary majority. The Callaghan Government 
has often been characterised as weak and lacking strategic vision in its approach to 
minority government, not least on account of having suffered a large number of 
parliamentary defeats. This view has significantly influenced the wider British 
understanding of minority government as an ineffectual model of governance. This 
dismissal in historical studies of the Government situates the Callaghan Administration 
within the pre-1970s orthodox theoretical model of weak minority government referred to 
in Chapter 1. A more recent interpretation has been to accept these weaknesses as endemic 
to the Callaghan Government, but to acknowledge, more in line with revisionist views of 
minority government, the circumstantial nature of most parliamentary defeats, which 




The circumstantial factors and prominence of Labour backbench rebels in defeating 
the Government cannot be overlooked. However, this chapter will demonstrate that both 
the Government and Opposition were far more strategically proactive than has previously 
been recognised in terms of considering the legislative aspects of minority government. In 
fact, both grasped some of the particular exigencies of minority government on the 
legislative process, evolving strategies for passing or opposing Bills over the course of the 
Parliament, with varying degrees of success. Furthermore, while both parties’ strategic 
doctrine was largely influenced by and framed within the context of previous British 
experience, strategies were considered which, however consciously assimilated, reflected 
aspects that are features of minority government elsewhere. As has been seen in Chapter 3, 
the Callaghan Government and Conservative Opposition actually resist strict categorisation 
within the different theoretical models formulated before and after their operation. These 
two facets once again demonstrate the British tradition of minority government, in which 
the precedents invoked by participants making parliamentary strategy were drawn almost 
exclusively from historic British minority governments, and where pragmatic adaptation 
was coupled with a refusal to countenance actions that would break away completely from 
a majoritarian political culture. This chapter will focus on the management of 
parliamentary defeats by the Government and Opposition, and their use of methods that did 
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not involve direct cooperation or negotiation with the MPs of other political parties. Such 
instances of interparty cooperation will be discussed in Chapters 5-6.
2
 
The Government’s handling of legislation, and of defeats in the House of 
Commons, shows something of a more rationally calculating minority government than has 
typically been identified by scholars, and that, for the most part, came to accept and adapt 
to the minority situation.
3
 Labour considered and adopted some approaches much deployed 
by minority governments elsewhere, in terms of accepting certain parliamentary defeats, 
overturning some, and circumventing others. At the same time, some other, more radical 
tactics were contemplated but ultimately not adopted, including that of actively seeking 
parliamentary defeats and widespread reform of Parliament. The Opposition and other 
parties also faced a complex and novel situation of parliamentary management, in which 
Government defeats could prove to be problematic for them, raising the possible dangers 
of appearing obstructionist or even forcing an election on unfavourable terms. Moreover, 
even the threat of defeat, or else the use of institutional mechanisms to filibuster or delay 
legislation, had to be selectively applied to achieve greatest impact. Conflicts between 
Government and Opposition over traditional institutional arrangements helped to shape, 






One of the simplest ways for a minority government to function is to act as if the situation 
is no different from that of a majority government, making full use of institutional powers, 
putting forward controversial legislation without amendment or accommodation of other 
parties and daring the opposition to vote against it. Rather than seeking defeat, the goal is 
to pass legislation and to continue to survive as a government. Variations of the approach 
may incorporate institutional tools discussed below, such as making particular votes 
matters of confidence in the Government. This approach has historically been widely used 
by minority governments in other countries, either selectively, applied to a particular piece 
of legislation, or as the general approach of a government, to varying degrees of success. 
Joe Clark’s 1979 minority Government in Canada operated in a constant state of daring 
opposition parties to defeat it, and, as a consequence, survived for less than 7 months (most 
of which time was a parliamentary recess). In Britain, the Wilson Minority Government of 
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early 1974 was very much inclined toward acting along these lines, which worked initially 
because of Conservative fears over appearing unnecessarily obstructionist or of triggering 
an early election. Later in the year, the Opposition became less reserved about attempting 
to defeat the Government, but this did not prevent Wilson from being able successfully to 
gain a majority in the subsequent autumn 1974 election. In the early stages of Callaghan’s 
Government, far-reaching and contentious Bills over policies including nationalisation 
were still brought forward, and an especially heavy programme of legislation tabled, 
seemingly no different from operations under a majority government. However, Callaghan 
faced an Opposition which did not have these same reservations about trying to defeat the 




Often the dynamics of how a minority government is to operate are determined 
during its formative stages. In Wilson’s experience, a successful confrontation with the 
Opposition over the Queen’s Speech in March 1974 set the tone for subsequent 
interactions. Callaghan, by contrast, faced a confrontation in the early months of his 
minority government which, although not much discussed by commentators, had a 




Whipping System (Disruption of the Usual Channels) 
 
An essential component of day-to-day legislative management and timetabling of 
parliamentary business occurs through informal discussion and contacts between 
Government and Opposition Whips, referred to as the ‘usual channels’. This mechanism 
enabled pairing agreements for MPs to be absent from specific votes, so as to negate the 
need for a constant full turnout of MPs from all sides. This institution may be used by 
Governments in order to maintain their existing majority, or, in a state of minority 
government, to help secure a day-to-day majority, such as through pairing members not 
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normally voting because of illness or serving as officers of the House (i.e. Deputy 
Speaker). Even now, pairing arrangements continue to be a source of both strength and 
controversy for minority governments in other countries, most recently perhaps in 
Australia between 2010 and 2013.
7
 
The Callaghan Government’s minority status helped provoke an incident during 
parliamentary votes in May 1976 on the controversial Bill to nationalise large parts of the 
Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries. This largely overlooked conflict served significantly 
to shape the interaction between the political parties and the conflicts over institutional 
arrangements for the remainder of the Parliament. On 27 May, the Government won an 
important parliamentary division on the Bill by one vote, on a motion already anticipated 
as likely to be close. It later transpired that the Government victory resulted from a pairing 
arrangement being broken, a Labour MP voting when it had been previously agreed that 
both he and his Conservative counterpart would abstain.
8
 
While such rows over voting procedures have happened under a majority 
government, the exigencies of not having a majority, and the pressure placed on Whips to 
ensure passage of important legislation increased the possibility. Although arguments have 
continued in political memoirs, it is difficult to find evidence of either the Government 
breaking a pair or the Opposition’s subsequent withdrawal of cooperation as being 
anything other than reactive and unplanned.
9
 Some members of the Opposition did later 
seek to capitalise on what they considered to be success in delaying Government business, 
raising the matter in strategy meetings. Thatcher was encouraged deliberately to extend the 
tactic for as long as possible in a way that was manageable for the Opposition, such as 
advocated by Nigel Lawson in his letter of 30 May: 
 
“Provided it is accepted that, on all except essential business, our people can – 
within reason – register as ‘absent unpaired’, this will inconvenience the 
Government infinitely more than [..] the Opposition; whereas not to implement the 
threat would, I suspect, be seen as a sign of weakness”.10 
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The success of this Opposition tactic is debatable. A vote of censure called by the 
Opposition on 9 June 1976 was defeated by a clear majority and only one Government 
defeat occurred in the House of Commons during the breakdown, that of 28 June 1976, 
when the Government abstained on a motion of adjournment, fearing defeat in any case 
from a likely rebellion of its own backbenchers. The vote on the controversial Aircraft and 
Shipbuilding Bill was retaken at the request of the Opposition, along with amendments.
11
  
There was also a perception expressed in Government and Opposition strategy 
meetings that Labour’s likely victory in an upcoming by-election would restore a situation 
in which the Government could effectively operate as if they possessed a majority. The 
Conservative leadership did not extend the tactic indefinitely, recognising that such a 
situation was, in the long term, as unsustainable for Opposition MPs as for those of the 
Government, and that Government attempts to portray them as being unnecessarily 
obstructionist could cause more damage to the Conservatives politically. Withdrawal of 
cooperation prevented the prospect of traditional Opposition influence or input into 
Government legislation through negotiation. The absence of communication with the 
Government meant the withholding of information normally provided about the schedule 
for parliamentary business, forcing the Opposition to guess what the timetable for 
upcoming legislation would be and to manage the attendance of their MPs accordingly. 
Although the threat of cooperation being withdrawn remained an option and continued to 
be discussed at various points by the leadership through the autumn of 1976, it was not 
acted upon during the remainder of the Parliament. There were occasional selective 
refusals to provide pairs for particularly important votes, but this was very much in line 
with existing procedures. When it appeared not long after the resumption of cooperation 
that the Government were seeking to extend the length of time the House of Commons 
would sit, in order to give more time for passing legislation, the Shadow Cabinet decided 
that any attempt to prolong the session, or to force through controversial legislation using 
allocation of time (Guillotine) motions to curtail debates, would be met by a fresh 
withdrawal of all cooperation. In spite of the session extending into August and the 
Government use of Guillotines to pass certain Bills, it does not appear that further 
withdrawal of cooperation was either implemented by the Opposition or, if implemented, 
had significant impact. The Government were able to pass their Guillotines successfully, 
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and, of the six divisions that occurred in the first week of August, only one, on an 




The closest thing to a further breakdown was the Opposition’s cancelling of the 
pairing of ill members in a series of important votes on the Shipbuilding Industry on 29 
July 1976, leading to the bringing in of a number of seriously ill MPs for the purposes of 
ensuring passage of these votes. The particular approach on this occasion backfired 
somewhat for the Opposition, the presence of the ill members enabling the Government to 
win the vote and to be able to characterise their opponents as unnecessarily obstructionist. 
There is no record of this tactic being discussed in the Shadow Cabinet meetings over the 
preceding days. In part, the failure of this move may account for hesitation over pressing 
the Government further in the August sitting.
13
 
However, the withdrawal of cooperation also had more of a detrimental impact on 
the Government than might otherwise have been expected. While such a breakdown in 
relations could have caused significant difficulties either for majority or minority 
governments, the absence of a majority made it particularly damaging for Callaghan. 
Although the number of defeats was small, the ever-present possibility of defeat meant that 
a sizeable number of Labour MPs had to be permanently in attendance at Parliament, 
increasing their workload, and making it more difficult to undertake either constituency or 
Government-related business away from Westminster. The Government, as had been the 
case during the 1974 Minority Administration, did adopt a rota for its MPs, to keep the 
requisite numbers in attendance. There were other factors which compounded the long-
term impact of the Opposition approach. Government concern at not being able reliably to 
get business passed served to delay important legislation, making it more difficult to enact 
Bills in what was already a crowded legislative schedule. The summer heatwave and 
drought of 1976, combined with the requisite late-night sittings in Parliament, served to 
wear out Government members. The withdrawal of cooperation also showed the 
Government how far the Opposition were willing to go in order to challenge perceived 
changes or alterations to existing practices. Although the Government were able to pass 
some Guillotine motions and to extend the session, the conflict had set the tone for 
subsequent relations between Government and Opposition. Difficulties over pairing, and 
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the Government’s not learning the lessons of minority governance at this early stage, made 




While a quasi-majoritarian and directly confrontational approach was adopted in 
the early and lattermost stages of the Callaghan Administration, its success was limited, 
similar to the experiences of other minority governments. The breakdown of the usual 
channels in 1976 had caused significant disruption of Government business, leading some 
within the Government to re-evaluate their approach thereafter. For the most part, the 
Government now sought other methods to handle both the serious prospect and the reality 
of Parliamentary defeats. 
 
Minority Government - Methods of Handling defeat 
 
There are three principal ways, other than cooperating with other parties or daring defeat, 
in which a minority government can seek to manage legislative defeats. The first method, 
and arguably the most appealing, is that of avoiding defeat – either by not putting forward 
or withdrawing legislation considered unlikely to succeed, or using institutional 
mechanisms of control to enable the passage of legislation that would otherwise fail. The 
second method, accepting defeat, involves reacting to legislative losses or opposition 
amendments by endeavouring to accommodate the changes in policy, and possibly 
planning or publicly indicating that these would be reversed by the government if it won a 
majority at a subsequent General Election. The third method is that of a government 
actively seeking its own defeat, putting forward legislation known to have no chance of 





In some cases, the simplest way for a minority Government to avoid being defeated, other 
than through compromise or discussion with other parties, is not to put forward legislation 
which is known to be particularly contentious, or unable to command a majority. This 
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practice is consistent with many instances of both minority and majority governments 
around the world, including those in Britain.
15
 
While the Government showed private recognition from the outset that the passage 
of some Bills could no longer be assured, and contemplated adapting their programme 
accordingly, they largely continued to press ahead with some controversial legislation in 
the early stages. In spite of Foot’s Cabinet report in May 1976 prioritising some Bills and 
indicating possible compromises, it was only later on in the Parliament that the 
Government began seriously to scale back its legislative programme. The abandoning of 
prospective legislation, discussed in greater depth below and in the chapter on interparty 
cooperation, caused significant internal strategic debates within the Government. One of 
the greatest fears expressed was that the absence of politically important legislation would 
depress Labour supporters and undermine subsequent electoral campaigns. The absence of 
controversial legislation was not merely a hindrance to the Government, but also to the 
Opposition. In a notable Shadow Cabinet discussion, concern was expressed that the 
legislation being put through Parliament did not allow for major points of disagreement 
between the two main parties, thereby depriving the Opposition of ammunition for 
subsequent political campaigns against the Government.
16
 
Where the decision was made to pursue legislation which could prove to be 
controversial, the Government relied in the first instance on its considerable institutional 
powers in order to attempt to get Bills through Parliament. The UK Government leadership 
has historically enjoyed very substantial control over setting the agenda for parliamentary 
business. It has more recently been argued by Tsebelis that minority governments 
generally seek to make greater use of the institutional mechanisms available to control the 
agenda and force Parliament to comply with their will. Such experiences are consistent 
with minority governments internationally, notably in Canada. The UK Government of the 
period, perhaps even more so at present, possessed considerable institutional control over 
Parliament when compared to both European and American counterparts. Governments 
over the last few decades, whether in a majority or minority, have increasingly resorted to 
more frequent use of institutional devices to strengthen their control over Parliament. 
However, the Callaghan Government’s use of powers over Parliament to manage the 
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 Some of these institutions affected included the composition of parliamentary 
committees that considered and amended legislation, and devices affecting the timing and 
amount of legislation that could be passed, including Guillotine Votes or timetable 
motions, as well as the length of parliamentary recesses. The state of minority government 
also presented the Callaghan Administration with additional challenges, and indeed 
opportunities, through the device of votes of confidence and no confidence, as well as from 




The institution of a strong party Whip system to manage MPs served as the Callaghan 
Government’s first main method of controlling Parliament. Changes to established voting 
arrangements for MPs were considered by the Government as one means of securing their 
majority. One change considered was that of altering pairing agreements. In September 
1976, the Government Chief Whip raised the possibility with his counterpart of pairing ill 
members of Parliament who were unable to attend, of which Labour had at that time a 
greater number, with Opposition members even if they were in good health. Such a 
procedure would have changed the existing practice of only pairing ill MPs with others 
who were ill. Opposition Chief Whip Humphrey Atkins’ preliminary memorandum was 
very much against, arguing that it was unreasonable for an MP in good health to have to 
“justify [their] actions to [their] constituents” for choosing not to vote on an important 
issue when their counterpart’s health restricted them from voting, and that it would be 
difficult for a party leader “to enforce it”. As such, this potential alteration was not pursued 
further. The question of proxy voting also arose, specifically that of allowing either ill 
members or Ministers who were absent on Government business to cast a vote. This would 
have marked a significant departure from established practice, and was likewise rejected.
18
 
The only form of proxy already allowed at the time was the ‘nodding through’ of ill 
members who were within the Palace of Westminster but physically unable to walk 
through the division lobby. This concession led to the infamous scenes of several 
ambulances being parked outside Parliament, so that the MPs within them could have their 
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votes counted. The Government’s continued reliance on the votes of these members, even 
in its latter stages after the end of the Lib-Lab Pact, shows something of a continued 






Some parliamentary systems afford greater influence to opposition parties through the 
composition and powers of parliamentary committees. These committees’ roles can 
include the oversight of Government departments, approval of appointments, and, 
particularly, the examining, amending and even delaying of legislation. Their composition 
is, in many cases, determined by party strength in a Parliament, and thereby may come to 
play an increasingly important role during periods when a government is in the minority.
20
  
Legislative committee composition was one of the first issues confronting 
Callaghan following Stonehouse’s defection on 7 April 1976. The system of parliamentary 
committees served as an integral part of the legislative process, all Bills having to pass 
through individual Standing Committees of MPs, assembled on an ad hoc basis, which 
examined legislation and could amend it.
21
 Since committee composition normally 
reflected the political strength of parties in the House of Commons, names being supplied 
by the Whips, the absence of a Government majority led to calls by both Conservative and 
Liberal Press releases for committees, then dominated by Labour, to have additional 
members assigned to reflect the new ‘majority’ of opposition MPs.22  
The Government’s first instincts were to resist any changes to committee 
composition, in the knowledge that it would make it more difficult in the future to avoid 
amendments or delays to legislation at the committee stage, which could prevent the 
passage of important Bills. In the Cabinet meeting of 29 April, there was even the 
suggestion by Foot that the Government was not, in fact, in a minority, attempting to count 
“Mr Robertson and Mr Sillars” and “the two Northern Ireland members who regularly 
voted with the Government” as not part of the opposition, and even perhaps constituting 
                                                 
19
 R. Rogers and R. Walters, How Parliament Works, pp. 53, 172-6. 
20
 R. Rogers and R. Walters, How Parliament Works, p. 132; R. Hazell and A. Paun (eds), Making Minority 
Government Work, pp. 33, 50-1; K. Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule, pp. 42-4, 152-3. 
21
 R. Rogers and R. Walters, How Parliament Works, pp. 100, 354-5, 360. 
22
 CAC: THCR/2/1/1/54, ‘Statement by the Rt. Hon. Humphrey Atkins, M.P., Opposition Chief Whip’, 7 
April 1976; ‘Statement from Alan Beith, MP, the Liberal Chief Whip’, 7 April 1976. There were two main 
types of MPs Committees in the House of Commons, Select Committees (permanent, designed to monitor the 
work of government departments) and Standing Committees (formed on an ad hoc basis to study and provide 
amendments to Bills prior to their third reading in the House of Commons). These latter committees were re-
formed into General/Public Bill Committees as of 2006; House of Commons Information Office: General 
Committees, Factsheet L6 Legislative Series, pp. 2-3. 
Chapter 4 – Defeats and Legislative Management  77 
part of the Government’s own total.23 This seeming unwillingness to acknowledge 
minority status is a further reflection of the continued majoritarian mindset of members of 
the Callaghan Cabinet in its early stages. The Committee of Selection, a body of MPs 
whose role it was formally to put forward any appointments to committees, and itself with 
a Labour majority of five members to four, initially ruled that there should be no changes 
to new Standing Committees. Nevertheless, the Government, recognising the constraints of 
not having a majority and seeking to avoid providing political ammunition to their 
opponents, subsequently recognised opposition demands by conceding that the 
composition of any newly formed Standing Committees for future legislation would reflect 
the change. This approach was in line with that of the previous Labour Minority 
Government of 1974, which had similarly conceded the question of Standing Committee 
composition. It was suggested that the addition of extra committee members from among 
the smaller parties might be strategically used by the Government Whips, presumably 
through allocating members more likely to be sympathetic to Labour on to committees 
regarded as particularly important. Maintaining the status quo on existing committees was 
also thought likely to help limit the number of adverse effects on Government policy. The 
Cabinet also considered possible ways to circumvent the changes, such as through the 
suggestion, first raised on 29 April and discussed at greater length on 6 May, that the 
composition of Standing Committees “reflect the majority for that Bill on Second Reading, 
rather than the composition of the House”. This method was rejected, however, in terms of 
strategy: it was feared that Opposition MPs would be encouraged either into more vigorous 
resistance and “to vote against the Second Readings of Bills”, or even, to vote for a Bill 
and then claim extra places on a committee, representing themselves as constituting part of 
the Bill’s majority, but would then “not necessarily support the Government when voting 
on amendments” in the committee. Cabinet discussions concluded that, in light of the 
“present parliamentary circumstances”, it would not be practical to implement any change 
and that such a measure would be fiercely resisted by all opposition parties.
24
  
As with the withdrawal of pairing arrangements, the Opposition’s first approach to 
demanding the change in Committee appointments was purely reactive. However, although 
less high profile, there were some instances in which the Opposition consciously judged 
that it would be better to allow Bills to proceed rather than oppose them in the Commons, 
but then possibly to attempt to amend the legislation at the committee stage. Although 
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defeats for the Government at the committee stage were not given the same high profile as 
Parliamentary losses, and, in some ways, the Opposition were merely following established 
practices, the lack of a Commons majority prevented the usual response of a Government 
overturning some of the more damaging amendments in a meeting of the full House of 
Commons. Often the Government expressed fears that while legislation was expected to 
pass through Parliament, it could suffer significant amendment at the committee stage.
25
 A 
possible means of countering this threat was putting legislation to a committee of the entire 
House (a standard practice on constitutional legislation), where it was potentially easier for 
the Government to achieve majorities through such tactics as dividing the larger numbers 
of opposing MPs. Time pressures and the dangers of further delays or more damaging 
backbench amendments being brought forward limited the extent to which such an 






The process of getting a Bill through Parliament typically occupies a significant amount of 
time, going through three readings and a committee stage in both Houses. Technically, the 
Government controls the timetabling of the House of Commons, and does not currently 
have to answer to any all-party committee as is the case with many of their European 
counterparts. In spite of this, in practice, the institutional set-up of Parliament provides 
some accommodation to opposition parties in terms of time for debates. Both majority and 
minority governments have had to face time constraints when introducing legislation, 
significant proportions of parliamentary time already being allocated for various essential 
items including the annual Budget and Queen’s Speech, Questions, General Debates, and 
days given to opposition parties and individual MPs. In other countries, minority 
government has significantly effected legislative timing, compelling longer periods for the 
consideration of Bills, reducing the amount of legislation put forward by a government, or 




During the Callaghan Minority Government, neither side considered pushing for a 
fundamental alteration of existing arrangements regarding Government control over 
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legislative timetabling. Any question of removing parliamentary time allocated to 
opposition parties and individual MPs was similarly not entertained as a viable option, the 
Government fearing that the Opposition would break off all cooperation and voters would 
see the move as being inherently unfair. As in the case of Whipping arrangements, 
Government attempts to use institutional mechanisms to overcome timing problems were 
very much shaped by the minority government situation.
28
 
One method which had already been in place during periods of majority 
government was that of combining pieces of legislation that would otherwise have been 
considered as separate Bills. Although Bills were also combined for administrative or 
legislative clarity, strategic reasons did play an important part in discussions within the 
Callaghan Government, particularly on politically sensitive measures. There were, of 
course, limits as to how far such a tactic could be employed. The approach could make it 
more difficult to ensure passage of the legislation, whether through uniting opposition 
parties and government rebels who objected to different parts of the Bill, as in the case of 
the Scotland and Wales Bill in 1976-77, or legislation being more susceptible to failing 
because of a technicality, such as in the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Bill. The prospect of 
further combining of Bills to save time was considered by the Government occasionally, 
particularly in late 1976, such as in the case of those concerning Conspiracy and Criminal 
Justice (which were combined), or two Post Office Bills on industrial democracy and 




Another institutional device increasingly used by postwar Governments to pack 
more legislation into a crowded schedule has been that of votes designed to shorten the 
amount of time spent debating legislation, establishing a timetable, or Guillotine Votes, to 
set limits on the amount of parliamentary time to be allocated to a debate or piece of 
legislation, or to end an ongoing debate on a particular issue and compel a vote. The 
Callaghan Government had sought to use these devices in order to continue with a heavy 
legislative programme through late 1976 and into 1977 (in part making up for delays 
during the breakdown in cooperation with the Opposition). However, the exigencies of 
minority government restricted the occasions on which such votes could be successfully 
employed, often being fiercely resisted not only by opposition parties, but also by some 
backbench government MPs who resented the practice. While the Scotland and Wales Bill 
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of 1976-77 was never defeated in the Commons, the loss of a timetable motion setting out 
the limits for debate was effectively regarded as having prevented its passage. Although 
the Government could have allocated more time to what was essentially an important piece 
of constitutional legislation, this would have required the dropping of other legislation 
regarded as politically important. The principal aim of Devolution legislation was to 
address increased support for the nationalist parties in both Scotland and Wales, which 
posed a threat to Labour at a subsequent General Election. Labour MPs were bitterly 
divided over the issue, some of those from Scotland and Wales being particularly 
vociferous opponents of the legislation. Whereas there had initially been reluctance by the 
Government to drop legislation in order to find the necessary time to complete passage of 
the rest of the legislative programme, some prospective Bills were dropped by the 
Government from 1977-78 onwards.
30
 This change reflected, in part, the increased 
difficulty of ensuring the passing of Guillotines or timetable motions after the failure of the 
Scotland and Wales Bill. In spite of this, paradoxically, the Government still made use of 
some timetable motions and Guillotines in order to curtail debate and get through parts of 
the Government’s legislative programme, although their use remained controversial, 
primarily arising on matters where the major parties suffered internal divisions, such as 
over the European Elections Bill in early 1978. Alternatively, Guillotines were used after 
negotiation, with the backing of the Opposition. Guillotines also continued to be used on 
major legislation such as Devolution, helping contribute to legislative defeats through 







The question of minority government dictated the Government approach to their control of 
the length of parliamentary recesses, raising significant questions and prompting internal 
disagreements. An important difference of opinion was over the issue of whether to shorten 
the length of recesses and thereby provide more time for Parliament to pass legislation, or 
to increase the length of recesses and thereby reduce the time of having to deal with 
prospective parliamentary defeats. Other concerns raised regarding shorter recesses 
included the greater physical pressure on Labour MPs, and that the parliamentary party had 
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been under a particular strain over the previous three years in Government. An alternative 
suggestion of holding more late night sessions, requiring that over 100 Labour MPs be kept 
at Westminster during these to ensure a sufficient majority for closure motions, was met 
with similar arguments. Such considerations would very much seem to be a continuation of 
decisions faced by the Wilson Minority Government in 1974, where the long summer 
recess served as relief from parliamentary defeats in June, and provided a platform from 
which the Government could gain added coverage and launch an October election 
campaign without having to meet Parliament again. Discussions both in Cabinet, and in the 
Cabinet Future Legislation Committee, particularly on 10 March 1977, highlight the 
Callaghan Government’s changing approach over time. Initially, the preference in 1976 
until early 1977 was to reduce the length of recesses in order to accommodate more Bills. 
By March 1977, however, the Government were clearly moving in favour of maintaining 
and even lengthening the amount of time when Parliament was not in session, partly as a 






In some parliamentary systems, constitutional arrangements provide for the possibility of 
appealing directly to the population to settle a particularly contentious political issue or 
seek support for a major policy through a referendum. A referendum can potentially be 
used by a minority government that desires to get an important policy through a 
deadlocked legislature but is unwilling to call an election, as was the case with the 
successful Danish referendum in 1986 over ratification of the Single European Act. This 
prospective use of referenda is, of course, conditioned by particular institutional and 
political constraints, such as where there is a requirement for a referendum proposal to be 
approved by a parliamentary majority.
33
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The need for parliamentary approval would appear to make such a device 
inappropriate for British minority governments, although there are situations in which 
opposition parties may sometimes be less inclined to oppose referenda for fear of the 
adverse political consequences of denying the population a vote on a particular issue. 
Britain had also had recent experience of a nationwide referendum through the EEC vote in 
1975. After parliamentary defeats on the Devolution Timetable motion in early 1977, 
Callaghan’s Government briefly considered holding pre-legislative national referenda, in 
order to secure an additional mandate and pressure MPs not to block Devolution 
legislation. In not pursuing this approach, a number of justifications were brought forward 
in Cabinet which reflected strategic assessments that continued to be weighed against 
established majoritarian principles, believing that: the legislation for any such move would 
be unlikely to pass without a secure government majority; even if referenda legislation 
were passed, there was no guarantee of a positive referendum result when voters did not 
know what a finalised Bill would contain; and that even a positive result could not 
guarantee majority support in Parliament for Government Devolution proposals. Labour’s 
concession of referenda over Devolution in Scotland and Wales, held in 1979, were, as has 




Considerations of using referenda to reinforce particular policies were not restricted 
to the Government. During the early stages of the Parliament, and even latterly, the 
Conservative leadership contemplated the acceptance of referenda proposed by others, 
albeit reluctantly, or even the initiation of referenda themselves, both in terms of 
Devolution, and in order to buttress support for the passage of potentially controversial 
legislation concerning the restriction of trade union power. Although this device was 
ultimately unused, discussion surrounding it illustrates something of the Opposition 
mindset. Some concerns were raised when an Opposition committee was formed to 
consider the matter. When discussing the matter in the Shadow Cabinet in relation to a 
prospective manifesto pledge, some of these arguments were raised, including that of 
creating a “two-tier” system of legislation, where laws backed by referenda could acquire 
greater legitimacy than those that had only been passed by Parliament, and that the use of 
referenda to entrench legislation could challenge the established notion of one British 
Parliament not binding its successor. It would appear that the Shadow Cabinet feared that 
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their acceptance of referenda would also enable Labour Governments “to secure popular 
endorsement for certain superficially appealing socialist measures”. It was agreed at this 
stage to include a passage on the usefulness of referenda in the manifesto, and there were 
further references made by the Opposition to the prospect of referenda being used in order 
to pass popular legislation “resisted by a minority”, although this was conceived of more as 





House of Lords 
 
Another institutional challenge which the Government faced was that of the legislative 
defeats inflicted by the House of Lords, which were much more numerous during this 
period than those in the House of Commons. In part, the situation was also exacerbated by 
the practical difficulties imposed by the heavy legislative timetable and associated 
Government pressure to get Bills passed, which led to late nights and increased opposition 
from the Lords.
36
 While the Lords had previously been more inclined to vote against 
certain measures, and Labour Governments permanently lacked any majority in the upper 
house, traditionally the second chamber had accepted the will of the government in the 
Commons, especially over manifesto commitments.
 
The absence of a Commons majority 
made it much more difficult to overturn reasoned amendments made by the Lords. 
Theoretically, there were several institutional approaches which might have helped the 
Government to overcome its difficulties with the second chamber, including some 
particularly radical options. One such sanction was the creation or threatened creation of 
enough new peers to achieve a Government majority or reform of the second chamber to 
reduce its powers. The former threat had been used historically to enable the passage of the 
first Parliament Act in 1911 that limited the power of the Lords, and reform had been 
seriously considered by Governments into the 1960s and 1970s.
37
 While reform proposals 
were being worked on by Labour during this period, implementation of such policies as 
arbitrary creation of new peers or rapid changes to established procedures were not 
pursued as solutions to the immediate day-to-day problems of Parliamentary majorities. It 
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was recognised by the Government that any such approach would appear unconstitutional, 
would likely lead to intransigent opposition in Parliament, and would not solve the lack of 
a Commons majority. Abolition of the second chamber was supported by the wider Labour 
Party, but not given any significant consideration by the Government, knowing that it 
would be impossible without an electoral mandate and Commons majority. Although put 
forward by the NEC and years later adopted as a manifesto commitment, this arose more 




The only institutional option seriously countenanced was that of using the 
Parliament Act, which would allow a Commons vote to override the House of Lords’ 
opposition to legislation. The prospect of its use was raised selectively in Cabinet, 
particularly in the case of the Health Services Bill in late July 1976, and the Aircraft and 
Shipbuilding Bill in November 1976 and February 1977. Consideration of whether or not 
to try to override the Lords veto on this latter Bill produced debates in Cabinet, and a 
difference of opinion between the principal Government strategy-makers.  
 In the November 1976 Cabinet, the Government were more inclined towards the 
approach of daring defeat. Foot advocated the use of the Parliament Act to compel passage 
of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Bill, potentially leading to the loss of one or more other 
pieces of less important prospective legislation from the timetable. In discussion, concerns 
were raised about losing the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Bill completely, although there 
would also appear to have been considerable frustration with the Lords’ actions on 
rejecting a major Government policy as being “intolerable and unconstitutional”. 
Callaghan, in summarising the debate, recognised the need for further consideration of 
options, but emphasised the continued pursuit of the legislation, and that the fault of losing 
any Bills would rest with the Lords: 
 
“The Government could not allow their programme for next Session to be affected 
by the behaviour of the Lords, and the legislative proposals in The Queen's Speech 
should all be maintained. If, because of the need to invoke the Parliament Act next 
Session, it was not possible to complete some other measures it would be clear 
where the blame lay” 
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A shorter discussion of an Education Bill was also couched in terms of compelling passage 
through the Parliament Act in the event of Lords’ opposition.39  
By contrast, the Cabinet meeting of 24 February 1977 shows something of a 
different approach. The Government once again considered invoking the Parliament Act to 
ensure passage of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Bill. However, rather than losing the 
legislation, the alternative proposed was seeking a deal with the Opposition. Foot’s 
personal preference once again was to use the Parliament Act, citing some of the political 
dangers involved in any deal: 
 
“The reaction of Government supporters would be hostile, and they were likely to 
vote against these amendments while Ministers had to vote in the same lobby as the 
Conservatives […] parliamentary difficulties of a deal with the Opposition would 
also be very great, and the Cabinet should consider very carefully before deciding 
to seek such a deal.”40 
 
Various points were raised in the subsequent discussion, including the possibility that it 
was better as a minority government to fight and lose. However, it was emphasised that 
there was not much time for the Government to make a decision to challenge the Lords, 
and the argument was ultimately settled by Callaghan, coming down against the use of the 
Parliament Act:  
 
“THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that the majority of the 
Cabinet took the view that the better course was to decide now to seek a deal with 
the Opposition.”41 
 
Foot had also earlier acknowledged that his was a minority opinion, and that a majority of 
the group which had been tasked to consider the options for the Bill: 
 
“had reluctantly reached the conclusion that the industrial consequences of delay 
and the political risks of proceeding under the Parliament Acts made it necessary to 
adopt the second option.” 42 
 
Once again, the minority government situation proved a crucial determining factor, 
discussions being set in the context of the Government having recently lost two Commons 
votes attempting to overturn Lords amendments. The Government’s fear was that any 
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Parliament Act vote would be perceived by the smaller parties as attempting to force 
through controversial legislation without due consideration, and would almost certainly be 
blocked, damaging the prospects for future legislation. The Parliament Act was not 
invoked by the Callaghan Government during its time in office, and not even raised as a 
serious option in Cabinet after February 1977. As discussed later on in this chapter, the 
blaming of the Lords on wholesale obstruction of bills was also not carried through, 
Cabinet preferring the quiet withdrawal of legislation rather than its defeat. In the case of 
the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Bill, the Government went for cooperation with the 




The Conservatives recognised the advantages of the Lords as a block on legislation, 
and sometimes chose to allow Government Bills to pass, planning stronger resistance to 
them in the Lords, where there was less danger of the Opposition being characterised as 
obstructionist. In Shadow Cabinet meetings, the preservation of Lords amendments to 
legislation was given high priority on several occasions when deciding where Conservative 






Votes of confidence or of no confidence in a Government are considered, along with the 
Budget and Queen’s Speech setting out the Government Programme, as being crucial for a 
Government to win if it is to survive. The loss of such a vote would normally lead to the 
Prime Minister’s resignation, and, probably, a General Election or change of party in 
Government. This approach has largely been upheld since the first precedent for resigning 
on a confidence vote, established in 1782 by the British Government led by Lord North. 
Past British administrations, whether in a minority or majority in Parliament, have used the 
confidence motion as a tool to bolster political support, normally after the defeat of a major 
piece of legislation or perceived failure of a particular policy.
45
 
At the time of writing, April 2015, the Callaghan Government is the only British 
Administration in the last ninety years to have been brought down in a motion of no 
confidence. In keeping the focus on the life-cycle of the minority government from its 
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formation to dissolution, this no confidence defeat will be considered at greater length in 
Chapter 9, since it marks the end point of the Callaghan Government. While this final 
confidence vote in March 1979 has already been looked at to a certain extent by scholars, 
what has not received appropriate attention has been the previous votes which the 
Callaghan Administration won, in spite of not having a formal majority, including five 
confidence votes called by the Government, several no confidence votes called by 
opposition parties, three Queen’s Speeches, and three Budgets.46  
Theoretical perspectives on minority governments have mainly concentrated on 
confidence votes at the time of investiture, i.e. as an obstacle to the initial formation of a 
minority government: the absence of such rules, as in Britain, is largely seen as a factor 
making minority government more likely to form in the case of indecisive elections rather 
than coalitions. There is also a general acceptance in the literature that minority 
governments are more susceptible to being defeated on confidence motions, a trend borne 
out in recent British history, where the administrations that have fallen as a result of no 
confidence votes have all been minority governments (twice in 1924 and once in 1979). In 
some countries, such as Canada, the confidence motion has been used by minority 
governments either to compel opposition compliance with particularly controversial 
legislation for fear of otherwise leading to an election, or designed to enable the 
Government’s own defeat and to trigger a General Election which can then be fought on 
the grounds of Opposition obstructionism.
47
 
Although in a minority, the Callaghan Government’s use of confidence motions 
was very much in line with the traditional British conception of strengthening a 
Government, rather than some of the potential uses of reversing legislative defeats or 
holding charges of obstructionism against opposition parties. While the Government did 
suffer from increased backbench rebellions, Labour MPs were, in fact, far more disciplined 
when it came to explicit confidence votes. The success of those confidence motions put 
down by the government, as opposed to the no confidence motions of the Opposition, 
partly relied on circumstances, but also upon careful selection and strategic calculations. 
Callaghan and the Labour Whips recognised that, on certain divisive issues, even the 
strictures of a confidence motion could not be guaranteed to gain the support of all 
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Government MPs, or that making something an issue of confidence would unite the other 
parties in voting against the Government.
48
 
Several backbench amendments to Scottish Devolution legislation in early 1978, as 
a result of Government defeats in the Commons, created significant political difficulties, 
not least in terms of imposing a 40% minimum turnout threshold voting in favour of 
Devolution to carry the proposal. Even the prospect of finally passing both Bills into law 
was considered to be in serious doubt. The Government considered whether votes to 
overturn these amendments, or, indeed, the passage of the entire Bills, should be made 
matters of confidence. Nevertheless, it was concluded that invoking a confidence vote 
would actually lessen the chances of success, shifting the emphasis from the particular 
issue, which was, at this stage, supported by the crucial votes of some pro-Devolution 
Conservatives and Nationalist MPs, to that of a more general endorsement of confidence in 
the Government, more likely sharply to divide MPs along party lines and push opposition 
parties into uniting against the Government. While the Bills were successfully passed, the 
amendments were not overturned, which helped not least to prevent a pro-Devolution 
victory in the Scottish referendum campaign in 1979.
49
 
Conversely, the Government chose to make some issues into confidence motions. 
The attempted Opposition vote to reduce the salary of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
June 1978 was taken to represent a direct challenge to the Government’s economic policy, 
which, after careful deliberation, made the issue into a successful confidence vote. While 
there was an increase in actual and threatened rebellions by Government MPs during this 
period, Labour remained remarkably disciplined on motions of confidence, reflecting the 
Government’s strategic judgement and careful selection.50 
Wilson’s Minority Government of 1974 had attempted to set precedents with 
regard to confidence votes, such as creating different categories of confidence vote, to 
build in some flexibility as to a Government’s response. The apparent aim was to allow the 
Government a chance to call another formally-titled confidence vote even if defeated on 
the Queen’s Speech or Budget, which would previously have been regarded as 
necessitating the resignation of the Government. While this attempted re-conceptualisation 
of confidence motions does not appear to have gained wider acceptance among MPs or 
been subsequently taken up by the Callaghan Government, the latter Administration did 
face internal debates over whether some major pieces of legislation should really be 
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regarded in their traditional role as being implicit ‘confidence’ issues. When there was 
concern about losing the Devolution Bills in February 1978, some in the Cabinet regarded 
these as implicit ‘confidence’ issues, being the major items in the Government’s legislative 
programme, whereas others challenged their centrality, suggesting that this was not 
necessarily the case unless they were made explicit confidence votes.
51
 There have been 
instances in other countries of minority governments seeking to reconceptualise the notion 
of confidence votes, not least, for example, that of the Canadian Liberal Minority 
Government in May 2005, which dismissed a defeat over a committee report as not being a 
confidence vote, and subsequently put forward and won a Budget Bill.
52
 
While the prospect of confidence votes created problems for the Government, the 
Opposition could also suffer political damage when they decided to hold no confidence 
votes and were then unsuccessful in winning them. Indeed, it led to questions being asked 
about the judgement of the Opposition leadership on more than one occasion. Conservative 
preparations for such votes may be regarded in part as reflecting normal debate 
preparation, but also considered other factors. Increasingly these preparations included 
greater discussion on framing confidence motions in a way that would appeal to the 
smaller parties. There were also debates over timing, with the increasing tendency being to 




One of the most informative cases, in terms of the Government and Opposition 
approach to confidence motions, is that of the defeat in the vote on sanctions in December 
1978. This defeat, on an Opposition motion criticising the Government’s use of sanctions 
on companies awarding workers higher pay rises than the 5% target limit, helped to open 
the floodgates to the subsequent wave of strikes.
54
 Even if such sanctions would have been 
ineffective in the case of Ford, the contemporary view of the Cabinet was very much that 
the threat of sanctions in other cases had proved to have a significant impact, and that the 
parliamentary difficulties “stemmed from the absence of a Government majority”.55 This 
vote also remains particularly instructive in terms of how Government and Opposition 
handled minority government in Parliament; from the Government perspective, the 
decision not to make implementation of the sanctions a confidence vote, and from the 
Opposition perspective, the ability to vote against sanctions but avoid being blamed for the 
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subsequent industrial turmoil. It may appear strange that the Government lost the vote on 
sanctions but then called and won a general vote of confidence the next day, without 
attempting to overturn the earlier decision. Why did they not make the sanctions issue 
itself a confidence motion, given the perceived importance of the 5% figure? In an 
indication of the seriousness of the issue, Callaghan himself, along with Foot, met with 
members of the Tribune Group who had threatened to vote against the sanctions. A minute 
of their conversation suggests that even the threat of a confidence motion would not 
necessarily have prevented defections. As had been the case with Devolution legislation, it 
would appear the Government believed that their initiation of a confidence motion would 
compel all opposition parties into voting against. Such a prospective defeat, leading to a 
January election in bad weather and against the background of striking trade unions, 
conjured images of the Conservatives’ defeat in February 1974, counselling the Labour 
leadership against linking the two issues. This vote also represents something of a paradox 
in terms of the Opposition’s approach. In part, their victory resulted from using a technical 
motion and not seeking to portray the vote as a major confrontation between Government 
and Opposition, enabling some Labour backbenchers who disagreed with the 
Government’s policy on pay sanctions to feel that they could vote with opposition parties 
on a motion without endangering the existence of the Government. The Conservatives 
were able subsequently to criticise the Government’s lack of effective action concerning 
the industrial disputes, while having simultaneously disempowered ministers by voting 
down sanctions. The Opposition’s approach relied on an emphasis that the Government’s 
policy had been flawed, the Conservative shift to a tougher stance regarding the regulation 
of trade unions, and on the subsequent offer made by Thatcher during January 1979 to 
cooperate with the Government over passing measures to mitigate strike action.
56
 The 
defeat over sanctions also continued to limit the Government’s legislative response to the 
industrial situation in the early months of 1979, not least, for example, when attempting to 
pass an Order limiting the prices charged by the road haulage industry. Callaghan 
expressed his fears to Cabinet, suggesting that: “The Government might well be defeated 
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Accepting defeat 
 
An alternative to minority governments avoiding parliamentary defeat, either through use 
of institutional resources or not putting contentious legislation forward, is to accept defeat 
as a consequence of not having a majority. A government may either publicly accept this, 
or publicly reject defeat but tacitly accept it by not seeking to overturn a decision. Minority 
(and indeed majority) governments around the world have often accepted losing votes on 
certain pieces of legislation, without the need for a change of government or an election. 
The 1974 Wilson Minority Government tacitly accepted certain defeats, such as over six-
monthly pension upratings, while maintaining a robust public rhetoric, in anticipation that 




The Callaghan Government similarly maintained a defiant public stance, retaining 
very much a majoritarian mindset and stressing in strategy meetings that the Government 
could not formally and publicly ‘accept’ defeats over its major policies. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that, on some issues at least, the leadership accepted legislative defeats, prioritising 
their efforts in terms of only trying to reverse particular legislative decisions.
59
 
Although the sheer number of defeats suffered was much greater than majority 
governments before and after the Callaghan Administration, not all defeats were of equal 
importance. Contemporary political actors recognised that there was a hierarchy of 
parliamentary defeats. Some losses of parliamentary votes barely feature in official records 
of Cabinet discussions, meetings of strategy-makers, or political memoirs, such as that 
over an adjournment motion on teacher training colleges in Scotland in April 1977 or the 
Firearms (Variation of Fees) Order in March 1979.
60
 By contrast, other defeats, including 
over Devolution, Income Tax Reductions, and, of course, the defeat over a vote of no 
confidence in 1979, were of much greater importance, and had significant space dedicated 
to discussions concerning the response to them.
61
 
One Government tactic, used in the early stages of the minority government, was to 
accept defeat by abstaining on a vote which they knew in any case could not be won 
because of rebellion among their own MPs and/or unity of opposition parties. The aim of 
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this approach, when first applied to an adjournment debate on Child Benefit on 28 June 
1976, was to lessen the humiliation of defeat or even refute that a defeat had occurred at all 
so as to deny political ammunition to the Opposition. The approach does not appear to 
have been especially successful, however, only being used on one other occasion, over an 
adjournment debate over a public expenditure White Paper on 11 March 1977. The 
abandonment of the tactic may reflect this latter experience, providing little more than a 
breathing space and serving as an encouragement to the Opposition motion of no 




In other cases, defeat was swiftly followed by the modification of Government 
policy. When defeated on an adjournment motion concerning the setup of a contentious 
Government inquiry on 5 December 1977, the Government’s reaction was immediately ‘to 
accept the will of the House’ and change the format of the inquiry. Indeed, the Prime 
Minister’s statement to the Commons on the matter was amended more clearly to express 
that the Government ‘accepted’ the decision, rather than the original and more obscure 
formulation ‘did not intend to stand in the way of’. After suffering an unexpected defeat on 
a clause of the Devolution legislation for Wales, the Government planned to try to reinstate 
the clause at a later stage, but also showed willingness to concede the loss of the clause if it 
would facilitate easier passage of the Bill.
63
 
Accepting defeat was not restricted to procedural questions but also some more 
major aspects of Government policy. Conservative amendments to the 1978 Finance Bill, 
reducing income tax from 34% to 33% and increasing the personal allowance, were 
initially regarded as intolerable by the Government when successfully passed through the 
Commons by a combination of opposition MPs. Ultimately, however, the amendments 
became accepted when the Cabinet concluded that the risks of defeat in trying to reverse 
the decisions were too great, that further defeats over these issues would lead to the 
collapse of the Government, and that, even if successful, restoration of the previous rates 
would be unpopular among the wider electorate.
64
 
More recent minority government theory has even gone so far as to suggest that 
regular defeats of a minority government that change policy need not challenge the 
viability of the incumbent administration. In Denmark, for example, there were frequent 
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cases in the 1980s of minority governments being overruled by an ‘alternative majority’ of 




Although as indicated above, the Callaghan Administration accepted certain 
Opposition victories while regarding some others as intolerable, there are significant 
differences between the attitudes of Danish and British political elites, as well as in the 
scope of this approach. The Callaghan Government’s acceptance of legislative defeats was 
a begrudging recognition of their inability to reverse particular votes on single issues, 
rather than on whole policy areas. Defeats were also still regarded very much within the 
British political establishment as a sign of outright government weakness and a deviation 
from the expected ‘norm’ of strong majority government. While Labour sought to lessen 
the impact of particular defeats, there is no indication of any sustained effort to normalise 






A third and rather unusual possibility for governments dealing with parliamentary defeat is 
to actually want it or even actively work towards this outcome. Normally, the idea of 
Governments seeking to engineer the loss of their own legislative votes might be 
considered as counterintuitive. Rather than having consciously to get some of their MPs to 
vote against these specific measures, all the Government required was to push the 
legislation forward and endeavour to agitate and bait the Opposition into voting against it. 
The tactic of using unwinnable Bills as signposts built on the experience of the Wilson 
Minority Government in 1974, when similar concerns led to such legislation as the 
refunding of £10 million in tax to trade unions being put forward in the hope that it would 
be defeated by the Opposition, which, in fact, occurred on 19 June 1974.
67
 
This paradoxical practice is actually far more common than might otherwise be 
expected. Theoretical discussions of minority government highlight two ‘unusual’ 
situations in which such defeat may be sought. Either, a government may wish to provide 
an excuse for calling an early election because of ‘obstructionist’ opposition politicians (as 
                                                 
65
 C. Green-Pederson, ‘Minority Governments and Party Politics’, pp. 15-16, 20. 
66
 See infra, pp. 91-2, 134-6. 
67
 B. Castle, The Castle Diaries, p. 118; R. Hazell and A. Paun (eds), Making Minority Government Work, p. 
65; J. Campbell, Edward Heath, pp. 635-6; I. Burton and G. Drewry, ‘Public Legislation: A Survey of the 
Session 1974’, pp. 158-60; F. Stacey, British Government 1966-1975: Years of Reform (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), p. 52. 
Chapter 4 – Defeats and Legislative Management  94 
was the case in Canada in 1974), or in preparing issues for a future campaign, a 
government wishes to establish a policy objective it seriously wants to accomplish as being 
blocked by the efforts of opposition parties.
68
 
In Callaghan’s case, it was very much the latter, suggesting that certain Bills should 
be put forward which Ministers knew would be defeated, but highlighted potential future 
campaign policies. These Bills were also perceived by Labour as seeking to satisfy 
supporters, both within Parliament and the wider country, who demanded action on such 
issues as Occupational Pensions Schemes legislation, Post Office reforms, or the Dock 
Labour Scheme. Various strategy meetings had highlighted concerns by leading figures 
that the Government could not win an election if it could not pass controversial legislation. 
For example, the Cabinet meeting of 3 March 1977 considered the question of what future 
legislation the Government should put forward given the ongoing state of minority 
government and recent defeats. In summarising the discussion, Callaghan highlighted the 
different proposed approaches over seeking parliamentary defeat:  
 
“the Government had to consider what strategy to adopt while without a 
parliamentary majority […] whether to introduce Bills which would be popular 
with the Government’s own supporters but likely to be defeated in Parliament, or 
whether to take special steps to obtain the necessary support for Government 
legislation.”69 
 
The Cabinet Legislation committee was tasked to respond to this discussion, looking to 
address these concerns in their meeting of 10 March 1977 by, amongst other things, 
recommending a series of Bills which were unlikely to pass but were judged to have use as 
political signposts and electoral campaign ammunition. However, although sentiments 
were expressed on several occasions favouring this approach, there is little evidence to 
suggest that these signpost Bills were actually pursued unless support could be secured for 
them. In fact, Callaghan and the Cabinet increasingly perceived any Commons legislative 
defeat as undesirable and damaging to the Government. A reflection of this approach is the 
fact that only two Government defeats involved the loss of entire Bills, both occurring 
earlier on during Callaghan’s Administration, on low turnouts of fewer than 200 MPs in 
the Commons, seemingly as much a result of miscalculation rather than planned 
confrontation between Government and Opposition. After July 1977, all the Callaghan 
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Government’s parliamentary defeats were on amendments to Bills or on motions rather 
than the loss of entire Bills. Where Government legislation was part-way through the 
parliamentary process but unlikely to be completed successfully, the preference was 
quietly to abandon work on the Bills, rather than risk their being defeated in Parliament.
70
  
One such example of the Government’s fear of defeat may be seen in the case of 
the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Bill, discussed earlier on in the chapter. While the November 
1976 Cabinet were more confrontational in terms of it being “preferable to lose the Bill 
this session rather than give way to the Lords”, the meeting of February 1977 made a deal 
with the Opposition.
71
 Another particularly interesting example may be seen in the 
Occupational Pension Schemes Bill. In meetings in 1976 and 1977, the TUC had stressed 
that they particularly wanted the Government to proceed with passage of the Bill, even if 
controversial provisions were “amended or deleted”.72 However, having ascertained the 
likely defeat of these proposals, subsequent Cabinet discussions in May 1977 highlighted 
that, even if the Bill could be passed in a significantly amended form, the amendments 
constituted an unacceptable political price: 
 
“strong doubts were expressed whether it would be advisable to introduce a Bill 
containing these provisions, which would be to court a humiliating defeat at the 
hands of the Opposition and the minority Parties. Defeats in Parliament on issues of 
importance damaged the Government and its electoral prospects.” 
 
Callaghan very much shared this view, summarising that “the standing of the Government 
was only weakened by defeats on issues of this kind.”73 The legislation was quietly 
shelved, as referred to in a rather more perfunctory note in the Cabinet discussion of 20 
October 1977 when compared with the earlier debate, “because it would not secure 
sufficient support in the present Parliament”.74  
Conversely, the prospect of the Government seeking its own defeat led the 
Opposition to contemplate how to avoid the dangers of being lured into a trap. The 
Conservative Opposition to Wilson’s Minority Government had attempted to grapple with 
this problem in 1974, either through choosing not to vote against the Government, or 
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deliberately to withdraw certain backbenchers from a vote to ensure Government victory. 
While there was no repeat of these tactics during the Callaghan Administration, the 
Opposition did modify their approach at times to address this strategic dilemma. In some 
instances, the Conservatives supported the Government over legislation or in particular 
votes which would otherwise have led to defeat by the actions of rebel Labour MPs. While 
sometimes this was very much in line with pre-existing practices, there were other cases 
where the Opposition clearly envisaged the move as a tactical response to minority 




In addition to the disunity between different opposition parties, there were other 
factors which limited the Conservative ability or desire to defeat the Government. Some of 
the most major pieces of Government legislation were those over which the Conservatives 
themselves were divided, such as Devolution, or else had a particular interest in seeing 
implemented, such as Direct Elections to the European Parliament. As a result, there were 
a number of instances when the Opposition actively supported the Government in the 






Contrary to what has previously been acknowledged, both the Government and the 
Opposition were more proactive in their strategic approaches to managing legislation and 
defeats during a minority government. The initial conflict over pairing agreements set the 
tone for subsequent Government-Opposition relations, and conditioned the strategy-
making process for the main parties in ways that have often been overlooked in studies of 
this period. 
The Government at times operated as Taylor and Laver’s theoretical ‘almost a 
majority government’, making increased use of its institutional powers to ensure passage 
of a full legislative programme. At the same time, however, the Government recognised 
the limitations of its minority position, and the inability to pursue wholesale institutional 
changes in the legislative process that could have increased its power, such as over reform 
of the House of Lords or use of referenda. 
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Over time, the Government’s position increasingly evolved to one more accepting 
of added limitations in terms of what Bills could be passed, being ready to drop entire 
pieces of legislation. A largely-majoritarian approach was maintained, with no effort being 
made to normalise the process of legislative defeats, while the practice of actively seeking 
defeats for tactical purposes was considered too radical an option to be pursued. The 
selective use of confidence votes played a much more important role than has hitherto been 
accepted. While mistakes were made, adoption of these strategies helped to enable the 
Callaghan Government to survive for a prolonged period of time without a majority, even 
in instances where interparty cooperation was not guaranteed. 
The Conservatives’ ability to thwart Government legislative efforts remained very 
much dependent on factors beyond their control. Nevertheless, their approach of 
consciously recognising some of the potential minority government traps, selective 
opposition to legislation, increased reliance on committees and the House of Lords to avoid 
charges of obstructionism, and offers of cooperation to the Government, reflected 
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As may be seen in the previous chapters, the process of managing and passing legislation 
through Parliament without a majority presented important strategic questions for 
Government and Opposition. Although the Government sought to rely on a combination of 
traditional majoritarian approaches in addition to some institutional devices, situations 
arose in which their maintenance of a Parliamentary majority depended upon cooperation 
with other smaller parties and independent MPs in the House of Commons. 
Studies and reflections by participants on interparty cooperation during the 
Callaghan Administration have been dominated by the subject of the Pact between the 
Liberals and Labour during the period of March 1977 to September 1978. The Pact 
presents something of a conundrum for any study on minority government, appearing to be 
closer to a coalition. More recent scholarship (not least Kirkup’s as yet unpublished 2012 
work)
1
 has also given greater detailed consideration to the Pact in its own right than is 
possible in this study. Both main parties have typically been perceived as subscribing to 
the previously-cited ‘minimal winning’ formula, demonstrated not least in a general 
preference for ad hoc deals to ensure a government majority in particular votes and the 
general hostility expressed towards any notion of coalition. Subscription to the Lib-Lab 
Pact could well be regarded through this optic of applying only minimal conditions on both 
the Government and the Liberals.
2
 
In addition, the Agreement has generally been viewed as representing a lack of 
strategy-making, authored as primarily a reactive measure, entered into reluctantly by 
Labour, and largely leaving neither party’s goals satisfied beyond the sustaining of the 
Government in office. The alternative was defeat and a snap General Election, at a time 
when the Conservatives held a significant opinion poll lead of up to 15%.
3
 Even those such 
as Lipsey, who considered the most optimistic polling scenario at 7%, advised against an 
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early election. While this option received some consideration by the Government, as 
discussed in Chapter 7, it was still rejected as unlikely to deliver a victory.
4
  
However, while the Government’s participation in a formal interparty agreement 
may have been compelled by circumstances when facing defeat in 1977, the shape of this 
Agreement was by no means certain, being conditioned particularly by the contemporary 
experiences of minority government. The Government’s handling of the negotiation, 
renegotiation and operation of this Agreement involved greater strategic consideration and 
discussion about how to deal with interparty cooperation in a minority government setting 
than has previously been appreciated, including, for example, Donoughue’s paper for the 
June 1977 Strategy Cabinet, or the paper by the then Special Adviser Lipsey, indicating 
possible responses to the March 1977 confidence vote.
5
 In fact, in some ways, the 
Government’s use of the Pact may have been as much a psychological tool, with the 
Government even willing to consider only monthly renewal as better than having no 
Agreement. Other possibilities for cooperation that presented themselves to both main 
parties, before, during and after the Pact, as well as extra-parliamentary agreements and the 
prospect of post-electoral deals, will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters.
6
 
To understand fully the strategic dynamics involved in the Callaghan Government’s 
approach to the Pact, this chapter will begin by examining the distinctive nature of the 
Agreement and the formation process in light of aspects of the negotiations which shaped 
and were shaped by the state of minority government. Thereafter, the chapter will consider 
the Pact in terms of confrontation over raising petrol tax which shaped the renegotiation; 
the often-overlooked strategic discourse during the renewal of the Pact; the Government’s 
changing strategic approach during the course of the Pact; and development of an exit 
strategy. Some aspects which play an important part in negotiations or the scholarship 
applying to them will be highlighted insofar as it relates to questions of minority 
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Formation of the Pact 
Distinctive 
 
The Lib-Lab Pact, as with the Callaghan Government as a whole, provides an important 
case study in minority government because of its distinctive characteristics compared to 
formal interparty legislative agreements elsewhere. In part, these features can be explained 
as having arisen from inexperience of formalised interparty cooperation or the particular 
political circumstances in 1977. However, this format also reflected the distinct British 
tradition of minority government, which helped to enable the survival of the Pact and 
Government. Labour’s already cited deep-seated hostility to coalition meant the 
Government did not countenance the formation of a coalition, party leaders repeatedly 
seeking to reassure MPs and the wider party that their deal with the Liberals did not 
amount to one. 
Some of the devices typically adopted for interparty negotiations elsewhere were 
not used by the Callaghan Government, such as, for example, obtaining a mandate from 
MPs or party members before entering negotiations.
7
 There were no formally constituted 
teams, nor apparent briefing notes and pre-arranged strategy for negotiation.
8
 The Pact 
negotiations would appear not to fit into any formalised model, arising as a largely ad hoc 
and purely reactive measure by individuals facing the prospect of imminent Government 
defeat, such as Cyril Smith’s attempted approach to Callaghan or Foot’s approaches to 
Powell. Even narratives highlighting the overall strategic visions being pursued by 
individuals, particularly that of Steel, recognise this initial formation process as largely 
unstructured on both sides.
9
 
Devices for interparty cooperation that were employed, such as a formal written 
agreement, took on a different form from experiences of interparty cooperation and 
coalition elsewhere.
10
 The Government’s preferred form of any written agreement was of 
                                                 
7
 D. Giannetti and K. Ineoit (eds), Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments (London: Routledge, 
2008), pp. 174-5. See infra, pp. 12-15, 99. 
8
 Teams are typically around four to five individuals, although can be far more substantial. Negotiations 
following the 2005 German Federal Election included sixteen people in each of the two main teams, and a 
total of one hundred and ninety negotiators in attached working groups. C. Clemens and T. Saalfeld (eds), 
The German General Election of 2005: Voters, Parties and Grand Coalition Politics (London: Routledge, 
2013), pp. 176-8; R. W. Andeweg, L. De Vinter, and P. Dumont (eds), Government Formation, pp. 39-40; R. 
Hazell and A. Paun (eds), Making Minority Government Work, pp. 43-4, 86. 
9
 Callaghan Papers, Box 19, 2741, Michael Foot and Roy Mason Report – Ken Stowe to Prime Minister, 18 
March 1977; J. Kirkup, ‘The Parliamentary Agreement’, pp. 75, 84-6; K. O. Morgan, Britain Since 1945, pp. 
400-1; A. Mitchie and S. Hoggart, The Pact, pp. 10-11, 30-64; P. Bartram, David Steel, pp. 143-52. 
10
 C. Moury, Coalition Government and Party Mandate: How Coalition Agreements Constrain Ministerial 
Action (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 1-8, 34-6, 74-5; R. Hazell and A. Paun (eds), Making Minority 
Government Work, pp. 69, 71-3; D. Butler, Governing Without a Majority, pp. 56-71, 110-21. 
Chapter 5 – Lib-Lab Pact  102 
an exchange of letters between party leaders, rather than a more formal contract. These 
letters were subject to extensive redrafting by the Government, not least to prevent the 
Agreement from being perceived as a coalition. One amendment, for example, included 
that the commitment to consultation on paper was to be between the two party leaders, 
rather than the wider parties, designed to frame the Agreement as being limited to within 
Parliament. Another change was the removal of references to what Government plans were 
being dropped in terms of further nationalisation and the Direct Labour Bill. Even 
although, as highlighted in Lipsey’s paper, it would have been difficult in any case to 
proceed with these measures, the Government wanted to avoid the perception of the 
Liberals blocking policy or forcing concessions. Steel accepted the deletion of this 
paragraph in return for the change itself being “conveyed in briefing”. Changes also sought 
to give the Government more room for manoeuvre, avoiding being tied to specific 
legislative commitments on the basis of a timetable.
11
 
Furthermore, there were few attempts to utilise any kind of long-term commissions 
to solve intractable policy differences. The Consultative Committee, comprising several 
representatives from both parties, was more of a system for resolving day-to-day 
legislative disputes, and justified by the Government merely as an extension of pre-existing 
consultative mechanisms between Government and bodies such as the TUC, not attaining a 
higher priority than those mechanisms when formulating Government plans.
12
 Speaker’s 
Conferences, formal inquiries historically used for dealing with important constitutional 
questions concerning electoral arrangements, were similarly limited in their usefulness. 
Terms of reference and composition being set by the Government and dominated by the 
two main parties, these Conferences primary purpose was to confer legitimacy on a policy 
agreed between Government and Opposition. Callaghan did offer a Conference on 
increased Northern Ireland parliamentary representation to the UUP, but there was no 
similar offer to the Liberals concerning PR in Direct Elections. In the failed 1974 
negotiations by contrast, the Conservatives had gone so far as to offer the Liberals a 
Conference on PR for House of Commons elections. Steel, however, desired a more solid 
commitment to legislation in 1977, mindful of the failed coalition attempt in 1974.
13
  
                                                 
11
 Callaghan Papers, Box 19, 2741, Various annotated papers and handwritten notes on the wording of the 
Lib-Lab Agreement 20-23 March 1977; TNA: CAB 128/61, 12
th
 Meeting, 23 March 1977; 128/62, 28
th
 
Meeting, 28 July 1977; PREM 16/1399, Stowe to Callaghan, 23 March 1977; B. Donoughue, Downing Street 
Diaries, vol. ii, pp. 168-9. See infra, pp. 106-7. 
12
 TNA: PREM 16/1399, Cabinet: Liberal Party Agreement, 23 March 1977; Lord President and Mr Steel 
Meeting, 28 March 1977; J. Kirkup, ‘The Parliamentary Agreement’, pp. 130-2; P. Bartram, David Steel, pp. 
148-50; D. Steel, A House Divided, pp. 36-7; See infra, footnotes 13-14. 
13
 House of Commons, Parliamentary Briefing Paper (2009), SN/PC/04426, ‘Speaker’s Conferences’, pp. 1-
10; TNA: PREM 16/842, Note of a Meeting to discuss Representation at Westminster in the context of 
Chapter 5 – Lib-Lab Pact  103 
The Callaghan Government ended up using a promised free vote on PR for Direct 
Elections to deal with the issue. Dialogue between Government leaders would suggest that 
this method was accepted more because it would deal with problems Labour would have in 
any case faced through its own divisions over the issue of Direct Elections than as a 
specific concession to the Liberals or device for facilitating interparty cooperation.
14
 
Conditions set down in the Pact would, at first glance, suggest a limited 
‘Confidence and Supply’ agreement, in which an MP, party or group of parties agrees 
either to vote with a minority government or to abstain on votes of confidence or some/all 
monetary-spending bills. In such an agreement, usually, but not always, participants 
remain separate from the Government itself and do not take up ministerial posts. The 
agreement is normally established to operate over a set period of months or years, with the 
Government supplying some added legislative benefits to those providing support, such as 
greater influence in the formation of legislation, or support for particular Bills or policies 
advocated by the smaller parties. These arrangements may secure a government majority 
on certain issues, but their incomplete coverage and potential vulnerability of the 
government on other legislation, may, in practice, mean that the government is still 
formally in a ‘minority’.15 
However, as rightly identified by Kirkup, the Pact was not a typical ‘Confidence 
and Supply’ agreement, the Liberals only committing themselves to backing the 
Government in formally declared votes of confidence, rather than necessarily the ‘Supply’ 
of monetary spending Bills.
16
 In fact, it is arguable as to whether, in practice, the Pact even 
went so far as to qualify as a ‘Confidence’ agreement. Liberal MPs considered opposing 
and, in some cases, ultimately voted against Government Budget items which they 
disagreed with, in spite of such measures traditionally being matters of confidence. These 
ambiguities served to lay the foundations for the first major conflict of the Pact (discussed 
below) over the raising of petrol tax, as well as setting up further significant Government 
defeats over Budget items in both 1977 and 1978. Typical ‘Confidence and Supply’ 
arrangements also would tend to last a minimum of twelve to eighteen months and may 
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even extend up to the full length of a four to five year Parliament. By contrast, the initial 
Pact only committed both sides until the end of the Parliamentary session in the summer of 
1977, a time period of around three months. The continued insecurity arising from such a 
short-term agreement seems at odds with the Government having sought mainly to justify 
their efforts to secure a formal deal on the basis of ending uncertainty and reducing the 
need for vote-by-vote negotiations. Furthermore, the Pact was negotiated in less than five 
days, a much shorter timeframe than most interparty negotiations elsewhere. The restricted 
time-frame and the immovable deadline of a no confidence vote played an important role 
in pressuring parties into an agreement.
17
 
While this short-term outcome would seem, at first glance, paradoxical, not 
satisfying the objectives of either party, and indicative of the Pact’s reactive formation 
process, it was not totally counterintuitive. In other countries minority coalition 
governments have been formed and have governed successfully for a full term without a 
parliamentary majority. There are, however, other advantages of an agreement in these 
instances, not least in terms of raising governments to the ‘almost’ majority threshold 
suggested by Taylor and Laver in Chapter 1. Other psychological advantages include the 
perception of greater governing legitimacy among commentators and the wider public, and 
the dissuading of opposing parties from attempting repeatedly to bring down a 
government, by the implied failure of any prospective no confidence vote. The distinct 
form of the Lib-Lab Pact as a short-term ‘experiment’, as it was dubbed by participants, 
actually helped to enable its successful enactment and renewal, as represented in internal 
dialogues between Callaghan and other decision-makers. While, as stated earlier, the 
Government’s motivation was largely reactive, the final shape of the Pact was significantly 
affected by the negotiating process. By looking at the employment of potential negotiating 
tactics and the wider implications, it is possible to trace the strategic forces shaping the 
agreement, and further to highlight the main parties’ adherence to a particular British 
tradition of minority government.
18
 
Other issues raised by the negotiations provide even more direct insight into the 
Government’s development of strategy as a minority administration when forming the 
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Pact, and, particularly, during its subsequent renewal, including rhetoric/pre-signalling 




The exchange of statements of intent prior to negotiations, whether through party leaders’ 
correspondence or through press releases and television/radio interviews, tends to allow 
parties to reassure their supporters, citing continued commitment to particular electoral 
promises and criticising political opponents. In political systems where majoritarian 
government has historically been preferred, such as Britain, rhetoric will often also 
emphasise the Government’s mandate to govern, avoiding or limiting references to 
prospective interparty cooperation. In March 1977, the Government public rhetoric was 
one of daring opposition parties to trigger an early election.
19
 There also appear to have 
been some attempts by the Government to use communications to put pressure on the 
Liberals in terms of negotiations, and vice-versa, whether through strongly-worded press 
releases, newspaper comments, TV interviews, telephone conversations, or letters, warning 
of the impending election that would follow defeat. In the Liberals’ case, for example, 
these indications were echoed in Steel’s 19 March statement with the threat that “either” 
the Government could seek interparty cooperation over its wider legislative programme “or 
else we have a General Election”. From the Government side, references made were 
primarily brief factual statements, without specifying details of ongoing discussions, and 
generally refuting the use of such words as “deal” when asked if the Government were 
pursuing formal interparty cooperation. Similarly, Government spokesmen tended to take a 
belligerent line against the prospect of the Liberals bringing down the Government, not 
least for example in Rees’ implied threat of “so be it” on 21 March.20  
These exchanges may also set out parties’ negotiating positions and flag up a small 
number of crucial ‘red lines’ that are non-negotiable, while indicating particular aspirations 
that are then revised in discussions. In the 2010 General Election, for example, the Liberal 
Democrat manifesto included four top priorities considered critical to any post-electoral 
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interparty agreement, while Conservative leader David Cameron’s speech following the 
result set out ‘red lines’ on foreign and economic policy.21  
However, while the Callaghan Government were endeavouring to communicate 
their position and criticise their opponents through the media, this approach was grounded 
in pre-existing majoritarian practices in an effort to discourage opposition parties from 
voting against the Government, rather than being consciously engineered as part of 
signalling policy preferences for a negotiating strategy. The Government did seek to keep 
informed of statements by the smaller parties in the run up to the vote, including through 




The Government preferred communicating negotiating points through private 
channels, particularly letters and meetings between individuals in the party leadership and 
those of other parties. Limiting the Agreement’s scope to a Parliamentary arrangement 
with MPs of other parties, rather than wider party memberships, was also considered likely 
to help justify the deal to the Party. Unlike 1974, the secrecy of the initial formation 
process, the absence of leaking concrete information about the discussions, and the 
perception that any successful outcome was considered less likely by participants in both 




Planning for cooperation 
 
As indicated above, the reactive nature of the Pact negotiations and ad hoc approach meant 
that there does not appear to have been as much planning by the Government on how to 
tackle such a situation. Callaghan did ask his civil service advisers for additional 
information in order to help facilitate the negotiations, including a summary of the present 
and future proposed legislation which detailed the Liberals’ parliamentary actions 
regarding recent Bills.
24
 At the same time, however, members of the Callaghan 
Government were also engaging in some strategic consideration as to the implications for 
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prospective pacts, not least in the above-cited paper by Lipsey, which suggested that an 
agreement with the Liberals was the preferred option in the circumstances. Having 
examined and ruled out the alternatives of a UUP deal and early election, Lipsey detailed 
some of the different potential obstacles to a Lib-Lab Agreement and how these would be 
dealt with. Thereafter, the paper went on to explore the various conditions which, it was 
expected, would be attached by the Liberals to any such deal, concluding that enough 
could be offered by the Government to ensure an agreement without making any 
significant compromises from the perspective of the Government’s leadership. Conditions 
in terms of dropping legislation, such as the Direct Labour Organisation Bill, were viewed 
either as merely fulfilling the Government’s existing intentions or even as a positive 
excuse to avoid politically difficult issues: “We were going to have to anyway”, “There is 
no such Bill”, and, on the Bullock report on Industrial Democracy, “an excuse to escape 
from the TUC/Jack Jones axis on this issue is much to be desired”.25 Where it appeared 
that the Government would struggle to gain support for legislative demands, such as a 
stronger Devolution Bill and PR for European Direct Elections, Lipsey suggested that 
these could still be discussed with the Liberals or even offered: “on the understanding that 
the decision […] is ultimately one for the House of Commons”. Lipsey’s paper also 
represents one of the few instances of an example outside the British experience being 
employed in the illustrations of strategy-makers. In this case, the example was of the then 
Italian Government maintaining its unity while entering a Pact with a party of a different 
ideological persuasion, such that: “The Andreotti example of keeping the Communists with 
the Government, without splitting his Party, shows what can be done”. The use of this 
particular example does not appear to have been widely taken up in subsequent planning, 
reflecting the general preference for drawing upon British parliamentary precedents. That 
Lipsey himself advocated the arrangement with the Liberals is perhaps more surprising 
given his own strong dislike of the party, admitted to in the closing paragraph. However, 
dismissing other options as “hideously unattractive”, he ended by challenging the 
MacDonald example which had helped to influence Labour’s hostility to interparty 
cooperation, hoping that such an aversion would “not entice us into an act of electoral 
suicide”. While it is difficult to ascertain the full impact of Lipsey’s paper, the sentiments 
expressed and suggestions made appear to have been very much in line with the eventual 
outcome of forming and justifying the Pact to Labour as a temporary measure borne out of 
necessity and not imposing significant burdens upon the Government. 
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Prospective Bidding war 
 
Another side of simultaneous negotiations, although more unusual, is that of trying to 
compel potential political partners to outbid each other, or to pressure one to sign a barely 
acceptable deal for fear of losing out to another party, as occurred following the 1996 New 
Zealand Election. Following the 2010 UK Election, disclosure of Liberal Democrat 
negotiations occurring both with the Conservatives and Labour has been characterised as 
“bidding” for coalition partners.26 However, although the Callaghan Government could 
approach different smaller parties in 1977 it could not necessarily promise delivery of what 
they wanted, whether PR for the Liberals, or Northern Ireland Devolution along lines 
favoured by the UUP. Negotiations were conducted secretly, and there was no attempt by 
the Government to get smaller parties into a bidding competition with one another. Some 
prospective combinations with other small parties were also ruled out for strategic and/or 
political reasons, discussed further in Chapter 6.
27
 
Correspondence and Cabinet discussions suggested that talks between the 
Government and UUP in March 1977 were initially regarded as more likely to lead to a 
successful agreement.
28
 However, the Cabinet, Special Advisers, and Policy Unit opposed 
relying upon a UUP deal, believing it to be unworkable based upon the previous UUP 
voting record and policy differences. Concerns were raised that any formal agreement 
between Labour and the UUP would lose electoral support of Catholics in important UK 
constituencies.
29
 Both sides questioned how far the Government could deliver policies to 
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sustain any long-term deal, fearing the need for endless bargaining, a sentiment expressed 
not least in the above-cited paper by Lipsey, that the UUP were:  
 
“mostly Conservative by temperament and it is difficult to believe that we should 
permanently win any auction for their votes (eg by promising tougher security 
measures). We might just buy their abstention for Wednesday, but the alliance 
would be unstable, especially since Enoch Powell’s support would probably 
disappear if we introduced a Direct Elections Bill”.30  
 
Callaghan and Foot referred to parallel talks or offers to both parties during their meetings 
with the Liberals and the UUP, but there is no evidence that this was a conscious tactic, or 
that it had any effect on pressuring a deal. While any formal agreement with the Liberals 
could, and necessarily would, be made public, formalised cooperation with the UUP 
remained secret. Although both sets of discussions were subsequently acknowledged in the 




Any possibility of a bidding war was further diminished when, from the outset, the 
Government gave the assurance that increased Northern Ireland Representation would be 
granted regardless of the conclusion of a parliamentary deal. This move appears to have 
been designed as a gesture of goodwill, aiming to secure the support of a handful of UUP 
MPs over a longer timescale than the immediate confidence vote, even without a formal 
deal. While this opening offer may have limited the prospect of extracting greater 
concessions, it is questionable as to whether a conditional offer would have yielded better 
results.
32
 A limited deal with the UUP was done through an exchange of letters between 
party leaders, but, being kept secret, could not provide the public psychological 
reassurance of giving the Government the appearance of a majority. Certain UUP members 
continued support of the Government in votes and internal correspondence during the 
course of the Lib-Lab Pact would suggest that the Government’s tactic had some success. 
Lacking the same immediate electoral challengers which were faced by the parties in 
constituencies in Scotland, England and Wales, the UUP were not under the same 
pressures to do any deal with the Government as was the case with their Liberal 
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counterparts.
33
 At the same time, the arrangement also created issues for future 
Government strategy. In spite of attempted secrecy, news reporting of the ongoing 
discussions taking place and the subsequent actions of the UUP sustaining the Government 
(which lessened the believability of denials), prompted increased opposition from the 






Although the Agreement’s formation and the March 23 confidence vote have rightly been 
regarded as important, a particularly crucial experience conditioning the long-term 
operation of the Lib-Lab Pact was, in fact, the dispute which flared up in the weeks 
following the Pact’s inauguration over the Government plans to raise petrol tax by 5.5p. In 
the same way that the disruption of the usual channels in the summer of 1976 had 
influenced party approaches to minority government, the petrol tax conflict significantly 
shaped the Government’s approach to Liberal-Labour interactions and the workings of an 
interparty agreement. Liberal MPs judged this increase to be of particular concern to their 
supporters in rural constituencies and decided to vote against. While Kirkup rightly 
suggests that the episode reflected a lack of ‘experience of coalition politics’ for all sides, it 
is important to recognise that the Callaghan Government had as much to learn from the 
episode as the Liberals.
35
 The initial public reaction of the Government was more 
majoritarian, seeking to compel Liberal support through raising the spectre of a defeat over 
the issue as leading to the resignation of the Government and an immediate election. At the 
PLP meeting on 21 April 1977, Callaghan, as picked up on by Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury Joel Barnett, stressed the importance of avoiding the appearance of “solely 
reacting to the Liberals”.36 Nevertheless, from the outset the Government sought privately 
to balance these threats with potential compromises, albeit limited and disguised so as to 
avoid the appearance of concessions. Meetings were held, not least in Callaghan’s attempts 
early on in the row to persuade Liberal abstention in return for agreeing later Budget 
changes in a secret meeting with Steel on 31 March 1977. Other discussions between 
Government members and their Liberal counterparts also took place in an effort to resolve 
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the issue, including Barnett and Pardoe, as Liberal Treasury Spokesman, meeting to 
consider the matter at length on 20 April. An immediate motivating factor for the Liberals 
was highlighted during this meeting with Pardoe suggesting that the reduction in petrol tax 
would be an important tangible gain for Liberals facing upcoming local elections in May. 
Barnett proposed delaying the date of the amendment coming into effect to 5 August, on 
the grounds of it being easier from an administrative point of view, which Pardoe 
approved. However, no agreement was reached at this stage on the possible figure of the 
reduction, with Barnett ostensibly claiming that he could not offer any concession while 
floating the possibility of a 2p reduction before the local elections, while Pardoe said that 
his colleagues would not settle for less than 3p, and threatened the possibility of their 
voting against other parts of the Budget.
37
 At the same time as these discussions were 
taking place, as with other votes discussed in Chapter 4, the Government were also 
formulating contingency plans in the event of a defeat, including how to raise lost revenue 
from elsewhere. Discussions between the Chief Whip and Barnett had concluded that the 
Liberal amendment was likely to succeed. Following on from this, and his meeting with 
Pardoe, Barnett prepared a short paper for the Chancellor and Prime Minister on potential 
tactics for handling the issue. The two options considered were either outright opposition 
to an amendment, accepting defeat but seeking a way to recoup the lost revenue, or seeking 
to make the more limited reduction of 2p, rather than cancelling the 5.5p rise as demanded 
by the Liberals. This latter option was also framed in terms of attempting to justify the 
measure as dealing with concerns about the rising petrol price “which has come not only 
from the Liberals, but from [our] own backbenchers and the unions”. This offer thereby 
sought to disguise a concession to the Liberals under the veil of the Government 
addressing concerns of its primary participants. Although Callaghan was, in his own 
annotations of the paper, “in favour of [the] Government standing by the increase”, he also 
recognised the need for consultation and that “if we are going to lose we had better 
consider how it is reflected”.38 The subsequent compromise that emerged saw the 
Government publicly introduce the increase but privately promise to reverse it in full by 
amendment at a later stage as previously indicated in the Barnett/Pardoe discussions, in 
return for Liberal support on the other aspects of the Budget. The compromise allowed the 
Government to avoid the appearance at that stage of having given any concession to the 
Liberals which would reduce its credibility in the eyes of Labour backbenchers. At the 
same time, this offer arose from the recognition that the position of daring defeat without 
                                                 
37
 TNA: PREM 16/1225, ‘Note for the Record’, 20 April 1977. 
38
 TNA: PREM 16/1225, ‘Petrol Duty and the Liberals’, 22 April 1977. 
Chapter 5 – Lib-Lab Pact  112 
any notion of an alternative approach would also not appear credible in the eyes of many 
Government supporters or the Liberals, having only just avoided an early election through 
their recent negotiation of the Pact. Labour was in no better position than before the 23 
March confidence vote, indeed, it would have been far worse, cutting a deal a week earlier 
only to then have to fight an unpopular campaign on the basis of increasing a tax. The 
Government conclusion as expressed in Cabinet was that, even if the petrol tax vote could 
be won without Liberal support, it would make further cooperation over subsequent votes 
more difficult and effectively nullify any advantage that had been gained through the Pact. 
Even if the vote were not treated as a matter of confidence, such a rift between the Pact 
members at this early stage would also have likely encouraged further confidence vote 
challenges by the Opposition, with no guarantee of the Government’s survival.39 
 
Renegotiating the Pact 
 
Renewal of the Pact in July 1977 has often been seen as inevitable or unimportant, the 
terms largely remaining unaltered and the Liberals continuing not to gain any significant 
concessions in terms of policy. Indeed, even some more recent scholarly considerations of 
Callaghan’s Government tend to omit any reference to renewal of the Pact, treating the 
Agreement as a single, uninterrupted period. In fact, this process of renewal was of far 
greater importance, the interim period and conflict over increased petrol tax providing a 
context within which the Government sought alternatives to the established Agreement, as 
well as its longer-term implications. There were even suggestions raised at some strategy 
meetings that the Pact would not be renewed by the Government, which would lead either 
to an early election or to a different interparty agreement.
40
 
Callaghan’s original preference toward renegotiation appears to have been one of 
simply continuing the Agreement on the basis already established. The Government 
leadership feared that a fresh round of negotiations would not only invite the potential for 
further demands by the Liberals that could undermine the Pact, but would also invite 
criticism and even wholesale rejection of the strategy by the PLP. Some Liberal MPs also 
appear to have preferred an extension of the Pact on this basis. However, the experience of 
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the petrol tax dispute, along with backbench rebels defeating the Government over Finance 
Bill committee votes, led others to question the Pact’s basis. Liberal MPs, seeking reasons 
to justify to their wider party membership continuation of the Agreement, pressed for 
further policy concessions as prerequisite to any renewal. These demands, alongside 
Steel’s insistence that continuation of the Pact necessitated PLP approval in order to bind 
the Government to their commitments, raised both of the Government’s feared problems, 
and necessitated a response which involved greater Government consultation among 
decision-makers, including the Cabinet, as well as management of the PLP.
41
 
In some cases, parties cooperating with each other have split, some members of a party 
choosing to continue to support a government or even becoming a full or associated part of 
the governing party, while others break away to return to being an independent political 
entity in opposition. The historic Labour split upon entering coalition in 1931 was much 
feared by Callaghan and other members of the Government during negotiations over the 
IMF loan in 1976.
42
 It would appear that fears of a similar division arising from the Pact 
were given some serious consideration. While there had been disagreements, as discussed 
above, the Government perceived the relatively loose nature of the arrangement and lack of 
overt concessions as mitigating the potential for any irreparable grievances regarding the 
Pact on the part of Labour MPs. The greater risk of an intra-party split was perhaps that of 
the Liberals themselves, although the Government do not appear to have considered this 
contingency as distinct from the more general dissolution of the Pact. A rather cryptic 
comment by Callaghan in a meeting with Steel on 14 December 1977 suggested that if, as 
seemed a distinct possibility at the time, the Liberals rejected the Pact, and, by extension, 
compelled their leader to stand down, that the Prime Minister would try to find another 
position for him. In the event, the Pact survived this particular hurdle and there are no other 
references to such a possibility in future meetings. It is more likely that such a statement 
possibly referred to a public appointment of some kind, rather than an invitation to join the 
Government. Nevertheless, that the offer was made shows something of the positive spirit 
of the working relationship between the two leaders.
43
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While the short-term nature of the first stage of the Pact perpetuated a degree of 
uncertainty and necessitated renegotiation, this factor may also have, in fact, paradoxically, 
contributed to the Agreement’s successful continuation. The initial period acted as 
something of a trial run, demonstrating the working of the Pact to some of the Labour MPs 
who would otherwise have been likely to oppose it – showing that the Liberals could 
provide useful support to the Government in votes. Callaghan was also able to use the 
argument of a limited trial period in both private and public communication in order to 
counter criticisms that the NEC and other Labour decision-making bodies had been 
bypassed. The breathing space also allowed the Government time to consider and talk out 
some of the issues of interparty cooperation, as well as to consult and gain the, albeit 
reluctant, approval of the PLP.
44
 
In contrast to the relative passivity of the Cabinet in agreeing the Pact, the 
renegotiation was preceded by Callaghan calling a Strategy Cabinet at Chequers for 26 
June 1977. The meeting’s purpose was to discuss the deal with the Liberals, alongside the 
Government’s Economic Strategy.45 Uncirculated records taken by the Prime Minister’s 
staff during the meeting provide a particularly interesting insight into the Government 
approach to the renegotiation and some of the alternative approaches or formulations of the 
Pact that were proposed.
46
 As with the initial stage of Pact negotiation, there appears to 
have been some codified consideration of strategic implications, but not that of detailed 
negotiation briefings. The Policy Unit did prepare a memo for this Cabinet, at Callaghan’s 
request, which considered questions of strategy. The paper was much commended by 
members of the Cabinet, and appears to have been particularly valued by Callaghan, as 
indicated not least through the annotations on his copy. While the bulk of the document 
was focused on eventual electoral considerations, rather than constituting any sort of 
negotiating brief or formal strategy document concerning the Pact, it does contain useful 
insights into how Government strategy-makers conceived of their overarching approach to 
minority government and formalised interparty cooperation. The paper stressed the 
significant Opposition poll lead and the unrealistic chances of winning any early election. 
Further to this, and underlined by Callaghan, the paper set out that the “first objective must 
be to stay in office beyond the present discontents”. To meet this objective, maintaining the 
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Pact was perceived as crucial to the Government, as the only formalised interparty 
cooperation envisaged. At the same time, the arrangement was not viewed as being totally 
exclusive. Some emphasis was also briefly placed on obtaining informal support from 
other parties, including the SNP, to buttress the Government’s position, a consideration 
which will be discussed further in Chapter 6: 
 
“It obviously follows from this that maintaining the Liberal “alliance” is of prime 
importance (and that detaching the Scottish Nationalists from committed 
Opposition by a Devolution Bill would also help)”.  
 
Following on from this, the paper sought to forecast how long the Government could hold 
its current majority, based upon the state of the parties in Parliament and historic by-
election trends and results since the Second World War. The conclusion reached was that 
the Government could potentially “survive for roughly two years – virtually to the end of 
this Parliament if we want”, unless “we had a bad run of deaths against us [of Labour MPs] 
or if swings against us [in by-elections] were all of Ashfield proportions” (Ashfield being a 
formerly safe Labour seat that was lost on 28 April 1977 with a very large swing of over 
20% to the Conservatives).
47
 Ironically enough, this last forecast of the Government’s 
ability to retain its majority was in some ways actually remarkably prescient. Although 
Labour had to defend a further nine seats in by-elections up to the fall of the Government 
on 28 March 1979 (eight through death and one resignation), they only lost one of these 
seats to the Conservatives.
48
 
One of the other main papers at the meeting, ‘A Strategy for the 1980s’, compiled 
by the CPRS, identified the Liberal Agreement among its headings, but did not go into 
much detail in terms of maintaining interparty cooperation. The paper was, in any case, 
widely criticised by Government members for its tone.
49
  
Although not explicitly stated, the prospect of not renewing the Liberal agreement 
was briefly raised at the Strategy Cabinet, alongside the UUP not wanting an election, with 
the lingering notion of a more complete Pact with the UUP. Such a view followed on from 
perceptions of the UUP as more reliable than the Liberals in providing Parliamentary 
support for the Government through abstentions. The break-up of the wider UUUC 
coalition in May 1977 potentially enabled a deal with the UUP alone that would not raise 
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some of the previous political difficulties of involving the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) or Vanguard Party. However, the pre-existing issues were once again re-articulated: 
the Liberal deal was still seen as more likely to deliver the support of its MPs which the 
UUP could not guarantee, along with the potential backlash from Catholic voters and MPs 
if there were a more formalised UUP deal.
50
 
The most preferred length of the Pact proposed at this juncture appears to have 
been renewal for a further parliamentary session lasting twelve months. However, other 
possible timescales for the Agreement were contemplated by both the Government and the 
Liberals.
51
 Foot had raised the possibility of the Pact being renewed on a monthly basis, an 
idea rejected by other Government decision-makers as too short-term and uncertain. Foot 
raised the option only as a possible compromise to gain Liberal acceptance in the event 
that the Liberals would not commit to another full session, monthly renewal being 
favoured by some Liberal MPs, but not Steel himself. From Foot’s perspective, even a 
more short-term agreement that yielded greater uncertainty was better than no agreement 
and the prospect of an immediate election. Foot’s actual preference, as expressed in the 
Strategy Cabinet, was for an even longer arrangement than twelve months, lasting until 
“Autumn 1979”. Members from both parties had sought to explore lengthening the 
proposed Pact.
52
 In a conversation on 21 June, five days before the Strategy Cabinet, 
Pardoe approached Donoughue wanting to explore the possibility of an eighteen month 
Pact lasting until 1979. A meeting of Government Special Advisers the following day, as 
well as the aforementioned Strategy Cabinet, both ultimately endorsed renewal for a 
twelve month session as the preferred option.
53
 One fear, expressed at the Strategy Cabinet, 
was that an extended deal would effectively commit the Government to a single eighteen 
month parliamentary session, as opposed to the normal twelve months, and that this change 
in procedure would appear as “cheating” to both MPs and the public. Further objections 
included that the resulting difficulties in parliamentary management of MPs – whether 
curtailing Labour backbenchers’ expectations for more controversial legislation, or 
preventing a repeat of the Opposition breaking off communication with the Government 
again – would outweigh any potential benefits. By talking through alternative courses of 
action such as this, managing potential opposition, and making limited concessions, the 
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Government were, in large part, able to maintain the substantive initial tenets of the Pact. 
As with the initial setup, renewal of the Pact was concluded on 27 July by an exchange of 
letters between Callaghan and Steel.
54
 As with the formation of the Pact, the general 
changes appear to have been aimed at giving the Government greater room for manoeuvre, 
avoiding firm legislative commitments or timetables which might have proved difficult to 
implement, justified as such in meetings between Callaghan and Steel. The most visible 
change in Steel’s first draft, highlighted in annotations, was the watering down of any 
commitment on profit sharing, from “the Government intends to legislate in next year’s 
Finance Bill for tax incentives” to the somewhat more vague “would consider what help 
could be given”. The final wording, while being slightly more positive, nevertheless did 
not reflect a firm timetabled commitment with defined policies, the Government’s 
involvement in the area being “to consider ways […] with a view to legislation”.55 The 
second draft, which was more heavily annotated, similarly removed references committing 
the Government to particular Bills. For example, “legislation to assist the agricultural 
industry” and a “land bank” were changed to “assistance to meet the special financial 
problems of farmers”. In the same way, the definitive statement on “a reduction of the 
burdens of taxation on income” was changed to a “shift” in taxation “so far as is 
permitted”. Where firm commitments to legislation were given, these redrafts also sought 
to stress primacy of the Government’s input, as indicated in the case of “legislation to 
provide help for first-time home buyers” through the addition of “on the lines suggested in 
the Government’s Green Paper on Housing Policy”.56 
 
Operation of the Pact 
 
The successful operation of any formalised interparty agreement within a legislature 
typically (but not always) requires the creation and maintenance of certain structures and 
good relations between decision-makers. In addition to providing the basis for continuing 
an agreement, these structures may also be used strategically by parties to advance their 
own particular interests. Although the limitations of the Pact for both parties are often 
stressed, its operation demonstrated that the Government was attempting to engage in 
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greater strategic consideration of how to handle formalised interparty cooperation with the 
Liberals, albeit with mixed success.
57
 
The Government rejected commentators and MPs’ claims that the Pact was a 
formal coalition. Privately, however, some of the Government’s strategy-makers, including 
Donoughue, did refer to the grouping of parties supporting the Government as a 
‘coalition’, or as the ‘alliance’, and began to adapt their strategies over time to try to take 
advantage of some of the different mechanisms involved in formalised interparty 
cooperation, to strengthen the Government’s legislative position.58 
Following on from the formation process, a written agreement can be used by one 
or more parties to legitimise the rejection of further demands by other deal participants and 
help to lessen threats of such demands leading to the breakdown of the agreement.
59
 After 
a December 1977 vote on the European Elections Bill, in which the Liberal preference for 
PR was defeated, the Liberals accused the Government of not fulfilling the deal and Steel 
sought privately to negotiate with Callaghan for further action on both this and other policy 
areas. Callaghan, supplied with briefing notes to counter these accusations, was able to 
quote the relevant part of their original written agreement from March 1977, along with 
lists of those supporting the Bill supplied by the Government Whips, in order to prove that 
he was upholding the deal, a contention which Steel subsequently accepted.
60
 
Consultation mechanisms for managing any agreement may also be used 
strategically by a minority government in order to achieve their aims in terms of 
parliamentary legislation. Although the Consultative Committee is much cited as the public 
face of the Pact, a lot of discussion and negotiation occurred between Callaghan and Steel 
in their regular meetings, along with other important figures, Foot and Pardoe in particular, 
who also had significant input. Undoubtedly the lack of previous governmental experience, 
the inability at times to agree a common line, and the absence of significant administrative 
support were all factors that helped to undermine the Liberals in their negotiating with the 
Government. At the same time, the Government also sought to use ongoing negotiations as 
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a means to realise their preferences.
61
 As Kirkup has rightly emphasised, bilateral 
discussions between the two leaders were, to some extent, used by Callaghan to ensure 
Government preferences in the face of potential Liberal opposition, from sharing 
information with Steel on Privy Counsellor terms which he could not then circulate to his 
colleagues but which also encouraged him to tone down his demands, to negating Liberal 
Defence spokesman Emlyn Hooson’s call for a reversal to Defence cuts.62 
 The failure to resolve disputes has, in the past, frequently led to the breakdown of 
coalitions or interparty agreements, and, often as a direct consequence of this, the collapse 
of governments. A strategic approach to this problem may include formal or informal 
mechanisms of conflict resolution, or more belligerent courses of action. For example, in 
some cases, parties may actually deliberately seek a dispute with partners: threatening the 
stability of an agreement as a means to enforce their will over a particular policy; to obtain 
a stronger negotiating position for a potential compromise; to gain credit with potential 
voters for having stood up for a particular position, even if unsuccessful; or even, to 
provide an excuse to terminate the agreement prematurely. Where the breaking of an 
agreement is concerned, different factions within the parties may seek to pursue this 
approach, contrary to the wishes of their leadership.
63
 
The Government’s response to disagreements with the Liberals, and the resultant 
possibility of being defeated on particular issues, were themselves the subject of internal 
debates. Some Labour MPs consistently advocated a policy of no compromise, believing 
that, if a Government Bill were defeated by the Liberals voting against, then the public 
would blame Steel and Liberal MPs. One example of this approach was Dennis Skinner 
arguing for pursuit of the Electricity Bill in the face of Liberal opposition in February 
1978, reminiscent of Wilson’s attitude during the Short Parliament of 1974, and the more 
general tactic of daring opposition parties to vote down Government proposals. However, 
while this approach had proved relatively successful in the past, this was in the context of a 
recently defeated Conservative Opposition, itself unwilling to trigger another election in 
early 1974. While in 1977 it would still sometimes be possible to compel Opposition 
abstention or support for fear of appearing obstructionist, the Government recognised that 
there were many equally significant issues where this was not likely to succeed. Foot, 
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reflecting the Government position that had arisen after the petrol tax dispute, and desiring 
good relations with the Liberals to ensure the passage of future legislation, diplomatically 
refused to countenance such an approach, publicly stressing the greater danger of losing 
the Electricity Bill, while rejecting the notion that the Government were making 
concessions to the Liberals. In general, the Government endeavoured to get Liberal and 
other party support for such legislation where they feared the prospect of defeat.
64
 
By their own admission, the Liberals ‘stumbled’ into the dispute over petrol tax, 
and, as Kirkup suggests, continued to be divided and institutionally inhibited in terms of 
their approach to negotiations with the Government.
65
 However, the record of meetings 
between Liberal MPs suggests that they did grasp the strategic importance of dispute as a 
means to ensure their continued independent identity. As a consequence of this, the 
Government sought to avoid being drawn into public quarrels with the Liberals by not 
raising issues or putting forward legislation judged likely to spark disagreement. To avoid 
acknowledging Liberal influence on the prevention of this Government legislation, various 
pretexts were used, including that of there being insufficient time given the crowded 
parliamentary schedule. While these reasons may not have always convinced those among 
the Government’s critics, they allowed the defusing of potential conflicts that would have 
challenged the Pact. The Government also sometimes conceded points in discussions about 
legislation, some of which Liberals had either expected or even wanted to use to compel a 
dispute, or even modified or dropped legislation entirely, including over Occupational 
Pensions, restructuring of the Electricity Industry, and reform of the Official Secrets Act.
66
 
In addition to ensuring dispute resolution between governing parties, agreements 
also rely upon the resolution of disputes that can arise within a governing party. While 
unable to resolve Labour’s divisions, the Government was able to avoid an internal split. 
Greater consultation of Labour backbenchers had been raised even before the Government 
lost its majority in April 1976, formal reports looking into ways of improving coordination 
between Ministers and backbench groupings. Callaghan had also stressed the importance 
of good liaison with backbenchers following April 1976. One of the first questions 
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Callaghan was asked in Parliament following his announcement of the Pact was an 
intervention from Skinner, seeking reassurances over continued consultation of Labour 
MPs. Callaghan subsequently sent a Minute to Cabinet Ministers on interparty cooperation, 
emphasising the need to avoid any perception that the Liberals were being given 
preferential treatment or consultation in advance of existing internal Labour Party and 
TUC consultations. There was also an open letter to the Prime Minister in May 1977, 
signed by sixty-seven left-wing backbenchers, who, by virtue of their numbers, demanded 
the same facilities of consultation as had been extended to the thirteen Liberal MPs. This 
initiative does not appear to have been acted upon by Callaghan, nor further pursued by the 
MPs in question. While Kirkup may be right to suggest that Callaghan’s citing of the 
existing methods of cooperation negated the impact of the letter, the Prime Minister was 
clearly concerned about the problem, not least in arranging meetings with all the 
Government Whips in later May and June 1977, where he cited the letter, stressing the 
need to ensure PLP cooperation was working. In spite of continued vocal opposition to the 
Pact by some members of the PLP, and backbench rebellions in Parliament, there was no 
further sustained attempt by a large group of Labour MPs formally to challenge the Pact, 
suggesting that the Government’s management of perceived Liberal influence was to at 
least some extent effective.
67
 
Smaller parties will usually seek to publicise their particular contribution to a 
Government. In some agreements or coalitions there are even specific mechanisms 
designed to ensure that individual parties have their input highlighted. It is of course 
equally possible that parties, large or small, will seek to circumvent such mechanisms and 
claim all credit for policies.
68
 Although some members of the Callaghan Government were 
sympathetic to the Liberals, there was a general desire to avoid giving them credit in terms 
of policymaking, in spite of this being a clearly articulated Liberal goal. Callaghan himself 
stipulated clearly to Steel from the outset that he saw the Agreement as providing Liberal 
input into the general process of policymaking, but not having policies that would be 
identified or labelled as ‘Liberal’ contributions to the Government programme. This view 
reflected existing majoritarian attitudes, but also concerns that such publicity would 
encourage greater Labour backbench opposition to the Pact and to those particular policies. 
In response to Liberal demands, some additions to speeches were made, but these did not 
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explicitly acknowledge Liberal input into the policymaking process beyond thanking them 







Arguably one of the most important elements of any interparty deal is how the end of the 
agreement is handled. If conducted well, the different parties determine the timing, have 
control over the process, and, while returning to a state of greater interparty competition, 
remain on good terms and able to continue cooperating in the future, either informally or 
through another agreement. If the exit is handled badly, then an often unexpected, 
acrimonious and unilateral breakdown of relations ensues, which can lead to an immediate 
election and adverse political consequences for some or all of the participants. Regardless 
of the circumstances, the Pact would still have had to be ended at some point, renewed 
indefinitely, or transformed into some other kind of interparty agreement, possibly a full 
coalition. The former option presented the only realistic outcome. The Pact was only ever 
conceived of by most within the Government as a temporary expedient, had faced much 
criticism from MPs and members of both parties, and could not deliver policies on PR or 
other substantive measures that were crucial to continued Liberal participation.
70
 
However, in spite of this apparent lack of benefits for the Liberals and increased 
hostility between some members of the two parties, the ending of the Pact was actually 
relatively well handled by both sides. An end date was formally agreed in advance, the 
Liberals maintained their commitment to ensure the passage of the Devolution Bills even 
after the end of the Agreement, and Steel’s public statement signalling the end of the Pact 
was cleared by the Prime Minister’s staff with only minimal amendments – seeking a more 
positive portrayal by removing references to the “no confidence debate” that had led to the 
Agreement, and maintaining Government flexibility on timing by removing a suggestion 
that the session would finish at the “end of July”.71 While Kirkup’s study rightly identifies 
the end of the Pact as effectively following the failure to deliver PR and proving to be a 
disappointment for the Liberals, that the Pact was ended by mutual agreement, was, in 
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itself, a successful accomplishment for both sides, and did not seriously imperil the 
position of Labour as a Minority Government. Although the Government was largely 
dependent on the Liberals’ deciding whether or not to renew the Pact, there was greater 




From the outset of the Pact, the Government recognised that the Agreement would 
end at some point, and that this process would need to be managed, although there does not 
appear to have been any initial attempt to explore or to codify an exit strategy. Discussions 
over the issue in the early months particularly manifested themselves in terms of fears of a 
sudden collapse. Even when renewing the Pact, concerns were raised in Cabinet on 28 July 
that the Liberals might have drafted parts of the Agreement, including over Pay Policy, as 
a deliberate means to allow themselves the prospect of breaking the deal early if it were 
judged to be politically advantageous. It does not appear that this was viewed as a 
significant threat by the Government, although contingencies were put in place for having 
to fight an autumn 1977 election, as discussed in Chapter 7. While this “escape clause” 
does indeed appear to have been intended by some Liberal MPs and peers as deliberate, the 
prospect of using it as a means to break the Pact was never seriously considered as an 
option by the Liberals.
73
 Just as the Government feared that calling an election over a 
legislative defeat would not prove popular in the country, the Liberals recognised the 
danger of breaking the Agreement and forcing an election over an issue which would be 
perceived as ‘obscure’ by the public, such as over PR in European Elections, or which 
would be directly unpopular, such as that of preventing high pay rises for low paid 
workers. Steel’s personal investment in the Pact succeeding as part of his wider strategy 
gave added incentive for him to ensure it was maintained.
74
 At the same time, there was 
some recognition in the early stages, not least in the above-cited Policy Unit Strategy paper 
in June 1977, which briefly pondered the question of the Pact ending in the future as part 
of an attempt to forecast its likely lifespan, linking longevity to political and economic 
success as an effect upon the decision-making of participants: 
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“Whether, in fact, the Government would wish to go on to the bitter end, and 
whether the Liberals would wish to go along with the Government, will of course 
depend upon whether our prospects improve and demoralisation does not set in”.75 
 
There has been some suggestion from Donoughue that Steel’s acceptance of the ending of 
the Pact had been based upon the assumption of an autumn 1978 election, and that both he 
and Pardoe, in any case favouring a longer deal, would have sought to keep the Agreement 
going if they had known that there would be no election until 1979.
76
 Callaghan had 
expressed his preference for continuing the Agreement into 1979 during a meeting with 
Foot, Steel and Pardoe in May 1978, although without contradicting their perception of the 
inevitability of an autumn election in the event of the Pact ending. Callaghan’s reasoning 
behind the date of the election, not least in terms of preserving room for manoeuvre, will 
be discussed further in Chapter 7. Even if it were the case that the Liberals had 
misinterpreted Callaghan’s intentions, it is unlikely that renewal of the Pact could have 
worked given the defeat of PR for Direct Elections and the Liberals’ disagreement over the 
1978 Finance Bill – the Government did not seriously attempt to pursue ways further to 
renew the Pact. Both Steel and Callaghan agreed in one of their meetings that the Liberals 
no longer had anything they could reasonably ask for, and that there was nothing that the 
Government could muster its MPs to support, which would justify continuation of the 
Agreement. Substantive proposals of getting an amendment for PR in the Devolution Bills 
or a nationwide referendum on PR were suggested by Steel in a subsequent meeting as 
possible bases for renewal of the Agreement. However, these policies appear to have been 
recognised by all participants as being undeliverable by the Government, a sizeable 
number of Labour MPs likely vigorously to oppose any deal that sought to deliver PR. In a 
special meeting of the Cabinet on 25 May 1978 (without any officials being present), held 
to discuss the end of the Pact, Callaghan began by dismissing the PR amendment plan as 




 At the same time, the Government did engage in attempting strategically to manage 
the end of the Pact and its aftermath as far as possible. Even when the non-renewal of the 
Pact became a certainty in a meeting with Steel in April 1978, Callaghan suggested that the 
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best outcome was a “clean break”, rather than an acrimonious breakdown over a row about 
the Budget. In terms of presentation, Callaghan preferred a unilateral statement, with the 
Liberals resuming their independence, rather than both parties ending the Agreement, an 
alteration to the proposed mutual ending announcement, which was accepted by Steel. 
Such a change enabled both parties to regain their full independence for fighting the 
subsequent election, while seeking to lessen the notion of the Agreement having been 
broken by the Government. The Prime Minister also sought to delay the timing of the 
Pact’s end being announced, stressing the potential harm to the markets that would be 
caused by an early announcement, and playing for time by asking to take the above-cited 
Liberal proposals on Devolution PR to a meeting of the full Cabinet, allowing for a further 
two-week delay.
78
 However, while there were disagreements between the two sides, the 
managed ending of the Pact enabled continued interparty cooperation between Labour and 
the Liberals, including in such areas as: continued work on the Devolution Bills; the 
discussions in the following months between Government members and their Liberal 
counterparts; and the contacts between Callaghan and Steel. Indications from internal 
Liberal planning in early 1979 for possible future coalition preferences were more positive 
about another agreement with Labour, in spite of the difficult experiences of the Pact, and 
showed that the disengagement from the Agreement had left open the possibility for future 






The Lib-Lab Pact began largely as a reactive and ad hoc measure to prevent an imminent 
election, but its shape and method of operating were by no means foregone conclusions. 
Greater strategic consideration by the Government than has previously been recognised 
included the preparation of briefings by the Policy Unit that examined some of the 
implications of interparty cooperation with the Liberals and other parties prior to and 
during the lifetime of the Pact. The less-publicised agreement with the UUP, while never 
representing a true alternative to the Liberals as had been originally envisaged by some 
within the Government, nevertheless helped serve to complement the Pact in ensuring 
parliamentary majorities for legislation. This agreement did, however, also store up 
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problems for the Government in terms of cooperation with the SDLP and other supporting 
parties. 
The confrontation over petrol tax and the renegotiation process involved further 
strategic deliberation and led to the modification of Government tactics. Alternative 
formulations of the Pact were considered, including monthly renewal or an even longer 
Agreement into 1979, but were rejected for strategic reasons. Different mechanisms 
established by the Pact were utilised to varying degrees of success by the Government as 
means of pursuing its own objectives, whether in terms of curtailing some Liberals’ 
demands for additional policies by reference to the original written terms of the Pact, or 
engaging in negotiations with individual Liberal spokesmen while having access to greater 
briefing resources and channels for communication. The Government managed 
increasingly to use the facets of interparty cooperation in order to tie the Liberals into 
accepting Government policy preferences on various issues and withdrew legislation or 
conceded points to avoid disputes desired by the Liberals for tactical reasons. 
Even although the Liberals ultimately voted to bring down the Government in 
1979, disengagement from the Pact itself was managed remarkably well given tensions 
over the issue of PR for Direct Elections, allowing for the possibility of future cooperation 
between Labour and the Liberals, not least in terms of continued dialogue and mutual 
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While the Lib-Lab Agreement had a significant impact on the Callaghan Government, the 
particular emphases on the Pact, its antecedents, and its overall utility for both parties 
involved, have also, in some ways, served to obscure consideration of other forms of 
interparty cooperation in Parliament during this period. Half of the Callaghan 
Government’s time in office as a minority administration occurred outside the Pact, ad hoc 
cooperation or proposed cooperation with other parties continuing throughout the life of 
the Government.  
 Informal interparty cooperation during the Callaghan Government, whether in 
terms of cooperation during and outside the Agreement, as well as Opposition reactions to 
the Pact and other parties, has received comparatively less scholarly attention. This chapter 
will begin by considering how ad hoc deals were implemented by the Government 
concurrently with operation of the Pact, as well as after its dissolution up to March 1979. 
The chapter will then go on to look at the Opposition reaction to the Pact and more general 
relations with the Liberals during the Parliament, before considering Conservative efforts 
towards cooperation with other parties. Interparty cooperation in the no confidence debate 
and Government defeat in March 1979 will be examined in Chapter 9.
1
 
 Some communication between parties was routine rather than specifically in 
response to the minority government situation. Along with the interparty discussions of the 
usual channels already outlined in previous chapters, other circumstances compelled 
interparty dialogue beyond the scope of minority government, such as, for example, 




Government Informal Interparty Cooperation  
before, during and after the Pact 
 
In spite of the Callaghan Government’s general reluctance with regard to interparty deals, 
the exigencies of minority government increasingly compelled them to confront questions 
of interparty cooperation. Although they do not appear to have drawn upon international 
exemplars, some approaches to informal interparty cooperation that have been adopted in 
instances of minority governments elsewhere were considered by the Government. In large 
part, these decisions reinforced their adherence to the British tradition of minority 
government as instinctively majoritarian but also pragmatic in terms of seeking ad hoc 
cooperation. The devices that will be examined here include: building of informal 
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understandings with other parties; co-authoring of legislation across party divides; 
constructing different majorities for related Bills or even within the same legislation; and 
supplementing formally agreed or implicit understandings of support with case-by-case 
assistance from other parties. 
Sometimes a Government lacking a majority may seek to build upon relations with 
other parties, without any negotiations or formal understanding, maybe even enacting 
policies specifically designed to predispose them towards future legislative support. As 
already highlighted in Chapters 3-4, Callaghan’s early approach to minority government, 
from April 1976, was, to some extent, a mixture of daring defeat by governing as if 
possessing a majority, while, at the same time, attempting to make use of the different 
institutional tools to ensure legislation was passed. Although Devolution legislation had the 
added benefit of attracting the support of nationalist MPs, it was viewed primarily as a 
means of limiting electoral damage in Scotland and Wales, rather than as securing 
Parliamentary majorities. The first major effort of the Government towards seeking deals 
with the smaller parties came following on from the defeat of the timetable motion on 
Devolution and the threat posed by the no confidence vote in March 1977 that led directly 
to the Lib-Lab Pact.
3
 
There was, however, at least some Government consideration of different forms of 
interparty cooperation even during its early months as a minority in 1976. As already 
indicated in Chapter 3, formation of the Government had been accompanied by 
considerations of inviting greater formalised cooperation with the SDLP to retain a 
majority in Parliament.
4
 Although this initiative was never acted upon, the SDLP did 
already tend to vote with the Government, and the Labour Party itself, independent of the 
Government leadership, continued to pursue discussions with the party, not least through 
SDLP representatives meeting with members of Labour’s NEC. In one such meeting in 
June 1976, the SDLP Chairman, Denis Haughey, did raise the issue of greater interparty 
cooperation in general, suggesting that “it would be valuable if there were regular contacts 
between the respective Executive committees to establish friendly relations”. While this 
sentiment was positively received, the NEC representatives did distinguish between the 
Government and the wider Labour Party in their response. In spite of seeking better 
contacts, such discussions were primarily considering extra-parliamentary and longer-term 
issues, such as SDLP membership of Socialist International, and aiming to secure greater 
state funding for the SDLP. These meetings were not considered by the NEC as part of any 
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strategy to secure more parliamentary votes for the Government. Indeed, as set out in 
Chapter 8, the general sentiment in these meetings was against some of the electoral 
system reforms in terms of PR that had been proposed by the SDLP, not least because 
these would have necessitated coalitions.
5
  
There have also been many instances for minority governments in which 
constructing a majority has been approached through negotiations on a case-by-case basis 
of particular legislative issues. In other cases, formal pacts or agreements may be 
supplemented through negotiations with other parties on individual Bills, either when a 
formally supporting party will not back a certain Bill, or to garner greater legitimacy in the 
case of particularly important legislation.
6
  
Although the Callaghan Government accepted some of the necessities of ad hoc 
interparty cooperation, their approach did not conform to some of these expectations 
arising from minority government experiences elsewhere. For example, it has been 
suggested by Bräuninger and Debus that, during periods of weakened minority government 
(that is to say minority governments without formalised agreements of support from other 
parties) there is a significant increase in the amount of legislation co-authored by both 
government and opposition MPs, in order to increase the likelihood of Bills successfully 
being passed by a Parliament.
7
 In spite of greater efforts at informal cross-party 
cooperation on specific Bills (discussed below), there is no indication during the Callaghan 
Administration that either of the main party leaderships sought more legislation being co-
authored by MPs of different parties. Where such cross-party initiatives occurred, these 
often conformed to pre-existing arrangements, particularly those of individual backbench 
MPs introducing Private Members Bills that were, in any case, co-sponsored by fellow 
backbenchers from other parties. Party leaders would sometimes tacitly support such Bills 
by allowing them more time to be debated or encouraging their MPs to vote in favour, but 
this was seen by the Government and Opposition primarily as advancing policies favoured 
by their respective supporters rather than as a means of building further cross-party 
cooperation. One of the few instances concerning Private Members Bills where the 
Government considered facilitating such cooperation was concerning a Bill on Abortion. 
This initiative was, however, viewed as part of an effort to defuse controversy surrounding 
the issue and possibly to prevent the reintroduction of the Bill, rather than as a result of 
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minority government. The initiative was, in any event, not acted upon. The absence of co-
authoring perhaps reflected continuation of the British tradition of legislation largely being 
initiated by the Government rather than individual MPs, in contrast with the experience of 
minority governments in more consensus-based systems.
8
 
 Another widely used option for minority governments is to construct different 
majorities for different parts of a legislative programme. In this way, the support of one 
party may be used to pass a particular Bill and another party to pass a different Bill. In 
some cases, different parts of the same Bill may require almost completely different 
combinations of other parties in order to be passed.
9
 
After the Callaghan Government’s defeat on the Timetable motion on the Scotland 
and Wales Bill in February 1977, questions regarding strategy toward future legislation 
were raised – the suggested approach, presented to the Cabinet by Foot, was that majorities 
would thereafter have to be constructed on a Bill-by-Bill basis using the smaller parties. 
There were, however, limits as to how far the Government would go in terms of using 
different party combinations. For legislation on the Electricity Industry, one suggestion 
brought to the Cabinet was the use of Conservative support to help aid passage of one Bill 
on reconstruction of the industry, the measures being opposed by the Liberals, while, at the 
same time, using Liberal support to pass another separate Bill on the Drax B power station 
and nuclear safety, the precise formulation of which would have been opposed by the 
Conservatives. While the Government had reluctantly made deals with the Conservatives 
before, not least over the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries, these alternate combinations 
were rejected, the Cabinet fearing that reliance on Opposition votes would encourage 




While Government adoption of the different majorities approach was limited, this 
did not preclude seeking informal cooperation to supplement, or even act as a temporary 
replacement for, the formal Pact with the Liberals. In the aforementioned Cabinet 
discussion of 3 March 1977, when the minority government situation was being 
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considered, Callaghan summarised the utility of ad hoc interparty cooperation in terms of 
future legislation: 
 
“Ministers would have to construct the necessary Parliamentary majorities for their 
legislative proposals, by putting these proposals to the PLP and obtaining support 
for them, and by seeking support from the minority Parties, at the planning stage”.11 
 
Even after the formation of the Pact, efforts of the Cabinet and Whips were directed to 
build upon existing contacts, through ascertaining whether smaller parties would support 
particular legislation, not least, for example, Stanley Orme, Minister for Social Security, 
reporting to Cabinet in May 1977 on ascertaining the views of the SNP and other parties on 
the Occupational Pension Schemes Bill.
12
 The Government were also in some cases more 
actively seeking to encourage the support of these parties in individual votes. Active 
methods for gaining smaller party support included changes to legislation or proposed 
amendments to accommodate their particular concerns.
13
 
While formal approaches were made to both the UUP and the Liberals, there does 
not appear to have been any attempt during negotiation of the Pact to gain formalised 
support from the SNP or Plaid Cymru. Nevertheless, as highlighted by Kirkup, this did not 
prevent the Government from considering other ad hoc forms of cooperation to win the 23 
March confidence vote.
14
 By contrast, during the coalition negotiations in February 1974, 
informal contacts had been established between Heath’s Conservative Government and the 
SNP, including the outlining of potential conditions for nationalists to provide support to a 
Conservative or Conservative-Liberal Minority Government. Such a course of action may 
not have been open to the Callaghan Government, given the SNP’s desire for an election at 
this point, which, following the failure of the Government’s Devolution legislation, offered 
the SNP the potential of electoral gains at the expense of the established parties. Even if an 
agreement with these parties had been technically feasible, the Cabinet had rejected the 
possibility, considering the political price of doing a deal with the SNP to be too high – 
likely to push Scottish Labour MPs into opposing the Government and further endangering 
the Party’s seats in Scotland at the subsequent General Election. The two ex-Government 
MPs of the breakaway Scottish Labour Party, Robertson and Sillars, had, in the early days 
of the minority government, still been effectively taken for granted as part of the 
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Government’s seat count, as indicated in Chapter 4. The failure of the Devolution 
legislation had removed this support. Both MPs were in correspondence with Foot on 21 
March, offering to vote with the Government on the confidence motion in return for 
reintroducing the Guillotine vote on the Devolution Bill and making it a vote of 
confidence. This offer similarly does not appear to have been followed up, not least, as 
with the SNP, because of the unacceptable political price and likely opposition from other 
Labour backbenchers. The prospective two votes were, in these circumstances, in any case 
insufficient in of themselves to stave off defeat.15 
Only the day after the Pact was formally announced, the Cabinet considered 
contentious legislation concerning Industrial Democracy in the Post Office. While 
favouring Liberal cooperation, the meeting considered that the Bill could potentially be 
secured using SNP and UUP support, even in the face of Liberal opposition. Although the 
Government’s attempt to maintain the general support of Scottish and Welsh nationalist 
MPs through Devolution legislation is more widely recognised, there were also attempts of 
varying success to encourage their support for particular Government measures, including 
the Occupational Pensions Bill and aspects of the 1978 Finance Bill. It does not generally 
appear, however, that reliance on the SNP and Plaid Cymru was widely countenanced by 
the Government, fearing the potential negative impact to their own electoral position in 
Scotland and Wales. It is notable that, during the 1978 passage of the Devolution 
legislation, there was a particular effort by the Government to ensure that the Bills were 
passed by a sufficient margin rather than by a bare parliamentary majority. This was in an 
effort to counter the potentially politically damaging notion of the Government having to 
rely on nationalist votes to deliver on Devolved Assemblies.
16
 At times during the Pact 
when Liberal support was uncertain, particularly concerning conflicts over the 1977-78 
Budgets and Direct Elections, Government strategy-makers speculated about a potential 
future need to rely upon alternative party combinations. Donoughue, for example, came to 
reflect in subsequent months on the possibility that UUP support could theoretically allow 
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While dismissing the possibility of a Pact extension, the Strategy Cabinet meeting 
at Chequers on 25 May 1978 did discuss some alternative ways forward. There were no 
suggestions of other formalised Agreements, but rather of continuing through constructing 
majorities on an ad hoc basis where necessary, with the different groups in Parliament 
being, as Callaghan’s sentiments are recorded, “in their various ways, up for auction”. The 
absence of further pacts at this stage reflected the widespread perception within 
Government that an election would most likely be only a few months away, in the autumn. 
In spite of this perception, members of the Cabinet stressed the need to avoid attacking the 
Liberals directly, and justified this course of action either as a means of preventing Liberal 
MPs from breaking the Pact early, or in order to encourage the Liberals as a party to focus 
on attacking the Conservatives.
18
 
In line with experiences already cited elsewhere, a Government may make 
concessions in order to achieve a majority on a case-by-case basis. Following the end of 
the Pact, the Government did continue to work with the Liberals on an ad hoc basis, not 
least Steel’s promise of ensuring that Devolution legislation was passed.19 When 
legislation was raised in Cabinet as lacking a stable majority, such as in terms of a 
proposed National Insurance Surcharge in June 1978 to answer a successful Opposition 
Budget amendment, the Government had to concede a lower increase than had been 
planned in order to obtain Liberal support.
20
 Although the Liberals were voting more 
against the Government, partly to re-establish their independent identity following the 
Pact, informal contacts did remain between the two parties, with Callaghan being able to 
meet Steel privately for discussion in July and September 1978. Steel made it clear in the 
latter meeting that the Liberals would vote with the Opposition against the autumn Queen’s 
Speech. However, Steel also explained that the Liberals were taking this course of action 
while assuming that the Government would win the vote, indeed it is recorded by Stowe in 
the minute that “Mr Steel seemed to hope they [the Government] would! [win]”. Steel 
further indicated that the Liberals “would thereafter deal with each issue on its merits”.21 
At the same time, this did not mean that the default position became one of the 
Government making deals to ensure a majority. As argued in Chapter 4, in some cases, the 
Government decided not to bargain for potential legislation that was otherwise unlikely to 
succeed. Instead, as was explicitly stated in private, they would not put forward such 
measures until they had regained a parliamentary majority, such as over the gilt market or 
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reform of the Official Secrets Act.
22
 In other cases, the Government did sometimes decide 
that daring other parties to defeat them was a preferable option, rather than negotiating or 
shelving legislation. When a prospective Dividend Control Bill became necessary to 
extend existing controls in July 1978, the Liberals were again considered as the party to be 
approached. In this case, however, there was division within the Government as to whether 
they were willing to accept a deal at the Liberal price of setting an earlier date when the 
legislation would cease operating, a few months as opposed to a full year. Callaghan’s 
summary of the discussion reflected the Government’s earlier and instinctively 
majoritarian approach of daring defeat: “it would be premature to accept a compromise 
with the Liberals at this stage”.23 The Government’s preferred aim in this case was very 
much one of risking defeat and, if it occurred, blaming the Opposition and Liberals. In the 
event, the Liberal amendments to the Dividends Bill in terms of timing were not passed. 
The Opposition, not viewing the measure as carrying the same importance or likelihood of 
success as amendments to the Finance Bill, did not commit their full voting strength to the 
divisions, allowing the Government to win by margins of over 200. The Bill was passed 
into law by the end of July.
24
 While the Government talked about daring defeat on some 
other issues, this was not something that they were willing to apply particularly widely 
and, when applied, was not always successful. The aforementioned Dock Labour Scheme, 
taken at a similar time as the Dividend Bill, was similarly recognised as facing defeat 
through the explicit opposition of both Conservatives and Liberals, along with the lack of 
support from smaller parties. There were concerns expressed in Cabinet that “The overall 
political situation required that the Government should not unnecessarily risk defeat at this 
time”. Nevertheless, despite disagreement, the Cabinet again decided that the political 
imperatives, including pressure from the TUC, required them to adopt the approach of 
daring defeat. The Government nevertheless did not consider defeat to be a reasonable 
outcome in this instance, Callaghan stressing that the Bill:  
“should be proceeded with despite the risk of defeat. But it was important that 




The Dock Labour Scheme was subsequently defeated on 24 July 1978 by 301 votes to 291. 
Although there were calls for it to be reintroduced in the subsequent Queen’s Speech in 
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autumn 1978, the lack of support from smaller parties meant that it was instead given as 
one of the aspirations that Callaghan would address in his speech on the possible measures 
in a future majority government.
26
 
In some instances, concessions may be designed as much to facilitate future 
cooperation with other parties as to further a particular deal. There were some cases where 
the Government consciously decided to let the Liberals ‘win’ in terms of making 
concessions designed both to ensure the passage of legislation, and also to ensure their 
support – allowing the Liberals to claim that they had influenced Government policy, not 
least, for example, in lowering the aforementioned National Insurance surcharge. 
Paradoxically, such an acknowledgement of Liberal success would have been previously 
unacceptable to Labour under the Pact. While the Government’s initiative here may well 
have reflected as much an attempt to limit the taking of Liberal votes by Conservatives at 
the upcoming General Election, it also served as a mechanism to retain Liberal support in 
parliamentary votes or the prospect of negotiation with them over other legislation.
27
 
However, there were limits to the effectiveness of this approach, not least in terms of what 
Callaghan could offer and how far the Liberals would feel indebted to the Government for 
these ‘victories’. In addition, the Liberals feared that overt support for the Government 
would damage them further, given the hostility they were already facing from their 
membership and the public over the then recent legacy of the Pact. Following on from this, 
it was not possible to retain Liberal support in the final stages of the Government, as 
witnessed in the no confidence debate of March 1979.
28
  
As will be discussed further in Chapter 7, Callaghan’s decision not to call an 
autumn 1978 election was primarily conditioned by the knowledge that he could be 
relatively certain of a parliamentary majority for another Queen’s Speech, not least through 
private assurances from the UUP.
29
 Callaghan also reported to Cabinet in October 1978 the 
conclusion from his September meeting with Steel that “after the Queen's Speech the 
Liberals would consider each measure on its merits: they would not wish to vote regularly 
with the Conservatives”. Nevertheless, as with earlier measures, Callaghan also cautioned 
that implicit support given could not necessarily be relied upon, and echoed the sentiments 
of the March 1977 Cabinet meeting before the Pact was even considered, that, in 
coordination by Foot and the Chief Whip:  
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“It would however be necessary to construct a majority for each Bill, and Ministers 
sponsoring Bills would need to consult individually with the minority Parties”.30  
 
Even with the assurances received from some of the smaller parties, the Government did 
not wish to risk the Queen’s Speech in the way that risks had been taken with the Dividend 
or Dock Bills. When Foot reported on the drafting of the Speech, he began by outlining 
that the committee: 
 
“had sought to avoid provocation for the minority Parties to vote against the 
Motion on the Address, and for this reason they had omitted some material which 
would be attractive to the Government’s own supporters and on which the 
Government’s position would need to be reaffirmed.” 
 
Such subjects were instead to be saved for the speech by Callaghan or other Ministers in 
the subsequent debate, highlighting the Government’s intended goals for when it had 
gained an overall majority. These speeches, occurring within the normal robust context of 
parliamentary debate, were viewed as less likely to put pressure on the smaller parties to 
oppose, while still allowing the Government to communicate its plans.
31
 This signposting 
of future aspirations was very much in line with the experience of other minority 
governments, and of the Wilson Minority Government, which had used speeches and the 
publication of White Papers on future policy in 1974.
32
 While, to some extent, such a move 
allowed the Government to survive, there were limits as to how far it ensured a majority on 
any given issue. When attempting to overturn defeat over the Pay sanctions vote in 
November 1978, discussed in Chapter 4, the Government did not pursue the matter, 
believing that the move would not be successful. Callaghan summed up the Government’s 
view of the situation, and that, in this instance, “the minority parties could not be relied 
upon for support”.33 
While different forms of informal interparty cooperation were considered, adopted, 
or attempted with varying degrees of success over the course of Callaghan’s 
Administration, the Conservatives also had to deal with the various questions raised when 
endeavouring to construct majorities and defeat the Government. 
                                                          
30
 TNA: CAB 128/64, 35
th
 Meeting, 17 October 1978. See infra, footnote 10. 
31
 TNA: CAB 128/64, 33rd Meeting, 28 September 1978. 
32
 M. Holmes, The Labour Government, 1974-79: Political Aims and Economic Reality (London: Macmillan, 
1985), pp. 15-18; Butler and Kavanagh, The British General Election of October 1974 (1975), pp. 97-100. 
33
 TNA: CAB 128/64, 41
st
 Meeting, 30 November 1978. 
Chapter 6 – Informal Interparty Cooperation  138 
 
Conservative Reaction  
The Opposition and the Pact 
 
Although the Lib-Lab Pact is usually discussed in terms of Government/Liberal relations, 
it also had a significant effect on the Opposition, compelling them to confront significant 
challenges regarding their own approach to interparty cooperation. Questions arising 
included the potential for an opposition coalition, coordinated efforts to disrupt the Labour-
Liberal partnership, and the scope and extent of Conservative relations with the Liberals 
and other parties. 
As during the initial formation of the Callaghan Government, there was no 
suggestion in March 1977 of any opposition coalition being formed. There was no need for 
the Conservatives to consider one, the conditions being ripe for the traditional replacement 
of a Government through an election. Opinion polls had given the Opposition a significant 
lead of up to 15%, the economic situation in the country remained problematic, and 
important defeats over Devolution and economic policy had made it more likely that the 
smaller parties would vote to bring down the Government and trigger an election which the 
Conservatives would probably win. While the Shadow Cabinet sought to be supportive of 
the UUP and to reiterate their calls for a Speaker’s Conference on ‘Northern Ireland 
Representation’, it was agreed on 16 March that no formal offer should be made to them at 
that stage.
34
 Thatcher did meet with UUP leader James Molyneaux immediately prior to 
the no confidence vote, but there is no indication that either side was seeking any kind of 
formal negotiations in terms of voting support. Sometimes a party either directly involved 
in or excluded from coalition negotiations may aim to gain political advantage by actively 
seeking to disrupt the formation of any potential agreement, particularly one which allows 
other parties either to enter or to remain in government. Following the 2010 UK election, 
Labour figures, including both MPs and special advisers, privately contacted Liberal 
Democrat counterparts, seeking to discourage participation in negotiations with the 
Conservatives. In March 1977, the Conservatives’ favourable electoral position in the 
opinion polls meant that they certainly would have had an incentive to prevent any deal 
that would keep the Government in power.
35
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However, there is no indication in the Conservatives’ strategic dialogue during 
March 1977 that they should attempt to disrupt negotiations between the Government and 
the Liberals, or to establish their own dialogue with Steel. Non-consideration of this 
approach may well have reflected the Opposition being caught unaware by the secrecy in 
which the Pact was established. Nevertheless, even if the Conservatives had previously 
known, it seems less likely that they would have considered active disruption of the Pact in 
this way. As already outlined, their primary interest was in fighting and winning an 
election, rather than forming any alternative coalition. Rather, as discussed below, the 
preferred long-term Conservative approach to dealing with the Pact appears to have been 
extra-parliamentary. The Opposition wanted to focus on increasing Conservative support 
in the subsequent General Election, as articulated in Shadow Cabinet meetings, by trying 
to appeal to Liberal supporters who were dissatisfied with the Pact, rather than 




Opposition Relations with the Liberals 
 
On the surface, it would appear that inauguration of the Pact led to an implacably hostile 
relationship between Conservatives and Liberals throughout the rest of the Parliament. 
This view was initially articulated publicly through the adverse reaction of Opposition 
backbenchers and statements by members of the Shadow Cabinet after the Pact was signed. 
In electoral campaigns, whether local, by-elections or the General Election of 1979, 
Conservatives criticised the Liberals and the Pact as propping up the Labour Government 
and allowing the perpetuation of harmful socialist policies in the country.
37
 
However, the Opposition approach to the Liberals was, in fact, more complex than 
this initial impression would suggest. The Opposition’s strategic deliberations show the 
alternative courses of action under consideration, which sought to retain the possibility of 
future interparty cooperation with the Liberals during the course of the Parliament. After 
the Pact began, there were some initial changes in the way in which the Conservatives 
dealt with the Liberals in Parliament in terms of procedure. A Liberal request in June 1978 
to be given one of the Parliamentary Supply days, allocated for Opposition use to conduct 
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a debate, was denied on the grounds that the Liberals formed “part of the Government” 
through the Pact. By contrast, after the end of the Pact, a similar request in November 1978 




The line agreed in the first Shadow Cabinet meeting following the inauguration of 
the Pact seems surprisingly conciliatory, emphasising “sorrow rather than anger”, targeting 
the Government rather than attacking the Liberals. In the early stages of the Pact, the CRD 
also challenged the idea of any condemnatory approach towards the Liberals. A CRD 
research paper, discussed in the Shadow Cabinet, suggested that this tactic would only 
work in the short term, that there was significant danger of the Liberals gaining greater 
electoral credibility if they were seen to be moderating a Labour Government, and that 
there was a need for Conservatives to reach out to rather than blame Liberal MPs. In 
practice, however, the Opposition approach appears to have been more condemnatory than 
accommodating. The harsh language that tended to be employed against the Liberals in 
debates and electoral campaigns would appear to suggest that the electoral conversion of 
dissatisfied Liberal supporters was given a higher priority by the party leadership, than 
gaining the support of Liberal MPs. Nevertheless, there are no indications of contacts 
being broken off between Liberals and Conservatives in the same way that Opposition 
cooperation with the Government was withdrawn over the disruption to the usual channels 
in the summer of 1976. In fact, there were some continued instances of discussions 
between the Opposition and Liberals, and, indeed, of the Conservatives supporting Liberal 
amendments to parliamentary legislation. Some of the Conservatives’ greatest successes in 
defeating the Government on votes during the lifetime of the Pact were only made possible 
by cooperation with the Liberals, including the politically important devaluation of the 
Green Pound and cutting income tax by 1p in the 1978 Budget.
39
 
In this respect, while the Conservatives expressed public and private outrage at the 
Pact and sought long-term electoral gains at the expense of the Liberals, they continued to 
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Opposition relations with other parties 
 
While pursuing different legislative goals, the Conservatives also had to respond to 
Government initiatives and pursue their own relations with other parties. Situated firmly 
within a majoritarian optic, the Opposition’s strategic dialogues nevertheless show 
recognition of some of the implications of minority government and a desire to co-opt 
other parties to achieve the defeat of government legislation. As highlighted earlier, the 
Conservatives had long established historic experiences of interparty cooperation. In the 
years immediately preceding the Callaghan Government, the Conservatives had also 
pursued different forms of interparty cooperation, not least through an attempted coalition 
with the Liberals in 1974, and campaign for a Government of National Unity. While 
Thatcher was undoubtedly more hostile to notions of coalition than her predecessor Heath, 
she was also a pragmatic leader – a point emphasised in considerations of the Conservative 
experience in Opposition before 1979, and her recognition of the importance of securing 
the support of other parties to defeat the Government in Parliament.
40
 Even in mid-1975, 
the Shadow Cabinet had not ruled out the possibility of entering a Unity Coalition 
Government in the event of Wilson’s Government collapsing, while a 1922 Executive 
Committee meeting in late 1976 once again seriously considered the prospect: albeit that 
these instances were very much responses to looming economic and political crises at the 
time. Other Conservatives were also very much involved in interparty cooperation during 
this period, whether in terms of the cross-party campaign on Britain’s EEC membership 
referendum, or the pursuit of formalised cooperation with other centre-right parties in 
Europe. While a general predisposition toward majority government remained, there was 
recognition among those formulating Conservative strategy of the need to consider the 
implications of how to respond to the minority government situation, not least in terms of 
the Lib-Lab Pact, and the potential for interparty cooperation in Parliament.
41
 
By contrast with the overt condemnation of the Pact and limited ad hoc cooperation 
with the Liberals, the Conservatives adopted something of a different line towards the 
other parties in Parliament. There are clear indications that the Conservatives, while 
criticising the outcomes of Government agreements with other parties, were actively 
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seeking to avoid rebuking some of the smaller parties themselves, recognising the 
importance of protecting the possibility of future cooperation to defeat legislation. In July 
1977, the Shadow Cabinet decided not publicly to criticise a statement by the UUP leader 
suggesting that there were some instances in which he would support the Labour 
Government. Similarly in the aftermath of a deal between Labour and the SNP over a vote, 
there were calls in the Shadow Cabinet for condemnation, but there was also, however, a 
recognition by some at the meeting that the Conservatives would need to work with the 
SNP in the future to achieve anything against the Government’s legislative programme. 
Some within the Opposition even went so far as to link this idea of maintaining working 
relations to the thought that if the SNP held the balance of power at a future election it 
might end up being necessary to cooperate with them in order to form a government. 
Although this line of argument does not appear to have been supported or pursued by the 
party leadership, the fact that it was even raised in Shadow Cabinet showed a willingness 
to contemplate contemporary relations within the context of future interparty cooperation 
and minority government (discussed further in Chapter 8). This suggestion also reflected 
something of the effect which the initial success of the Pact had had on the Opposition 
mindset, as exemplified in the above-cited correspondence among Party strategy-makers, 
including researchers in the CRD, who feared the potential success of the Lib-Lab Pact. 
The Conservatives would also vote for amendments or no confidence motions put forward 
by these smaller parties, although this appears as much to have been a reaction to 
upcoming votes where they tied into pre-existing Conservative policy commitments or 




Even prior to the no confidence debate in March 1977, and the subsequent events 
that led to the Pact, the Conservatives were considering improved cooperation with the 
UUP, albeit on an informal basis. This nevertheless was likely to prove difficult, given the 
split between the Conservatives and the UUP over the Heath Government’s policies in 
Northern Ireland. An example of how this sentiment affected the UUP approach to the 
Conservatives during the Callaghan Government may be seen in Molyneaux’s comments 
in a UUUC Executive Committee meeting in June 1976:  
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“Until such times as they came up with policies which were an improvement and 
which would undo the damage which they did – then they could not come to 
terms.”43 
 
Indications of the Conservative approach to the UUP included an early March 1977 
Shadow Cabinet paper dedicated to the question of finding ways to achieve better 
cooperation through continued informal contacts with individual MPs, along with public 
support for particular policies, including a Speaker’s Conference on ‘Northern Ireland 
Representation at Westminster’. Following the inauguration of the Lib-Lab Agreement, the 
break-up of the UUUC, and the Government’s promise of a Speaker’s Conference, 
Conservative efforts regarding cooperation with the UUP continued largely along the same 
lines, although gathering increased importance in the eyes of the Opposition leadership: 
Conservatives voted for particular UUP amendments to legislation, including the desired 
retention of First-Past-the-Post in European Elections, and pressed the Government on the 
issue of pursuing greater representation for Northern Ireland in the House of Commons. 
Towards achieving this end, some potentially more radical suggestions were put forward 
by the Opposition, not least the idea of promising to push through the increased 
representation as quickly as possible, and then immediately holding a special General 
Election in Northern Ireland on the new boundary lines, as a means to separate the UUP 
from supporting the Government. There were limits, however, as to how far the 
Conservatives pursued these efforts at improved cooperation, not supporting other 
amendments and supporting some but not whipping all their MPs to vote. The notion of a 
special General Election was not pursued, nor does it appear that any formal 
Conservative/UUP voting deal was attempted during the Parliament. There are also few 
indications of such formalised cooperation being considered, one of the most visible 
appearing in a 1978 report by the Young Conservatives, which examined the possibility of 
establishing formal links with the UUP, Official Unionist Party, or even parties 
traditionally less aligned with the Conservatives, such as the Alliance in Northern Ireland. 
In part, this approach reflected the already-cited Conservative desire to hold and win a 
General Election outright and UUP reluctance to form deals with the main parties. While 
emphasising the need to take a tougher line on security, there was also no suggestion 
among Conservatives of breaking the overall consensus with the Government over the 
security situation in Northern Ireland by offering the restoration of devolution on 
                                                          
43
 CAC: POLL 9/1/8, UUUC, Executive Committee Meeting, 18 June 1976. 
Chapter 6 – Informal Interparty Cooperation  144 
majoritarian lines as a means to secure UUP support.
44
 This attitude reflected something of 
a continuation of the Heath Government’s position in 1974 when engaging in post-
electoral coalition negotiations, recognising that a formalised UUP deal at that stage would 
likely drive some of the other smaller parties away from voting with the Conservatives. 
The possibility of future formal cooperation between the Conservatives and the UUP after 
the end of the 1974-79 Parliament was, however, considered by some within the 






The forms of interparty cooperation that occurred during the Callaghan Minority 
Government were more complex and involved greater strategic considerations by both 
Government and Opposition than has often been appreciated. 
Ad hoc cooperation between the Government and other parties continued 
throughout the Pact, and afterwards, helping to ensure the Government’s majority for 
particular legislation. There were some forms of such cooperation used in other minority 
government situations which, for strategic reasons, the Callaghan Administration did not 
seek to make greater use of, whether in terms of seeking to build greater ties with other 
parties in Parliament during the early stages, co-authored legislation, or regular 
construction of alternate electoral alliances for different clauses within the same Bill. 
The Conservatives did not attempt to foster formal agreements with other parties, 
and were, to some extent, forced to react to the will of smaller parties and Government 
backbenchers in any given vote. However, while condemning the Liberals’ participation in 
the Pact, the Conservatives recognised the importance of continued cooperation with them 
to inflict defeats upon the Government. The Opposition leadership also sought greater 
informal interparty cooperation with other groupings in Parliament, and did try to avoid 
taking actions that would dissuade other parties from supporting their attempts to defeat 
certain Government proposals or pass their own alternatives, whether, for example, in 
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terms of tax cuts or opposition to sanctions against businesses that broke the pay ceiling. 
Over the course of the Parliament, the Conservatives were able to inflict a number of these 
reversals to Government policies, culminating in their defeating the Government in a vote 
of no confidence on 28 March 1979. 
The loss of the confidence motion in 1979 was a catastrophic failure for the 
Callaghan Government. The defeat represented not least a more majoritarian attitude to 
cooperation towards the end of the Government, and a miscalculation of how some MPs 
would vote, including the SNP representatives. Although some deals had been done prior 
to the vote, the limitations placed on what Callaghan considered to be an acceptable 
political price, or what Ministers considered could be practically delivered in the face of 
Government backbench opposition to forcing through the Devolution proposals, served 
severely to restrict any potential room for manoeuvre.
46
 
These different experiments in interparty cooperation as a means to deal with the 
situation of minority government would provide an important foundation for the 
formulating of strategies for coping with the possibility of another indecisive General 
Election. Both main parties, in considering these strategies, would have to confront the 
prospect of their participating in a further minority government, a Pact, or even a formal 
governing coalition. 
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In addition to developing plans for dealing with the day-to-day challenges of minority 
government, parties have tended to prefer securing a more permanent legislative majority. 
Britain’s two main parties in the late 1970s primarily sought a return to a situation of either 
a Labour or Conservative majority administration through achieving victory at a 
subsequent General Election. 
 There are many facets to electoral strategy, including, amongst others, campaigning 
events, manifesto policies, and media presentation. However, a particularly important 
overall strategic factor in winning an election, whether operating as a majority or minority 
government, is that of timing when the election is to be held. The added parliamentary 
uncertainty of minority government has typically served to increase debate over electoral 
timing in countries where election dates are not pre-determined in advance by a 
constitutional requirement. In addition, there is a greater probability of an unexpected and 
early poll being called in situations of minority government, either as a result of a 
conscious Government decision or an inability to pass crucial legislation in the face of 
concerted opposition. Callaghan’s lack of a government majority raised the serious 
prospect of an election occurring from 1976 onwards, depending on factors including 
government defeats. Prime Ministerial control over the decision to dissolve Parliament led 
to distinct differences in the planning conducted by the major parties.
1
 
 The timing of elections in situations of minority government has not been subject to 
as much scholarly consideration as other aspects relating to elections. Study of this area 
focuses mainly on the implications for government formation (i.e. the effect of fixed-term 
parliaments on producing coalition as opposed to minority government) and on cases of 
minority governments which have been forced to call early elections on account of major 
legislative defeats. In part, the lack of emphasis on this area reflects the fact that many 
minority governments occur in political systems where election dates are fixed, for 
example, in the Scandinavian countries. As a partial consequence of fixed-term 
parliaments, many of these governments have survived for a substantial period, or even 
their full term in office, without a legislative majority.
2
 
Other questions of timing, including the length of an election campaign, will not be 
considered in detail in this chapter. While important strategic considerations may be 
involved when deciding on campaign length during the Callaghan Administration, these 
                                                 
1
 K. Jefferys (ed.), Labour Forces: From Ernest Bevin to Gordon Brown (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), p. 89; 
D. Butler, Governing Without a Majority, pp. 30-2; M. Holmes, The Labour Government, 1974-79, pp. 15-
18; D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, British General Election of October 1974, pp. 97-100. 
2
 D. Arter, Democracy in Scandinavia: Consensual, Majoritarian or Mixed?, pp. 98-100. See infra, footnotes 
5-6. 
Chapter 7 - Electoral Timing  148 
primarily appear to have been driven more by immediate political factors other than the 
state of minority government. While some suggestions of a short campaign were raised, 
even in the earlier stages of the Callaghan Administration, the Government tended towards 
holding a long election campaign, senior figures, including Donoughue, calculating that 
this would provide more opportunities for the Opposition to make mistakes. When the 
actual dissolution came in 1979, an added reason for a long campaign was that it would 
move the country further away from the recent unpopular events of the ‘Winter of 
Discontent’.3 
Electoral timing has been the subject of much discussion when considering the 
Callaghan Administration. However, these discussions have often been reduced by 
theorists to a simplistic binary choice between autumn 1978 and May 1979. In fact, the 
minority government situation raised the prospect of an earlier election, with a contest in 
1978, or 1977, or even 1976 being viewed as a possibility, albeit less likely. This added 
uncertainty over electoral timing affected the subsequent actions and planning of both 
major political parties, and resulted in a sustained though often obscured conflict, 
researchers trying to predict when the election would occur and plan their response in a 
way designed to outmanoeuvre the other.
4
 
Efforts by the Government and Opposition to anticipate possible election dates 
from 1976 onwards may in one sense be regarded merely as an academic exercise until the 
actual dissolution of Parliament. It is clear, however, that the strategy of both was 
influenced by these forecasts. Assessing how seriously parties took the prospect of an early 
election, or tried to bring one about, requires consideration of potential dates alongside 
other General Election preparations, particularly whether there were changes in the 
timescale in which the manifesto was assembled or organisational preparations set in 
motion. 
Both the Canadian and UK Government systems have, in the past, operated in a 
similar way in terms of dissolving Parliament, allowing Prime Ministers the sole power 
over when to call elections within a given period. Both countries also show some 
similarities over dissolutions during periods of minority government, with Prime Ministers 
tending to favour, or being forced, to dissolve Parliament early, sometimes as little as a few 
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months to two years after forming a minority government. In a favourable scenario for the 
incumbent, such a poll has been aimed to occur at a time when there is a likely prospect of 
the minority government gaining a majority. Wilson requested such an election in October 
1974, gaining a small majority, the previous election having been held in February.
5
 
However, there are also alternatives to this practice which have not, at the time of 
writing, been adopted in the UK. One such variation on the timing of Parliamentary 
dissolution includes instances of Prime Ministers who have chosen to fight an early 
election with the knowledge that the best possible outcome was likely to be a continuation 
of minority government, such as in New Zealand in 2002, and in Canada in 2008. An 
election has therefore sometimes been used as a device to buttress the authority of a 
prospective minority or coalition government by confirming the relative strengths of 
parties’ parliamentary seats, or even, possibly, strengthening the government’s bargaining 
position in negotiations with other parties by gaining seats or votes. Another variation, as 
already discussed, is that of Prime Ministers who either respond to, or deliberately set up, 
major legislative defeats or confidence votes by calling an immediate election, seeking to 
increase government electoral support by portraying opposition parties as being 
deliberately obstructionist or blocking popular legislation. In 1974, Canadian leader 
Trudeau successfully used this approach to turn his minority into a majority government. 
During the Callaghan Administration, Government and Opposition gave serious 
consideration to these two approaches, but, for separate reasons, rejected them as unusable. 
As already highlighted in previous chapters, even where the Government or Opposition 
were aware of these situations in other countries, such considerations of strategy relating to 
minority government were not framed in the context of international experience, but rather 
that of British political history and ongoing parliamentary practices.
6
  
Government leaders communicating with their party’s MPs did stress the prospect 
of defeat on an important issue and the triggering of an election at various points during the 
Parliament, as highlighted in the Chapters on Defeat and Interparty Cooperation. This 
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device was, however, primarily seen as a means of attempting to curtail rebellions by 
backbench Labour MPs, or as a form of brinkmanship to convince opposition parties not to 
defeat the government, rather than actually wanting to fight an election over a particular 
policy defeat. The Government’s efforts to avoid defeat through this method had varying 
degrees of success. Although some major votes in terms of the Budget or Devolution were 
partly secured through this, it did not appear to have helped when Callaghan sought to head 
off a rebellion over industrial sanctions policy in the winter of 1978-79, a vote which the 
Government subsequently lost, significantly undermining their economic policy and being 
a key factor in triggering the disastrous strikes in the ‘Winter of Discontent’. While the 
Government did not seek to set up defeats for itself on important matters or confidence 
votes, they did consider that the response to defeat on certain issues would be to choose to 
call an election, whether over the Budget or Devolution. As highlighted in the Defeats 
Chapter, these were similarly threats that were not acted upon, either because the 
Government were successful in averting defeat, or accepting defeat in votes which would 
previously have constituted a basis for an election. Timing did play an important factor in 
some of these decisions, not least the Government wanting to avoid elections when the 
Opposition enjoyed significant poll leads, when particularly difficult news was scheduled 
to come out in terms of such issues as the economy, and at times of the year that were 
disadvantageous in terms of holidays or poor winter weather.
7
 
Another practice from overseas that has only been adopted more recently in Britain 
through creation of the Devolved Assemblies and by the present Coalition in Westminster, 
is that of using constitutional reform to remove questions of uncertainty in electoral timing, 
thereby providing a greater impetus for minority or coalition governments to be formed 
that are potentially viable for the duration of a Parliament. The method in question is that 
of introducing fixed-term parliaments, or some special constitutional requirements to be 
met prior to any parliamentary dissolution, such as a supermajority of votes in Parliament. 
In some countries, such reforms or measures have proved useful to stabilise minority 
governments, and, in the UK, the Liberals were very much in favour of such a move in the 
late 1970s. However, as far as can be determined, neither main party leadership was 
willing at this stage to think about giving up the advantages offered to a Government 
through control over the timing of an election. In this regard, both continued to adhere to a 
primarily majoritarian mindset of the British tradition of minority government that has 
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been highlighted in previous chapters, desiring to win an election outright, or to adapt to 




Evolving Process of Planning 
 
There were many aspects of Labour’s electoral planning which followed or built upon 
existing procedures, from organisational questions of hiring staff and putting candidates in 
place to the preparation of the manifesto by the NEC in conjunction with (or often in 
opposition to) Cabinet Ministers and the Prime Minister. Being in Government, Labour’s 
main concerns over electoral timing were those of considering when best to call an election 
or how to respond to an election compelled by parliamentary defeats. Minority government 
conditioned these preparations, the possibility of an imminent parliamentary dissolution 
leading to much more work on electoral timing by the Government than has previously 
been acknowledged. When the Government lost its majority in April 1976, the prospect of 
an immediate election was raised, as discussed in an earlier chapter, but was not taken 
seriously as an option by Labour. The first real Government consideration of a possible 
election was in March 1977, highlighted in the earlier chapter on the Pact. Again this was a 
purely reactive measure, amounting primarily to a paper supplied to the Prime Minister 
about the mechanics of election dates when it was feared that a defeat on a vote of 
confidence was imminent. Even in this paper, it was not suggested that such a defeat made 
dissolution inevitable, raising the possibility of consultations with the other parties.
9
 When 
considering the response to the March 1977 confidence vote, Lipsey’s paper on strategy 
suggested that the more reliable polling showed a 7% Conservative lead rather than other 
projected leads of up to 15%. He judged this smaller poll lead against historical precedents 
and contemporary conditions as being: “not insuperable […] about the same as our gains 
vis-à-vis the Tories in February 1974”. However, even taking the most optimistic 
projections, Lipsey still counselled against an early election, believing that even the 
prospective indecisive outcome would be undesirable: “the best we could realistically hope 
for is a Parliament made up much as the present one is”, while the “most probable result” 
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was still a Conservative victory.
10
 The Wilson Government had similarly come to view 
potential defeat over the Queen’s Speech in 1974 not as necessitating an election, but as a 
separate confidence vote. The subsequent majority secured by Callaghan through the 
inauguration of the Lib-Lab Pact ended any threat of an immediate election.
11
  
Most likely as a result of the potential defeat in March 1977, the Government 
became more proactive in the field of electoral timing relating to the exigencies of minority 
government. Callaghan requested that special contingency planning be done by the 
Number 10 Policy Unit to deal with an election arising from a major legislative defeat. 
Planning included trying to anticipate when such defeats might occur, and producing 
reports which recommended potential courses of action, papers being updated on a regular 
basis. Papers were also produced prior to particularly important votes whose passage could 
not be assured, such as the Second Reading of Devolution Bills in November 1977, which 
outlined potential measures to be taken in order to prepare for an election in the event of 
the legislation being defeated.
12
  
Measures were adopted which would suggest that while 1978 was the preferred 
option, preparations were being made for a more immediate dissolution should the need 
arise. Joint NEC-Cabinet discussions of February 1977 began by highlighting the absence 
of a government majority as a crucial determining factor in the timing of an election and 
how this presented an urgent need to make preparations, not least in terms of resolving 
internal party conflict over a potential manifesto and the development of electoral 
strategy.
13
 After a campaign committee was established in February 1977, the Government 
sought to calm fears about a sudden poll, placing particular emphasis on such a committee 
being formed typically eighteen months to two years in advance of an election. 
Nevertheless, the records of the newly formed Election Committee from March 1977, and 
reports arising thereafter on proposed organisational planning, reinforce the perceived 
impact of minority government on election timing. Plans for a summer publicity and 
membership campaign were framed explicitly in terms of preparing for an election from 
October 1977 onwards. The model recommended for these campaigns was that used during 
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the Minority Government of 1974, when summer publicity work had served as preparation 
for an October General Election. Callaghan also sought to acquire information relating to 
the holidays in different constituencies from 1977 onwards, a factor long considered of 
political importance in terms of potential voter turnout.
14
 Correspondence entitled 
“Election Contingency Planning” in September 1977, was directed at obtaining 
information about holiday dates while, at the same time, seeking to prevent the fuelling of 
speculation over a possible early election date. Alternative reasons for inquiring about the 
information were devised to disguise the true nature of the planning involved, including 
such devices as the “provision of information for the planning of [the] Prime Minister’s 
regional industrial visits”, which was viewed as “the best cover”.15 
It would generally appear, however, that while accepting the possible need for an 
early dissolution, Government strategy-makers did not prefer 1977 as an option for an 
election. Such sentiments may be seen not least in the previously-cited Policy Unit paper 
for the Chequers Strategy Cabinet, which emphasised the need to “stay in office”, and 
advocated a later election in 1978/79.
16
  
Following on from such considerations, a potential 1977 election was ultimately 
ruled out. However, from 1978 onwards an election seems to have been contemplated as a 
more realistic option by the Government, either by choice or forced by a parliamentary 
defeat. When the possibility of serious parliamentary defeat was raised in strategy 
meetings concerning the Budget in April 1978, there was a much more definitive response 
from Callaghan, that an election would be held immediately in that instance. This approach 
is very much in line with minority government experience in other countries and British 
parliamentary practice – such votes being viewed as confidence motions, which were 
essential for governments to win. The early months of 1978 show the greatest evidence of 
immediate pre-election preparations by Labour in terms of organisation, including the 
hiring of campaign staff, the clearing of outstanding legislation in Parliament, and the 
changing of planned autumn events such as public rallies in consultation with the TUC. 
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Even up until the point when Callaghan announced there would be no election, many 
within the Government had come to view dissolution in October as inevitable.
17
 
In spite of earlier manifesto preparations being called for as cited above, the timing 
of such work would seem to argue against the influence of minority government and a 
possible early election. The NEC Home Policy Committee did not produce a draft of their 
basis for the manifesto until December 1978, and the final acceptance of the manifesto did 
not occur until the beginning of the election campaign itself in April 1979. However, this 
prolonged process is as much demonstrative of the level of conflict between the NEC and 
parliamentary leadership, rather than any lack of impetus in response to minority 
government. The decision not to produce its manifesto basis until such a late stage also 
reflected a desire not to publish a finalised draft too far in advance, for fear of certain 
policies being undermined by opponents within the party. If an election had been called in 
the summer or autumn of 1978, the NEC was in a position to publish such a draft at a much 
earlier stage. When the need arose to finalise election arrangements after the loss of a 
confidence vote in March 1979, the NEC’s ultimate begrudging acceptance of many of the 
Prime Minister’s preferences shows how the impetus of an immediate election could (at 




Minority Government – Influence on Timing 
 
Much of the analysis of Government planning with regard to election timing focuses 
around Callaghan’s fateful decision to delay until 1979 rather than hold an autumn election 
in 1978 when conditions appeared more favourable for Labour. Academic and media 
commentators have often suggested that if an election had been held at that earlier stage, it 
might have led to Government victory rather than defeat. The impact of the delay on 
contemporaries is seen as having been counterproductive for Labour, allowing the 
portrayal of the Government as clinging on to office, angering potential supporters 
including trade union leaders, and placing greater reliance upon support from the smaller 
parties in order to survive without a parliamentary majority. It has also frequently been 
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suggested that Callaghan wished to retain freedom of manoeuvre over the choice of 
election date, or genuinely had not made up his mind.
19
 
However, whatever the consequences of delaying the election, the decision-making 
process was more complex than is often recognised. There were many strategic 
considerations involved, all of which were primarily conditioned by Callaghan’s 
experiences and situation of minority government: securing a temporary majority for key 
votes; uncertainty about the potential result; fear over appearing opportunistic; greater 
consultation over timing; and attempting to negate Opposition strength by catching them 
off guard. 
Previous accounts have typically characterised Callaghan as being driven by only a 
small handful of Cabinet colleagues on the date of the election, and, partly in response to 
their advice, making the fateful decision to delay an election until 1979. Callaghan’s own 
retrospective account also alludes to the various letters of advice from other sources, but 
appears to dismiss them as not having had any significant impact. However, as shown in 
the more recently released files, Callaghan was more proactive in consulting a wide range 
of people on timing. It is also clear from these papers and from Callaghan’s own 
annotations of strategy documents that his decision over electoral timing was significantly 
influenced by factors and advice relating to the minority government situation. These 
consultations included discussions between all the Labour Whips amongst themselves, as 
well as meetings they had with Callaghan, reports from the No. 10 Policy Unit, advice of 
the full Cabinet, and extensive discussion in a meeting with Trade Union leaders. The 
papers from the Whips’ discussion, forwarded to the Prime Minister on 1 August 1978, 
showed that seven were against an autumn election, with only two unequivocally in favour. 
Callaghan’s annotation of the paper also suggests some of the issues which had particular 
impact, including the section of the plan (which he had highlighted) to “go as far as 
possible into 1979” before calling an election. There was also, paradoxically, a strong 
collective sentiment expressed against doing further deals with other political parties to 
remain in office during such a period. Even in his regular meetings with Steel during the 
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Pact, Callaghan raised the question of electoral timing, promising not to reach a decision 
before July or August 1978.
20
 
The likelihood that an election would produce another minority government served 
as a strong deterrent to an early dissolution, as already indicated in Lipsey’s March 1977 
paper on strategy, and also highlighted through different discussions on election timing 
within the Government leadership over subsequent months, not least one between 
Callaghan and Stowe in September 1978, where an early dissolution was viewed as 
probably leading to “a parliamentary stalemate as at present” which would “help no one”.21 
Private Labour polling suggesting that an indecisive result was potentially the best possible 
outcome of an autumn 1978 election has been identified by different decision-makers 
within the Government, including Callaghan himself retrospectively, as one of the major 
factors which led to the delay in calling an election. The experiences of inaccurate polling 
at elections over the previous decade complicated the problem. Recent UK history was 
very much in Callaghan’s mind when making a decision. The three preceding General 
Elections, 1970, February 1974 and October 1974, had all been called early, and had 
delivered poorer results for the incumbent Government than predicted by opinion polls.
22
 
Handwritten notes of Callaghan planning his autumn Ministerial broadcast highlighted the 
minority government political situation of 1974, as well as that of 1931, and indicated the 
Prime Minister’s continued fears over indecisive results and interparty cooperation 
potentially leading to the breakup of Labour as a party.
23
 
The Government also sought to draw lessons from recent experience if an 
Administration suffered limited electoral losses or made gains but remained a minority. It 
was suggested that the 1974 Minority Government, and subsequent Callaghan 
Administration in 1976, had been strengthened by the particular nature of their 
composition; the former Government had replaced an unpopular Conservative 
Administration, while the latter government had been originally been elected with a 
majority in October 1974. By contrast, a renewed Minority Labour Government after 
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another election in 1978/79 was viewed as likely to find it very difficult to claim a mandate 
to carry out its policies, even if it won an increase in votes or seats. The likely tradeoffs 
required in deals with other parties would therefore be significantly greater than had been 
the case in recent experience. Contrary to elections in other countries, including those 
examples cited above that sought renewed minority government, there was no desire 
among most senior figures in the Government in autumn 1978 to enter an election whose 
outcome could, at best, be another minority administration.
24
 
One of the factors which gave Callaghan the most reassurance in terms of delaying 
the election was, as discussed in the previous chapter, the apparent guarantee of smaller 
party support to get the next Queen’s Speech voted through Parliament. Tacit support from 
the SNP and at least some Ulster Unionist MPs theoretically secured the Callaghan 
Government against the threat of being forced to go to the country in late 1978. Even in 
December 1977, a paper on electoral timing, produced at Callaghan’s request by the No. 
10 Policy Unit, began by emphasising the importance of the minority government 
situation, but also argued that a 1978 election was not inevitable, given the parliamentary 
arithmetic. Certainly in his meetings with Steel, the Prime Minister had frequently referred 
to the end of the Pact, and resultant end of a stable government majority, as triggering or 
likely to lead to an early election. While, as suggested above, the Government planned for 
a possible election being forced by a major legislative defeat, Callaghan wanted to avoid 
this if possible. There were also differences in terms of what would be considered an 
‘acceptable’ defeat in terms of a parliamentary vote. For example, Callaghan could at least 
entertain the possible risk of defeat over the Budget, but not over the autumn Queen’s 
Speech. Rather than differences in terms of the legislative issue at stake, this concern was 
as much a reflection of the practical reality that a defeat during the autumn opening of 
Parliament would necessarily lead to an election in November or December, times deemed 
particularly bad politically, not least because of poor weather affecting turnout.
25
  
Callaghan’s meeting with Steel in March 1978 is one of the most definitive 
statements of his reasoning, stipulating that if there were no guarantee of support, an 
autumn election would be necessary, while simultaneously endeavouring to secure Liberal 
support for the Queen’s Speech, even in absence of the Lib-Lab Pact. The Prime Minister’s 
reactions to internal correspondence with strategy-makers also reinforce the importance of 
the secured majority for the Queen’s Speech as a factor in terms of electoral timing. In 
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addition, he sought to lay the groundwork for an autumn session, requesting a paper that 
outlined what actions would have to be taken to ensure that the Government could carry on 
if there were no autumn election, in terms of critical votes that could not be delayed and 
handling other events including the Devolution Referenda.
26
 
Callaghan also did not seek deliberately to set up a legislative defeat that would 
trigger an election, as has been practised in other instances of minority governments cited 
above, and which had been contemplated during the 1974 Wilson Minority Government. In 
fact, one of his major concerns was that an autumn election risked appearing opportunistic, 
given that there was “no great issue requiring settlement by [a] General Election” and no 
major piece of legislation whose passage had been prevented by the Opposition. Although 
the Government had continued to suffer parliamentary defeats, these were on isolated or 
more technical points, which the Government felt were not important enough to warrant 
dissolution, nor that such issues would serve to move public opinion towards the 
Government in an election campaign. Thus, although previous preparations had been made 
in the event of a major parliamentary defeat, the Government rejected the possibility of 
seeking a parliamentary dissolution on the basis of an ‘obstructionist’ Opposition during 
autumn 1978. Callaghan also alluded in private to other fears of opportunism producing 
negative election publicity, considering the timing of particular benefits such as tax 
concessions, which would be coming into effect. When faced with defeat in the March 
1979 confidence vote, this attitude had shifted somewhat, Callaghan himself increasingly 
opposing the use of deals with smaller parties to stay in power. Indeed, several whips were 
even willing to suggest at this stage that such a defeat would give a possible basis for an 
appeal to the country in an election, although presentation of this line of thought appears 
more to have been an attempt to make light of a desperate situation, rather than an 
indication of a shift in strategy, as will be discussed further in Chapter 9.
27
  
Another consideration Callaghan faced was that of counterbalancing the 
uncertainty of having no parliamentary majority by creating electoral uncertainty for the 
Opposition – building up to an election without committing to a date and then either 
calling one if conditions favoured the Government, or delaying the election, in order to 
catch his opponents off-guard. The experience of minority governments in other countries 
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has shown instances of this approach, such as occurred in the build-up to the New Zealand 
election in 2002. Prime Ministers have also sometimes used a potential election as a threat 
to compel the Opposition (or their own supporters) not to vote down a particular piece of 
Government legislation, such an approach being used to secure passage of the Queen’s 
Speech during the 1974 Wilson Minority Government. As suggested by some scholars, the 
calling of elections in relatively quick succession may also be used as a tactic to wear 
down the material and financial resources of opposition parties, particularly those of 
smaller parties, or as an attempt to compel those parties to reveal their plans prematurely, 
in anticipation of polls which do not then occur.
28
 
While electoral delay after a false build up has typically been portrayed as an 
inherently detrimental approach for a government to adopt, popular perceptions during late 
1978 were, in reality, more nuanced. Although political elites and groups including trade 
unions were annoyed by Callaghan’s decision not to hold an election, the electorate’s 
response was more mixed. As highlighted during correspondence between Patten and other 
CRD members, opinion polling immediately after Callaghan’s September announcement 
of no election showed a relatively even split between those for and those against the 
election being delayed (42% to 43%), and that the delay had not in itself significantly 
influenced which party people intended to vote for.
29
 
Some of those involved in shaping Government strategy, including Walter 
Harrison, Labour’s Deputy Chief Whip, viewed unsettling the Opposition as being of 
particular significance when they gave advice to Callaghan on election timing. By building 
up the expectation of an election and then delaying, it was thought possible the 
Conservatives might reveal some of their policy plans or use up funds early on campaigns 
which, through the changing political climate, would not necessarily be relevant months 
later during an actual election. The Conservatives’ relative financial strength over Labour 
was even greater during 1977-78 than had previously been the case, and there were 
certainly calls by some advising Callaghan, including McNally, that it was important to 
seek a way to negate these material advantages. To some extent, this uncertainty over 
election timing did have an effect, unsettling the Conservatives, who went to the verge of 
printing their manifesto in large quantities in September 1978 before the no-election 
announcement. Conservative groundwork for an autumn campaign had also been laid 
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through various publications and the buying up of costly advertising space which could not 
be recouped. Spending in anticipation of an autumn election had also certainly affected the 




Beyond the autumn of 1978, the choice over an election date was to some extent 
restricted by political events, not least the widespread industrial action during the ‘Winter 
of Discontent’, but nevertheless remained an important issue which was given some 
consideration by the Government in different meetings.
31
 In a meeting with Steel on 6 
March 1979, Callaghan discussed the response to the failed Devolution Referenda and the 
question of electoral timing. Once again, the absence of a majority conditioned his 
response, and was explicitly stated as the main reason for rejecting the suggestion made by 
Steel that October 1979 be announced as the election date well in advance, citing the 
practice of Sir Alec Douglas Home in 1964.
32
  
The Opposition was, to some extent, wrong-footed by uncertainties over electoral 
timing and the using up of some of their party funds. In spite of this, however, 
Conservative resources and planning over the timing of the election were also being 
employed toward endeavouring to cope with alternative outcomes, and to capitalise on the 
opportunities presented by subsequent events. 
 
Opposition Planning – Electoral Timing 
 
Conservative planning had begun early on in the Parliament to anticipate the timing of a 
potential election, as indicated in Chapter 3. The absence of a government majority made 
an early ‘snap’ election much more of a possibility, reminiscent of 1974. Efforts to forecast 
when such a poll would be called and how to prepare for it ranged from CRD calendars 
charting important upcoming events to papers that analysed the multiplicity of factors 
which could influence Callaghan’s decision. There was also significant debate as to how 
uncertainties caused by minority government should affect electoral preparations.
33
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While the Government principally determined election timing, the Opposition also 
dedicated significant efforts towards anticipating any future election date. After 1976, the 
first serious Shadow Cabinet discussions on preparations for a General Election were held 
in April 1977. These discussions concluded that production of the campaign guide in May 
would enable an election to be fought whenever it was called, and suggested that more 
policy documents should be produced to supplement existing plans. Although an autumn 
election in 1977 was briefly considered, it was also viewed as very unlikely.
34
  
Opposition efforts directed towards anticipating the potential election date largely 
built on the methods used in 1974, and were increasingly framed against the backdrop of 
the minority government situation.
35
  
Attempts to predict Callaghan’s decision considered a multiplicity of factors, 
including: the economy; recent political history; opinion polls; by-elections; the Prime 
Minister’s ‘cautious’ temperament, and even sporting events (in the context of Scottish and 
Welsh nationalist parties). The overall conclusion derived from all these factors was the 
almost certain belief that the election would occur in 1978 rather than in 1979. Timing of 
actual preparations for an electoral campaign would suggest that the Opposition expected 
the dissolution of Parliament to come in the autumn of 1978, including requests for 
Shadow Cabinet manifesto contributions from January 1978 onwards to the circulation of 
the first draft manifesto in July. Discussions of organisational arrangements were also very 
much based upon this timetable.
36
 
Nevertheless, even in spring 1978, the prospect of an earlier election had not been 
ruled out. When examining the question of whether a 1978 election would be held in late 
June, one of the most important factors identified was that of the minority government 
situation, and the prospect that the Government would face difficulties in securing a 
majority for getting the Finance Bill through Parliament, which would force a summer 
election. Discussion and papers on the drafting process questioned whether it would be 
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The removal of any threat of a summer election presented Conservative planners 
with the challenge of the summer parliamentary recess and prospective autumn election. 
Periods of recess when a Parliament does not meet have sometimes provided an 
opportunity for an incumbent government, and have been used particularly by minority 
governments – not having to face the prospect of parliamentary defeat during these times. 
Sometimes such breathing spaces have acted as launching platforms to seize back political 
initiative in terms of greater publicity, maybe even building up to starting an election 
campaign. The Wilson Minority Government capitalised on a long summer parliamentary 
recess to set up and win their election in October 1974. The Conservatives sought to thwart 
any Government attempt to recapture political initiative during the 1978 recess, through 
such measures as a special summer campaign which sought to foster greater awareness of 
issues that were a core part of the Conservative political programme and to provide a 
platform in anticipation of an autumn election. In the autumn, some within the Government 
privately acknowledged the effectiveness of this campaign in allowing the Opposition to 
maintain political momentum. It is difficult, however, to tell how far these campaigns were 
inspired by the minority situation, rather than in response to ongoing general concerns 
regarding publicity and a desire to build up party membership.
38
 
The purpose of some contingency planning, was, by contrast, spelt out more 
clearly. While convinced that the election would likely be held in the autumn, the 
possibility of the election being delayed to attempt to wrong-foot the Opposition was given 
some brief consideration by the Shadow Cabinet in the spring of 1978. Measures were 
adopted by the Opposition to avoid being caught out by changes in the ‘expected’ date of 
an election, not least, for example, in preparing an alternative series of publications on 
policy for autumn 1978 to be used in place of election literature, and in building up the 
autumn party conference to act as a substitute “high point”.39 
The subsequent delay in September 1978 led to serious reconsideration of 
Government planning by the Conservatives, although it was assumed that no poll would be 
called during the winter period, which was, as already stated, traditionally seen as a less 
favourable time for General Elections. Callaghan’s definitive September announcement of 
there being no election reinforced this assumption. Attempts to anticipate timing resumed 
in the beginning of 1979, although these appear to have presented even more of a challenge 
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in spite of there being fewer than eight months of the Parliament remaining. The CRD 
January predictions, sent by David Nicholson to Patten, of an election in March, June or 
October, did not carry any firm conclusion as to which was the most likely. In fact, 
Nicholson went so far as to question whether it was incorrect to assume that Callaghan’s 
sole motivation was that of gaining a parliamentary majority, and that he might, in fact, 
have more interest in securing longer-term goals rather than immediate political concerns:  
 
“All our considerations over the date of the election assume that Callaghan wants 
Labour to win with a majority […] why should he? […] would it not suit him to 
risk a Hung Parliament or even a slender Conservative majority?”40 
 
Given the Conservatives’ surprise at the election not happening in autumn 1978, contrary 
to the predictions of most commentators, and the difficulty of discerning Callaghan’s 
mindset, this uncertainty was understandable. By March 1979, other considerations were 
being factored in by the Conservatives, such as the possibility of the election being held at 
the same time as European Elections scheduled for June, a development which was seen as 
creating potential difficulties in terms of campaign finances. This possibility was not, 
however, viewed as practicable, requiring legislation establishing the UK framework for 
European Elections, which could not be passed by a minority government without 
Opposition support. Similarly, any extension of the Parliament to the final October 
deadline was viewed as unrealistic, primarily because of the absence of the Government’s 
majority and likely difficulties with important legislation. As such, the most likely election 
date considered was 10 May, ironically not far off the actual date of 3 May.
41
 
One other method for opposition parties actively to seize the initiative from a 
minority government in terms of electoral timing is that of winning a vote of no 
confidence, as already highlighted in previous chapters. A sizeable number of minority 
governments have been removed from office by being defeated in no confidence votes, 
both in Britain and abroad. While the Conservatives continued to seek to defeat the 
Callaghan Government, and ultimately succeeded in a no confidence vote on 28 March 
1979, there is no indication that Opposition leaders perceived a forced dissolution as an 
integral part of their overall strategy. There is also no indication that the Conservatives 
wished to try to impose a specifically preferred election date upon the Government, prior 
to the loss of the confidence vote. Delaying an autumn election in 1978, when the 
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Government appeared to be enjoying a period of greater political successes, ultimately 
benefited the Opposition, but was not necessarily viewed beforehand as a goal. Throughout 
the period, the main focus of the Opposition remained that of trying to win the election 
whenever it was called by the Government.
42
 
Following the March 1979 confidence vote, discussed further in the penultimate 
chapter, the need for an immediate election was established and the question of electoral 
timing effectively diminished in terms of both sides’ room for manoeuvre. However, even 
at this stage, Government and Opposition were making final calculations of strategy over 
the preferred election date. Callaghan wanted to avoid being pressured into an April 26 
election, to allow for a full rather than temporary Budget to be passed, albeit with the 
agreement of the Opposition. As highlighted above, the Government’s preference was also 
for fighting a longer electoral campaign, which it was believed would be to the 
Conservatives’ disadvantage. The Shadow Cabinet, fearing that the Government would 
seek a postponement to 10 May, decided to “press strongly for April 26th” following the 
confidence vote. In the event, 3 May was settled upon as the election date and a largely 
uncontroversial Budget was agreed upon by both parties.
43
 
The 1979 General Election and preceding campaign have, in some ways, been 
regarded as an anti-climax, when compared to the dramatic events of the ‘Winter of 
Discontent’, and of the Government’s defeat in the March confidence vote. In spite of 
some encouraging signs for the Government in terms of individual polls that showed 
Labour gaining ground during the campaign, a significant Conservative victory was 
consistently predicted by commentators and polls. Detailed reconsideration of these extra-
parliamentary events are beyond the scope of this study, the minority status of the 
Government no longer presenting added strategic challenges that either main party had to 
manage before the election. In line with previous minority governments in British history 
and administrations elsewhere, after the no confidence vote, the Callaghan Administration 
was effectively operating as a caretaker government. Such an approach was, in fact, 
consistent with that of any British government in an immediate pre-election period, 
avoiding major policy announcements and either putting off substantial political decisions 
for whatever government was formed after the election, or else taking such decisions with 
the agreement of the Opposition, not least over the essential business of passing an 
uncontroversial Budget. However, in the same way that the timing of the election had been 
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subject to the influence of the Government’s minority status, the election itself also 
presented a significant challenge to both main parties, that of potentially leading to another 
indecisive result, which would necessitate a further immediate election, minority 






Both main parties sought an exit from minority government through an election, and had to 
confront the particularly important strategic question of electoral timing and to adapt their 
strategies accordingly. The considerations faced by Labour and the Conservatives were 
distinct from those of minority administrations operating in fixed-term Parliaments, but 
were shared by contemporary minority governments in countries including Canada. The 
formulation of strategies conducted by both parties shows the clear and central influence of 
the state of minority government upon their planning. In the Government’s case, the 
questions of deciding when to hold an election and the impact of not having a legislative 
majority were given much consideration. Labour’s planning over election timing began 
even in 1977, to some extent drew upon their minority government experience from 1974, 
and sought to anticipate the possibility of an early dissolution or an election being forced 
by a legislative defeat in Parliament. Callaghan’s often discussed ‘mistake’ of delaying an 
election in autumn 1978 was based upon a wide-ranging consultation within Labour. It 
showed an understanding of the dynamics of the ‘hung parliament’, and recognised the 
inappropriateness of the ‘obstructionist opposition’ argument often used by minority 
governments while simultaneously making construction of a stable majority a central 
objective. Anticipating the uncertain timing of an election forced the Opposition to 
consider alternative electoral strategies, including that of a ‘doctor’s mandate’, and 
compelled researchers to question their assumptions about the mindset of their political 
opponents. Conservative planning started early on in the Parliament, developing from their 
existing fears of a snap or crisis election, and sought to anticipate possible election dates 
and to prepare for contingencies when the expected autumn election in 1978 did not 
materialise. Even in the final days of the Government following the no confidence defeat, 
both sides continued making strategic calculations over the more limited choice of date for 
the election, but were also able to continue cooperating where necessary to settle practical 
issues before the dissolution of Parliament. 
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Confronting the challenges of electoral timing in a minority government situation 
helped to develop the strategic understanding of both main parties, and affected their wider 
approaches to campaigning in the General Election. Although contemporaries from both 
sides sought a decisive outcome from the election, another indecisive outcome was 
privately thought to be a significant possibility. The prospect of another Parliament without 
a majority government further affected the main parties’ planning, as will be explored in 
the next chapter, both sides privately seeking to a greater or lesser extent to adapt and 
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The Election of 1979 is seen as a crucial moment in the development of modern British 
politics, providing a change in government which would have significant ramifications 
from the ending of the postwar economic consensus to the ideological and organisational 
transformation of Britain’s major political parties. While much scholarly work has been 
done on political parties’ advance preparations for this election and its aftermath, 
including, particularly, in terms of manifestoes and media presentation, there has not been 
significant consideration of the impact of minority government on strategy-making. 
Accounts since 1979 have tended to follow an established pattern, either expositing the 
seeming inevitability of Conservative victory and the inexorable decline of Labour, or 
cautioning that there was considerable uncertainty among contemporaries regarding the 
result, but not examining the strategic reaction in any great detail. Both main parties 
staunchly clung to their majoritarian philosophies in public and private discourses, seeking 
an outright electoral victory.
1
 However, at the same time, both the Government and the 
Opposition were considering contingency scenarios that were publicly unmentionable, and 
making plans for what would happen if the General Election were to produce another 
indecisive result. This chapter will firstly examine some approaches that have been used by 
parties elsewhere to adapt to future minority and/or coalition government, but which were 
not pursued by the Callaghan Government or Conservative Opposition. Both parties 
continued to adhere to a majoritarian British tradition, in terms of institutional reform, the 
preparation of the groundwork for interparty negotiations, and consideration of pre-
electoral alliances. Secondly, the chapter will examine the instances of pragmatic 
adaptation by Government and Opposition, looking at some of the preparations for a future 
minority government or even a coalition that were explored. In Labour’s case, this was 
very much a sporadic effort, tied into day-to-day survival as a minority government. 
Consideration of a future minority administration was evident only from occasional 
references in meetings, and from papers produced immediately in advance of Election Day 
itself, to consider whether or not Callaghan would stay on as Prime Minister, along with 
some possible ideas about how to seek further interparty agreements. For the 
Conservatives, more planning for this eventuality is apparent. A short-lived minority 
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government followed by another election appears to have been the preferred option of the 
Opposition, although plans for a potential coalition were also formulated.  
The mindset of contemporary policymakers in both main parties was very much 
conditioned by uncertainty and influenced by previous inaccurate forecasting of the 
General Election results in 1970 and February and October 1974. On two out of three 
occasions the polls predicted the wrong winner (Labour in 1970 and the Conservatives in 
February 1974), and, in the case of the third (October 1974), overestimated the 
Government’s majority. The continuation of significant dichotomies in opinion polls 
between Conservative strength as a party and Thatcher’s weakness as a leader when 
compared to Callaghan, further reinforced this uncertainty about the prospective electoral 
result, even during the actual election campaign itself in 1979.
2
  
Moreover, in the post-mortems of both parties following the election, there were 
also significant concerns expressed about the possibility that the result could have been 
indecisive. This feeling was reflected in Conservative ranks by the party’s internal ‘Inquest 
on the Election’ a week later, the opening question of which asked whether the party had 
really come close to ‘defeat or deadlock’ during the campaign. More recent scholarship 
argues that neither side viewed the outcome as inevitable in 1979, even during the 
campaign itself, but does not adequately recognise the importance of the existing minority 
government in shaping the formulation of post-electoral strategies of party leaders’.3 
Theoretical considerations of the breakdown of a minority government and possible 
subsequent elections have tended to concentrate on explaining why breakdown occurs or 
on forecasting what type of government will be formed based upon the resulting 
composition of a legislature, rather than providing insight as to what effect a minority 
government has on strategists deciding on how parties plan for the possibility of future 
minority or coalition governments. In some countries, the greater frequency of minority 
governments has led to their acceptance by political elites, whose plans and strategies are 
based on the significant possibility of not achieving outright electoral victory.
4
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Britain, by contrast, is frequently identified as a country where electoral majority 
governments are the norm, suggesting that political leaders experiencing minority 
government would generally perceive it as an abnormal experience and would not feel the 
need to accommodate future minority governments when conducting their electoral 
planning.
5
 Some of the smaller parties have typically been perceived as those more likely 
to engage in such planning, particularly the Liberals, who, during the Callaghan 
Administration, gave significant weight to the prospect of another minority government 
and gave some consideration as to how they would strategically respond to such an 
eventuality. Liberal planning for an indecisive outcome is unsurprising, given their 
experience of interparty cooperation through the Pact, and Steel’s desire to seek further 
influence through cooperation with other parties in a Parliament with no majority 
government. This trend of planning for an indecisive result is something which has 
continued up to and beyond the 2010 Coalition involving the party’s successors in the form 




Future minority or coalition planning 
Academic literature 
 
The state of minority government led both main parties to plan for the possibility of 
another indecisive election result and to devise strategies for coping with such an 
eventuality, through either a minority government or a coalition. As highlighted in the 
introductory chapter, academic literature on minority government has tended to focus on 
parties’ response to government formation, following on from an indecisive election or the 
collapse of a coalition, rather than on the preparation undertaken by strategy-makers for a 
potential future minority administration. The possibility of another indecisive election was 
taken seriously by commentators and political strategy-makers in Britain during the late 
1970s, and presented a significant challenge to the main parties. Against the backdrop of 
an ongoing minority government, both Labour and the Conservatives publicly ridiculed the 
idea of planning for another indecisive election. However, both main parties were 
simultaneously secretly conducting such planning, to a greater or lesser extent, either on 
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how to form and operate a new minority government after an election, or even, in spite of 




 Minority governments abroad have made plans for future indecisive results which 
may have to accommodate pre-existing constitutional conventions, such as the British case 
of a Prime Minister remaining the incumbent until (s)he decides to resign, (theoretically) 
irrespective of the majority in Parliament. Lines of interparty contact may be established 
prior to the loss of a government’s majority, creating pre-electoral agreements or alliances, 
or signalling potential negotiating positions through a manifesto or other communications.
8
  
Both the Labour and Conservative leadership in the late 1970s, in most public and 
private discourses, sought nothing short of an outright victory through a parliamentary 
majority. However, while neither of the two main parties harboured any desire for further 
minority governments and post-electoral political alliances, both sides came to suspect that 
their principal opponents might, in fact, be attempting to aim for such a situation, as has 
already been cited in previous chapters. Such fears manifested themselves in different 
ways, from Labour worries about a Tory-led Unity Government in the face of economic 
turmoil, to Conservatives’ questioning whether Callaghan was actively seeking a future 
coalition, during attempts to forecast the timing of the General Election.
9
 
The creation of certain coalitions and interparty agreements may be largely 
unplanned reactions to circumstances, as has been seen with the case of the Lib-Lab Pact. 
However, when faced with the prospect of a future coalition, particularly in countries with 
an established tradition of coalition government, different political parties have often 
sought to make plans regarding their approach to the coalition formation process. To 
varying degrees, Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberals made plans of this nature 
during the Callaghan Minority Government which highlighted elements of some of the 





                                                 
7
 See infra, pp. 176-87. 
8
 G. Loomes, Party Strategies in Western Europe, pp. 5-10, 30-40, 89-90; I. Stefuriuc, Government 
Formation in Multi-Level Settings: Party Strategy and Institutional Constraints (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), pp. 1-33; B. E. Rasch, ‘Why Minority Governments? Executive-Legislative Relations in 
the Nordic Countries’, pp. 9-17; R. Hazell and A. Paun (eds), Making Minority Government Work, pp. 56-9; 
S. N. Golder, The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation (Ohio State University Press, 2006), pp. 26-9; 
K. Strom, Minority Government (1990), pp. 47, 224. 
9
 See infra, pp. 28-9, 163, 181. 
Chapter 8 – Future Minority and Coalition Government 172 
Institutional Reform 
 
In some countries, institutional arrangements have been modified in order to assist the 
process of forming and operating a minority or coalition government after an election, 
whether in terms of extended time before the first meeting of a new Parliament to allow for 
interparty talks, the provision of official civil service support for such discussions, and/or 
the formal appointment of a person to examine coalition possibilities (i.e. a formateur). A 
legislature primed for government by minority or coalitions may include such 
arrangements as the timetable for business being worked out through an all-party 
committee, greater involvement of different parties in the legislative process and a stronger 
committee system, as seen for example in the Nordic countries. Initial acceptance of some 
of these constitutional reforms has, in many cases, also served as a requirement for larger 
parties to secure cooperation with potential coalition partners.
10
 
The Callaghan Government and Conservative Opposition spent a lot of time 
considering constitutional reform in terms of legislation on subjects including Devolution 
and Direct European Elections. However, while Devolution was used by the Government 
in an attempt to retain support of SNP MPs, such reforms were primarily designed to 
safeguard the political advantage of the main parties against new challengers. There was no 
serious consideration by either main party of changing constitutional arrangements in order 
better to facilitate the formation and operation of future minority or coalition governments, 
nor any suggestion of a move towards a formalised formateur. As already highlighted, 
Foot’s resistance to committee reform was, in fact, partly motivated by a desire not to 
weaken the power of a future minority government. This was very much in line with 
Labour policy, not least as expressed in an NEC report of 1978 which, while pressing for 
reforms to create more powerful committees that responded to the concerns of 
backbenchers, wanted these to reflect the parliamentary party balance along largely 
majoritarian lines, seeing “no future in consensus government”.11  
The only area in which any serious work on constitutional reform linked to a 
possible future minority government situation was that of Proportional Representation, 
and, even here, it was limited in scope and inspired more as an immediate response to 
circumstances. Many countries with experience of minority and coalition government have 
PR electoral systems, while the two main parties in Britain have traditionally been opposed 
to PR. The most visible example of PR being contemplated was for the European Direct 
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Elections. A majority of the Cabinet did consider a List voting system to be their preferred 
choice for European elections when the matter was discussed. This preference was, 
however, as already indicated, out of a desire to prevent the Conservatives gaining large 
numbers of seats at European elections, predicted to be the case under a First-Past-the-Post 
system, rather than as a means to facilitate future interparty cooperation in a minority or 
coalition situation at Westminster. That barely half of Labour MPs backed the PR system 
in the subsequent vote on European Elections meant that it would have been very difficult, 
if not politically impossible, for the Government to get PR approved for the House of 
Commons. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the hostility of some Cabinet members to PR in 
Direct Elections reflected wider Labour fears that PR reform at Westminster would be 
“paving the way for coalitions and the undermining of the legitimacy of Governments”.12 
Another instance in which PR was raised was in relation to Northern Ireland. While 
the Cabinet had shown some understanding of this possibility as reflecting the unique 
political situation there, this was not ultimately acted upon. When meetings had occurred 
between Labour NEC representatives and the SDLP in the early months of the Callaghan 
Government, the SDLP wanted the Alternative Vote system to be considered for use in 
elections in Northern Ireland. The response from the NEC representatives confirmed the 
wider Labour hostility to notions of reform that necessitated formal interparty cooperation, 
considering that such a move would pressure reform at Westminster, and that “there was 
not a wish for a system which would force coalitions on Britain”.13  
 
Groundwork for negotiations 
 
The possibility of a post-electoral minority government or coalition in other countries has, 
in some cases, led to political parties evolving tactics to prepare the groundwork for 
subsequent negotiations. One of these devices is that of setting out particular future 
policies or manifesto pledges in a format which more clearly distinguishes those whose 
adoption would be essential as part of any interparty agreement from those of a lesser 
importance which could be amended or shelved in potential negotiations. Examples of this 
have already been cited in the Chapter on Interparty Cooperation, not least in the UK 
General Election of 2010. Even if the structuring of manifestos is not so explicitly in the 
mould of a negotiating position, commitments within a manifesto may still be framed 
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vaguely to consult with other parties or to examine different possibilities in areas 
potentially of particular cross-party importance, such as constitutional reform. The 
aforementioned convening of a Speaker’s Conference had been a device used on several 
occasions during this period by the British Government to address certain issues of 
constitutional reform desired by different political parties.
14
 
However, there were no significant moves towards this approach in the final 
manifestoes for either Labour or the Conservatives, reflecting the continued long-
established hostility toward interparty agreements. Within Labour, this position also 
represented an increasing loss of patience towards deal-making among leading 
Government members, hardened by their ongoing experiences of having to do political 




Another area besides the manifesto that has typically been used as a route toward fostering 
cooperation between parties is that of pre-electoral alliances, pacts, or, at the very least, 
some form of assistance or of establishing channels of communication for future 
negotiations. There has been a long-established history of major British political parties 
engaging in such cooperation, from a local to a national level over the course of the early 
to mid-twentieth century.
16
 Some Government discussions did raise the possibility of 
helping parties such as the Liberals during the election, which would potentially be useful 
in the event of another indecisive result, not least in Donoughue’s meeting with Steel’s 
assistant Archibald Kirkwood on 12 July 1978.
17
 There were also indications of continued 
cooperation being raised even in the latter stages of the Lib-Lab Pact. As indicated above, 
Callaghan discussed the prospect of a “hung parliament” and further minority government 
with Steel during several of their regular meetings. However, it does not appear that the 
Government sought to develop or coordinate pre-electoral alliances, pacts or special 
channels of communication with other parties. If any support was being offered to smaller 
parties, rather than serving as groundwork for future interparty cooperation, it would have 
been more likely aimed at preventing Conservative vote and seat gains from Liberals 
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during the election, and, consequently, seeking to reduce the prospect of an indecisive 
outcome instead of preparing for one. Callaghan’s discussions with Steel were as much 
bargaining tactics, trying to prevent the Lib-Lab Pact from being ended early, or trying to 
end it cleanly, without causing political damage to the Government. Although Callaghan 
had a relatively good working relationship with Steel, he remained unwilling publicly to 
accept another indecisive result and potential continuation of having to negotiate with other 
parties to construct a majority.
18
  
The Conservatives similarly did not seriously consider adopting pre-electoral 
agreements or pacts before the 1979 General Election, partly because of the 
aforementioned adherence to a British majoritarian desire to win outright, borne out by 
opinion polls which consistently gave the Opposition a significant lead over the 
Government. One of the few notable instances of a prospective electoral interparty 
agreement being raised was in a CRD paper in March 1978 on the ‘Hung Parliament 
Contingency’, discussed further below, which considered “a limited electoral pact” with 
the Liberals when contemplating possible conditions that would enable a post-electoral 
coalition. This option was, however, couched in terms of a possible future measure that 
might be adopted for “the next but one General Election”, after 1978-79. The paper was 
also generally discouraging in terms of an electoral pact’s utility for the Conservatives, and 
ended on the note of practical concerns that “There would, of course, be great difficulties 
in persuading Conservative Associations not to contest seats”.19 The Party had also 
previously given greater consideration to prospective electoral agreements with the 
Liberals during the 1974 Minority Government. A number of papers had been prepared at 
the time to study the implications of such a move, some of them actively advocating a pact. 
The party leadership, including Heath, had decided not to pursue this approach, fearing, 
not least, that it would be likely to reduce the prospects for any future Conservative 
Government obtaining a majority.
20
  
Both main parties during the late 1970s avoided the implementation or even the 
planning of measures that would better facilitate the conduct of minority or coalition 
government following an election, whether in terms of institutional reforms, laying the 
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groundwork for negotiations, or creating pre-electoral agreements. In this respect, they 
continued to adhere to the British tradition of minority government, firmly grounded in a 
majoritarian desire to win outright electoral victory. In spite of this, the dimension of 
pragmatic adaptation within the British tradition was also in evidence, potential plans 
being drawn up by both sides in the event of an indecisive result.  
 
Plans for minority government or coalition 
Government Plans 
 
Some Government internal papers, such as the Number 10 Policy Unit’s June 1977 work 
on Government strategy, viewed another indecisive General Election result as a potentially 
more favourable outcome than defeat, even though anything other than an outright victory 
was still regarded as undesirable. However, there is no immediately apparent development 
of this position, or indeed of any strategic measures being drawn up to handle such an 
electoral result. Although unwilling publicly to state what he would do in the event of an 
indecisive result, Callaghan’s thoughts on the matter are made clearer in a February 1978 
Note for the Record, in which he discussed the matter with his Principal Private Secretary 
after a meeting with Steel. Callaghan considered the likelihood of an indecisive result to be 
“quite conceivable” and that, if the Government had called the election and lost seats, even 
if it were possible for Labour to get minor parties’ support, he would, in the first instance, 
resign as Prime Minister. If Thatcher failed to construct a majority through agreements 
with the smaller parties, Callaghan would then attempt to do so, considering that it would 
not be feasible for the Conservatives to ask for another parliamentary dissolution so soon 
after the election.
21
 In some respects, this approach would seem to build upon that 
recommended by Callaghan following the indecisive election in February 1974, when 
Labour waited for the Conservative Government to try to form a coalition and then resign 
after failing to do so, rather than trying to pressure an immediate resignation. The 
consideration was that waiting and allowing the Conservatives to try, for four days in 1974, 
would then strengthen Labour’s position as the incoming minority government, removing 
any suggestion of an alternative viable opposition majority that could be invited to replace 
them. It is difficult to tell whether such an approach would have, in fact, been workable in 
1978-79. Callaghan’s resignation would likely have been viewed as an admission of failure 
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by MPs from the different parties, and by the country at large. Even if the Conservatives 
had no majority, the removal of Callaghan would still have placed Thatcher as Prime 
Minister over a de facto minority Conservative Government, with control over the prospect 
of an early dissolution, in the same way that Wilson had been with Labour in 1974.
22
 
It would certainly appear that such thoughts were not lost upon those in Labour 
who were considering the question of a future indecisive electoral result. Up until the end 
of the election campaign itself in 1979, there is little indication of Callaghan’s approach 
being significantly developed, or of much further work being done on the prospect of 
another minority government. There were, however, two brief letters in May 1979 from 
members of the Policy Unit that presented summaries of options for the Prime Minister in 
the event of another ‘hung parliament’ – one written by Lipsey, the other by Roger Carroll. 
These reflections mark a significant departure from earlier sentiments expressed by 
Callaghan himself. Lipsey’s two page letter argued that the Prime Minister ought to 
attempt to stay on if the result produced no majority, “Even if we [Labour] were not the 
largest party”. 23 The letter also included a phoned-in message from McNally, stating in no 
uncertain terms “1. At all costs avoid letting her [Thatcher] get a toe-nail in the door” and 
“2. You have every right to announce that you intend to face Parliament (1923 precedent)”. 
Both of those advising in this instance favoured Callaghan’s staying on and attempting to 
form a Government. The 1923 precedent referred to Conservative Prime Minister Stanley 
Baldwin’s meeting Parliament and attempting unsuccessfully to rule as a minority 
administration after losing his majority in an election. Invoking this precedent, would, in 
the first instance, suggest a preference for continuing the minority government, and maybe 
even adopting the approach of daring other parties to defeat them. At the same time, these 
advisers would have been more likely to push for either another interparty agreement in the 
style of the Lib-Lab Pact, or maybe even a more comprehensive arrangement. Lipsey 
suggested that the Government’s recent practice would not be sustainable following 
another indecisive election: 
 
“Because of the difficulties ahead, if we do stay on, it could not be on the basis that 
we have operated on since the end of the Lib/Lab pact, seeking to construct a 
majority from day to day. Something solider would be needed”.24 
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Carroll’s letter, ‘In the Event of Deadlock’, briefly summarised some options for Labour to 
construct agreements with other parties while considering some potential scenarios.
25
 
Carroll appears to have favoured Lipsey and McNally’s position of Callaghan staying on 
as Prime Minister, and, whether Labour or the Conservatives were the largest party, and 
“to try and have first crack in any event” of forming a government. The paper also 
considered, in the event of Labour being a few seats behind the Conservatives, the 
possibility of reinforcing the legitimacy of Callaghan staying on by presenting it as a 
‘caretaker government’, so as “not to lose the advantage of being the incumbents”. 
Carroll’s reasoning was that of positioning Labour in the event of Conservative interparty 
coalition talks failing, stipulating that “Then, if their talks got nowhere, surely we [Labour] 
would be entitled to see if we could construct a majority”. The parties considered as 
potential partners to an agreement in the letter were the Liberals, the SNP, and (by 
inference) the UUP and SDLP. The clearest statement of potential conditions that other 
parties might set concerned the Liberals, the two policies identified being “A House of 
Lords elected by PR”, an attempt to present something of a preferred Liberal objective that 
still had some chance of being delivered by the Government, and “Allowing the Liberals to 
make some running on Pay Policy”, thereby enjoying some significant economic influence. 
The letter’s potential conditions for the other parties are less clear, referring to a possible 
review of “revenue raising power for a Scottish Assembly”, and, even more vaguely, to 
having “detailed material ready on a possible Northern Ireland initiative” that sought to 
engage parties from both sides.
26
 
While these documents demonstrate the potential willingness of some within the 
Government to engage with the possibility of further agreements or coalitions, and were 
considered by Callaghan, they, in of themselves, were also very much reactive, only being 
authored the day before the Election. The two letters appear to have represented isolated 
reactions to a possible outcome arising on the eve of the Election. The options and ideas 
which they considered do not appear to have been translated into any substantial 
preparation in such areas as the framing of the manifesto, or the setting up of teams or 
writing of briefing papers for negotiations which would have helped to realise such plans 
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Opposition Plans 
 
Ironically, given Labour’s past experiences of minority government and involvement with 
the Pact, greater strategic consideration of a potential minority or coalition government is 
in evidence from the Conservatives. A number of factors have tended to discourage 
consideration of the possibility that the Conservatives planned for an indecisive result after 
the 1979 election. Unlike the election of October 1974, there was no Conservative call for 
a coalition during the 1979 campaign. Thatcher herself made no secret of her hostility to 
the notion of coalitions during the course of the Parliament and the election campaign 
itself. While some individuals may have favoured being open to a more consensual 
approach, the Conservative leadership was firm in putting down any such proposals, as 
seen, for example, in Central Office’s strongly-worded denials of reports in The Times that 
the Shadow Cabinet had discussed the possibility of a coalition. Oft-cited internal strategy 
papers on the election would engage in analysing the strengths and weaknesses of both 
parties, but tended to refer to a ‘hung Parliament’ as particularly unlikely, and emphasised 
the objective as being outright Conservative victory. The subsequent electoral successes 
for the Conservatives during the 1980s and 1990s, and the image of Thatcher as the strong, 
uncompromising party leader, may also have served to influence scholarly investigation in 
this area. The seemingly self-assured message and image projected by the Conservatives 
during the 1979 campaign would suggest that any thought of planning for a future minority 
government or making deals with other parties would have been flatly rejected by the 
leadership as unnecessary and defeatist.
27
 
However, while the main Conservative emphasis focused on winning, senior party 
members were, in private, seriously considering the prospect of minority government or 
even a possible full coalition. The general preference expressed from 1977 onwards by 
those conducting planning for this eventuality would appear to have been for running a 
minority government with Ulster Unionist support before seeking a majority at another 
early General Election after a few weeks or months. A particularly important body in 
formulating these hypothetical plans for future minority or coalition government was the 
CRD. Even where the importance of this body may have been diminished or bypassed by 
the leadership during the late 1970s, particularly in economic matters, it continued to 
exercise influence over day-to-day Parliamentary affairs, as has been highlighted in 
previous chapters, from considering questions of electoral timing to supplying briefings on 
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confidence debates. Thatcher did not yet have the authority over her Shadow Cabinet that 
she would later possess, and, it is also likely that an indecisive result would have had to 
rely upon support from the Shadow Cabinet and official strategy-making bodies if the 
party were to consider how to run a minority government or interparty agreements. The 
apparently increasing polarization of British politics during the 1970s, and the widely 
perceived loss of the Conservatives’ traditional position as the ‘natural’ party of 
Government, had also served to change opinions within the Opposition. A growing number 
of influential Conservative voices from 1974 onwards were willing to contemplate radical 
notions of entering into a coalition or reforming the electoral system if it meant preventing 
another Labour Government from being formed. Even before the Government had lost its 
majority in 1976, the Conservatives had been confronting the coalition question. During 
mid-1975 when, as previously mentioned, an economic crisis or Government split 
appeared imminent, there was serious discussion among political commentators that an 
alternative to a ‘crisis’ election would be a National Unity Government as the only viable 
solution. Conservative Steering Group meetings on the subject in May 1975 suggested that 
nothing should be said publicly about the prospects of a National Unity Government, but, 
went so far as to say that in the event that Labour dropped further nationalisation 
proposals, there could possibly be a basis for coalition discussions (although there is no 
evidence of any concrete preparations being made toward this eventuality).
28
  
While no such Government was formed, these discussions provided the backdrop 
for planning after Labour became a minority government under Callaghan. This planning 
reflected ongoing uncertainty regarding a Conservative victory, and the belief that factors 
might conspire to produce another indecisive result: the vote swing required to win was 
greater than that achieved by an Opposition at any other election since 1945; national 
opinion polls had already proved themselves unreliable when predicting the result of the 
three previous General Elections; and, in any case, during the Callaghan Government, 
different polls had been showing periods of very small Conservative leads, or even, Labour 
leads. There were also persistent fears among some senior Conservatives that Callaghan 
would form a coalition to stay in power in the event of an indecisive poll. One such 
instance of these concerns being raised came in an October 1978 letter from Conservative 
Researcher Charles Bellaire to Patten and other senior strategy-makers including Adam 
Ridley (one of Thatcher’s inner circle and future CRD Director), entitled ‘The Future 
Scene’. This letter considered likely political developments following the delay of the 
                                                 
28
 CPA: SC 14, 26
th
 Meeting, 12 May 1975; 27
th
 Meeting, 13 May 1975. 
Chapter 8 – Future Minority and Coalition Government 181 
prospective autumn election. While the letter was primarily concerned with the 
Government’s economic strategy, Bellaire warned that waiting for Labour’s failing on 
industrial policy could usher in a Unity Government: 
 
“in such circumstances, Mr Callaghan might take a leaf out of Ramsay 
MacDonald’s book, and urge the formation of a coalition of all the moderates […] I 
would hope that the possibility of such action by Mr Callaghan is not dismissed as 
completely beyond the realms of possibility. He would certainly be making such an 
approach from a stronger negotiating position than was the case with Ramsay 
MacDonald in 1931.”29 
 
It is this context of continued concerns about the outcome of an election and Unity 
Governments that prompted some Conservatives seriously to consider future ‘hung 
parliaments’. In the first instance, it was suggested that the party’s public discourse needed 
to accommodate, even in a subtle way, the possibility of future minority government. In a 
paper written in November 1977, ‘Some Thoughts on Strategy and Tactics: A note by the 
Research Department’, Patten stressed that while a “hung Parliament” after the next 
election was unlikely, there was a need for contingency planning, “The subject deserves 
discussion”, and for the tailoring of publicity to allow for any eventuality by designing:  
 
“a form of words which, while making clear our determination to win a majority, 
does not rule out negotiation with other parties if we fall slightly short of that”30  
 
 Patten further suggested that:  
 
“there may be a case for more positive, if discreet, wooing of other parties in the 
coming months”.31  
 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, given the hostility within the party to this concept, such references 
appear to have been removed from subsequent redrafts of the paper. However, this 
statement was not only indicative of other discussions on the subject between those 
planning Conservative strategy that were not minuted, but foreshadowed further officially 
sanctioned planning within the party.
32
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Such papers were requested and considered by a special Co-ordinating Committee 
that had been set up in late 1977 to study important issues relating to party strategy and 
planning. It was chaired by Keith Joseph, with Thatcher kept informed of the planning 
being conducted.
33
 While such strategy-making may not have been on the scale of that 
conducted by their European counterparts, Conservative preparations appear to have been 
more extensive than those preceding the October 1974 Election. The 1974 Conservative 
Opposition, faced with Wilson’s Minority Government and the prospect of further 
indecisive elections, had produced several strategy papers on forming potential coalitions 
or electoral pacts with other parties, particularly the Liberals, in order to help ensure 
victory in a subsequent poll. The purpose of these documents, however, appears to have 
been as much to justify or condemn their authors’ advocacy or rejection of interparty 
cooperative policies as to provide practical plans for their implementation. It would also 
appear that the internal argument against electoral pacts was decisively carried, perhaps 
explaining, as cited above, why these political devices did not form a significant part of the 
Conservatives’ 1976-79 planning.34 
In contrast to Conservative planners’ efforts in both 1974 and 1975, interparty 
agreements for supporting a future Conservative minority government and potential 
coalitions with other parties were considered during the later 1970s. Even from mid-1977 
onwards, CRD documents were outlining not only a series of hypothetical post-electoral 
scenarios involving ‘Hung Parliaments’, but were also going into greater detail over the 
conduct of negotiations, the possibility of reaching agreements with particular parties, and 
some of the tactics that might be used or required in order successfully to achieve a 
workable agreement. This planning was very much framed within the British tradition of 
minority government, asserting a firmly majoritarian vision of the need to keep the 
planning secret, but also acknowledging the purpose of such planning for alternative 
outcomes as being a pragmatic preparation. Such sentiments are perhaps best captured in 
the opening of the April 1978 ‘Hung Parliament’ paper: 
 
“Before and during a general election campaign there can be no public admission 
that the Party expects anything less than victory with an overall majority: to give 
any hint that we had planned for any other contingency would tend to increase the 
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minority parties’ vote. We have thought it prudent, nevertheless, to set down, in 
case they are ever needed in the aftermath of an election, some considerations first 
on the constitutional and historical aspects of a hung Parliament, secondly on the 
contingency itself and thirdly on the psephological background.”35 
 
While these papers stressed their authors’ desire for an outright Conservative victory, they 
drew different conclusions as to potential minority government or coalition outcomes.  
The three documents that will be considered here include that of James Douglas’ 
paper on 27 May 1977, to which subsequent papers make reference, followed by 
Nicholson’s paper of 16 March 1978, ‘The Hung Parliament Contingency’, and a paper of 
April 1978, written by Alexander ‘Sandy’ Walker, ‘Appendix E’, which appears to have 
been, in part, derived from Nicholson’s paper.36  
In Douglas’ May 1977 paper, it is suggested that, in the event of an indecisive 
election: “the most likely outcome […] would be either an exceptionally short Parliament 
[with a minority government]” or a “grand coalition” involving at least part of Labour and 
the Conservatives. Although the idea of a coalition between Labour and the Conservatives 
was (and as of 2015 would still be) publicly dismissed out of hand as impossible by many 
contemporary political commentators, the fact that this was even being considered shows 
something of the mindset of Opposition planners at the time, and the influence that the 
notion of a Unity Government continued to exercise. Both Labour and the Conservatives 
had been in coalition around thirty-two years previously, albeit in terms of a wartime 
government. This paper was also framed within the above-cited context of a potential 
Labour Party split that had dominated previous Conservative discussion on the subject in 
1975 and 1976. While the economic turmoil of the IMF bailout had been successfully 
navigated by Callaghan, the early months of the Lib-Lab Pact and the tensions raised 
between Government leaders and Labour MPs, discussed in a previous chapter, once again 
raised the possibility of a party split in the minds of observers. 
37
 
By early 1978, the situation had changed significantly, as acknowledged in 
subsequent CRD papers. The Pact had not only survived, but had demonstrated the value 
of interparty cooperation, which led Opposition researchers considering ‘hung parliaments’ 
to fear “the recent narrowing of the gap between the two major parties in the opinion polls” 
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or that it had become “more likely that Callaghan would seek to stay in power through a 
continued arrangement with the Liberals”.38  
A later development of Conservative planning that addressed these issues may be 
seen in Nicholson’s ‘The ‘Hung Parliament’ Contingency’, a twenty-nine page paper 
considering likely Government behaviour, more detailed analysis of possible 
deals/coalitions between the Conservatives and other political parties, the likely political 
price of such deals, and an assessment of their viability. The twelve page “Appendix E: 
‘The Hung Parliament’”, prepared in April 1978, conducted an extended study of plans for 
a potential minority or coalition government. Both papers share some of their material, not 
least when setting out the different possible courses of action in a ‘hung parliament’, the 
wording of which between the two is practically identical: 
 
“If Mr. Callaghan resigned, the main options facing the Conservatives would be: 
(a) to form a minority government with an understanding with some or all of the minor 
parties; 
(b) to form a minority government without any formal understanding with the minor 
parties; 
(c) to ask for an immediate dissolution and have another general election within a few 
weeks; 
(d) to form a coalition with a combination of minor parties or a ‘grand coalition’ with 
the Right of the Labour Party and the Liberals.” 39 
 
Both papers also shared the idea of the initiative remaining with Callaghan after the 
election as the incumbent, and seeking to stay on, citing precedents including Heath’s 
experience in 1974. They both presented the notion of a Prime Minister losing seats at an 
election as having “forfeited” the right to govern, and that this represented a “powerful” 
argument for Callaghan’s resignation, a notion of electoral momentum that, as previously 
suggested, has been applied in other cases of minority government overseas. At the same 
time, both papers believed that Callaghan could dismiss the argument without facing 
significant public opposition, but that the Conservatives attempting a similar move would 
be met by trade union opposition that would make governing difficult. This position would 
appear partly rooted in the Conservatives’ experience of the February Election of 1974, 
following industrial action, and in the context of the ‘Winter of Discontent’. Walker’s 
‘Appendix E’ also highlighted the aforementioned 1923 precedent, showing that both 
Labour and the Conservatives were drawing on the same exemplars: 
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“The possibility of the existing Prime Minister (presumably James Callaghan) 
attempting to soldier on is of importance since there are recent precedents for 
this”.40 
 
After much discussion, the alternatives that Nicholson’s paper came up with notably 
featured the SNP in combinations with either main party, along with a Conservative-UUP 
option, while at the same time questioning the strength of such combinations:  
 
“The most likely outcomes of a ‘hung’ parliament would be Labour-SNP, 
Conservative-SNP, or Conservative-Ulster Unionist arrangements and all of these 
would exist unstably and possibly involve undesirable policies”.41 
 
In part, this focus on the SNP derives originally from Douglas’ paper, which forecast the 
possibility of a significant SNP presence at Westminster, as being the third placed party 
with around twenty to thirty seats. Although the SNP poll rating had diminished nearly a 
year later, the subsequent papers still considered an enlarged SNP to be a distinct 
possibility. Nicholson’s paper also examined the three above-cited arrangements in more 
detail, even going so far as to suggest that there were some conditions that the 
Conservatives could accept in order to reach an agreement with the SNP, not least that of 
offering a further devolution referendum in the event that the 40% threshold was not 
passed. Such a proposal was considered to be justified if it gained the parliamentary 
support of the SNP and could be “represented as avoiding the need to move into the 
murkier waters of federalism”, or, even more radically, of implementing devolution even 
without a further referendum. Evidence of multiple edits in this section of the paper, and 
the blotting out of entire paragraphs, shows something of the difficulty of considering these 
options, and that this was very much an area being repeatedly revised in Nicholson’s line 
of thought. Walker’s paper similarly considered conditions for an SNP agreement, such as 
“the power to raise revenue” for a future Scottish Assembly, but also spent less space 
discussing it, and couched the measures very much as temporary expedients designed to 
satisfy moderate devolutionists. Both papers also acknowledged the additional difficulties 
of a deal, including the absence of any previous “tradition” of cooperation with the 
Scottish nationalists, and viewed an enlarged SNP as being “further to the Left and […] all 
the harder to make a deal with”.42 
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While Nicholson’s paper was very much grounded in the experiences under the 
Callaghan Administration, Walker’s paper initially set out more of a history of minority 
governments in Britain. Subsequent discussion of options included drawing upon 
nineteenth-century precedents (possibly reflecting the paucity of twentieth-century British 
precedents for successful minority governments, none of which were Conservative). That 
the paper was prepared to cite the Derby and Disraeli minority governments of the 1850s, 
rather than contemporary minority governments from elsewhere, once again provides a 
good example of the British tradition of minority government as being self-referencing, 




In spite of differences, there is, nevertheless, a consistent preference expressed 
across these different papers, opting for the Conservatives running their own minority 
government on a temporary basis in the event of an indecisive result, and then seeking 
another election and majority shortly thereafter. This is very much in line with the 
aforementioned approach adopted by other minority governments, including those of the 
Canadian Government under Trudeau in 1974. While the CRD was undoubtedly aware of 
international experience, there is no indication in this planning that the exemplars were 
drawn from overseas, potential actions being justified either through reference to 
precedents from British political history and contemporary experience from the Callaghan 
Minority Government, or through an appeal to pragmatic adaptation that would enable the 
Conservatives to return to power. Ultimately the only formal interparty agreement 
seriously entertained in these proposals was that of a coalition between the Conservatives 
and the UUP, in a post-election Parliament where it was assumed the Conservatives would 
be the largest party. In Nicholson’s case: 
 
“The Ulster Unionists, of course, present the best basis for a permanent 
arrangement. Some additional support might be obtained when needed from the 
Liberals though the strength and reliability of this are both doubtful.”44 
 
Even where Walker’s paper had criticised some of the earlier views in Douglas’ 1977 
paper on a prospective Unity Government, it explicitly cites the earlier work, supporting 
the conclusion that: 
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“The only feasible course would seem to be the one James Douglas suggested in 
July 1977: to rule as a minority Government with Ulster Unionist support until 
another general election.”45 
 
In terms of policies that could have been offered to the UUP, the preference appears to 
have been largely the same as those cited in the chapter on informal cooperation when the 
Conservatives were seeking Ulster Unionist support during the Callaghan Government: 
increased representation at Westminster and the reconstruction of local government in 
Northern Ireland along majoritarian lines, while continuing to reject any notion of home 
rule that did not involve power-sharing. In this regard, Conservative planners recognised 
that the UUP were divided over the power-sharing issue, majority rule “not supported by 
Powell, Molyneaux and other Unionists”, and that rejection of power-sharing would lead to 
wider political damage and loss of Conservative supporters in Britain, negating any short-
term benefit. Other policies included modest changes or preservation of existing 
arrangements where preferred in areas from the structure of Secondary Education to 
improving Security. This is not to say that radical proposals were not being considered. 
Nicholson’s paper ended the section discussing the Ulster Unionists with a scenario 
reminiscent of the 1974 Wilson Government’s Doomsday plan, suggesting that, if events 
spiralled out of control, a future Conservative Government could be compelled: 
 
“with or without the agreement of the Irish Republic or the SDLP to re-draw the 
border and arrange appropriate exchanges of population”.46 
 
Nicholson’s closing sentence indicated that he had thoughts on the arrangements for this 
possibility but that it would not be appropriate “to specify them in a paper of this nature”, 
suggests this was very much a speculative and more general contingency scenario, rather 
than being connected to the paper’s main consideration of preparations for minority or 
coalition government. 
The only other option which came up repeatedly in these Conservative plans was 
that of the ‘grand coalition’, cited originally in Douglas’ paper. Nicholson considered that 
the only situation in which a grand coalition would emerge as an issue would be if 
Callaghan made “an offer to the Conservatives and possibly the Liberals”, but thought that 
even such an attempt would be “highly improbable unless the constitutional impasse were 
to be accompanied by an economic blizzard worse than any previously experienced”. The 
option of a coalition with Labour was detailed in ‘Appendix E’ so that it could be 
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dismissed as unworkable. However, the fact that both papers felt it necessary to outline 
such an option indicates the continued intellectual impact of the ‘National Unity idea’ 
among political elites, and the already-cited Conservative fears about Callaghan’s 
propensity for encouraging interparty cooperation.
47
  
Others engaged in planning strategy for the Opposition also gave some 
consideration to questions of minority and coalition government, showing both awareness 
and concern for the issues involved. Those who provided much of the foundational work 
on subsequent Conservative economic policy have traditionally been considered as 
particularly hostile to any notion of compromise. These strategy-makers attached some 
weight to National Unity as viable, but, in their eyes, deplorable. Alfred Sherman’s 
extensive memorandum to Conservative strategist John Hoskyns in May 1978 is one 
example of this, arguing passionately for the need to counter the threat of a prospective 
Government of National Unity. However, even some of these planners were willing to 
contemplate the possibility of the Conservatives entering into coalition. The wide-ranging 
reforms that the Conservatives sought to achieve in areas such as industrial relations were 
known to be controversial, planners including Sherman and Hoskyns anticipating 
prolonged battles against trade unions and other powerful interest groups. As such, a focus 
in planning was not merely to win a General Election but also to gain the power necessary 
to achieve their goals, a particular emphasis being on the ability to win several Elections 




These papers give an insight into the Conservative approach to the question of 
potential minority government. While the idea of a National Unity Government involving 
Labour and the Conservatives was very unlikely, its inclusion in the above papers as a 
concept even worth recognising gives some insight into the effect of minority government 
on strategy-making. The possibility of such a government when faced with a weakened 
political system and economic crisis was not confined  to the academic exercises of one or 
two strategists, but was, as already indicated, a view that had deep-rooted and significant 
influence among political elites during this period. The papers are also indicative of the 
Conservatives’ mindset when presenting their plans for minority or coalition government, 
framed very much within the continuation of experiences learned in the British political 
system, rather than looking toward innovation based on contemporary practices abroad. 
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Even where those making plans demonstrated their awareness of the experiences of 
minority governments in other countries, their papers on potential ‘Hung Parliaments’ 
drew exclusively from British examples. For instance, the Conservatives’ April 1978 paper 
on ‘Hung Parliament’, cites British minority governments going back to the mid-nineteenth 
century:  
 
“Minority governments have often been formed, usually at periods when the Party 
system has been in transition, e.g. when the Peelites were drifting slowly from 
Conservative to Liberal allegiance, or when the Liberal Unionists were moving 
rapidly from the Gladstonian to the Conservative camp, or when Labour was taking 
over from the Liberal Party. Sir Ivor Jennings, in Cabinet Government: 3
rd
 Edition, 
1961, cited no less than eleven cases of minority governments since the 1832 
Reform Act”.49 
 
While minority government planning was conducted behind closed doors, the 
Conservatives’ official public discourse would appear to have continued to militate against 
the notion of minority government and prospective interparty cooperation. There were 
some instances where appeals to greater interparty cooperation would appear to have been 
adopted by the Conservative leadership. In January 1979, Thatcher was persuaded by those 
advising her to make use of the spirit of ‘National Unity’ – doing a party political 
broadcast on 14-15 January in which she offered the Callaghan Government the support of 
Conservative MPs to pass specific measures in Parliament: seeking to alleviate the 
industrial crisis through bans on secondary picketing; providing funding of strike ballots; 
and a no-strike agreement in essential services. Although the offer was made on the 
premise that it was bound to be rejected, Thatcher voiced her concerns when discussing the 
approach with those advising her, fearing that a pragmatic Callaghan could accept, and, as 
a consequence, out-manoeuvre the Conservatives. The offer was, as had been forecast, 
rejected by the Government. Although this broadcast was couched in terms of a ‘National 
Unity’ appeal, it was conceived of primarily as a political device for gaining the support of 
moderate voters, rather than as a genuine move towards opening up greater interparty 
cooperation between the two main parties.
50
 
The framing of the Conservatives’ official discourse through the General Election 
manifesto also did not show any of the markers for potential negotiations that may be 
found in those of their counterparts abroad. It was suggested by Opposition strategy-
makers, including Patten, that, in spite of an indecisive outcome being unlikely, the 
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Conservative manifesto should still contain a commitment to a Speaker’s Conference on 
constitutional matters. The above-cited Conservatives’ April 1978 paper on a ‘Hung 
Parliament’ similarly advocated a public commitment to a constitutional conference, as a 
means of gaining the support of additional voters, but, also because “it would give us 
[Conservatives] some room for manoeuvre after the election if we need to trade 
constitutional points with minor parties”. A commitment of this nature would be very 
much in line with that promised in the Conservative October 1974 manifesto, and could 
have helped in the process of making an agreement with another party, judging that the 




The final wording in the manifesto was somewhat vague on this point, naming a 
number of constitutional matters as concerning “which we shall wish to discuss with all 
parties”, rather than putting forward any specific commitment to a Speaker’s Conference 
or other formal body. The tone of the section highlighting these issues focused around 
opposing the perceived unconstitutional role of industrial workers on strike during the 
winter, as well as decrying changes to the constitution “for party political advantage”. 
Although the need for more action on the constitution was noted by the Shadow Cabinet in 
July 1978, references to unifying the nation were qualified as precluding interparty 
cooperation. While the manifesto’s avoidance of detailed commitments may have served as 
a useful basis for negotiations with other parties, it was conceived of by those framing the 
document purely as a reaction against too much detail in previous manifestoes from 1970 
onwards, rather than as a preparation for a prospective minority government. Similarly, the 
avoidance of repeating anything resembling the October 1974 commitment on interparty 
cooperation, or even anything committing the Conservatives to examining wider 




While the Conservatives had largely ruled out the Liberals as potential post-
electoral coalition partners, the papers exploring the possibility justified this more on the 
grounds of the Liberal Party not likely to have a significant number of seats in Parliament, 
rather than from a principled stand against such cooperation. As highlighted in the earlier 
chapter on interparty cooperation, the Conservatives were more interested in converting 
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Liberal voters, but did not fully cut off cooperation with their Liberal counterparts.
53
 The 
Liberals’ own planning also did not completely rule out future cooperation with the 
Conservatives. The natural instincts of the Liberal party in the country would appear even 
in the 1970s to have been more oriented towards Labour, including their rejection of 
coalition with Heath’s Conservative Government in 1974 and the formation of the Lib-Lab 
Pact in 1977. However, internal planning by the Liberal leadership in the late 1970s did 
consider the possibility of working with the Conservatives after an indecisive election. The 
party’s National Executive Committee accepted in a June 1978 meeting with Steel that an 
agreement between the two parties might become necessary depending on the outcome of 
any election:  
 
“in the event of a hung parliament after the General Election, the Liberal Party 
would be willing to co-operate with another party in government, whatever its 
political complexion, in order to achieve certain Liberal objectives, foremost 
amongst these being positive progress towards the implementation of proportional 
representation, and therefore the possibility of an agreement with the Conservatives 
should not be dismissed, but agreed with Mr. Steel who had said that the Tories 
would have radically to modify their present dogmatic and intransigent attitudes, 
before such an agreement could be considered.”54 
 
Precisely what these modifications would have entailed is uncertain. It is however very 
likely that the most significant would have been the removal of Thatcher as leader in 
favour of someone more palatable to the Liberals, such as the Deputy Conservative Leader, 
William Whitelaw. This device of leadership change as a price for coalition is very much 
in line with contemporary and more recent practices of smaller parties seeking to form 
coalitions, such as the Liberal Democrat demands for Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s 
resignation as a condition for coalition in 2010.
55
 Such a device would have served to 
remove perhaps the greatest obstacle to a Conservative-Liberal agreement in 1979, that of 
Thatcher’s opposition to such a form of cooperation. At the same time, there was still 
considerable sensitivity within the Liberals and opposition to agreements with the 
Conservatives, Steel feeling compelled to respond to a Guardian article suggesting that the 
Liberal leader had outlined conditions for future Conservative-Liberal cooperation by 
apologising and providing reassurance in a letter to Liberal Parliamentary candidates: 
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“I am sorry that “The Guardian” misinterpreted my recent speech intended to 
illustrate Tory divisions as my “terms for a Lib-Con pact” and even sorrier that it 
was lifted as such straight into Liberal News”.56 
 
While this speculative scenario of a coalition may have appeared unlikely, it is possible 
that, in the event of the Conservatives failing to gain a majority, Thatcher’s position would 
not have been secure against challengers in 1978-79. Even if a formal coalition could not 
have been formed, some form of more informal arrangement between the two parties 
would not have been totally inconceivable, given their cooperation on important votes 






Although the final outcome of the 1979 election was a Conservative victory with a solid 
majority, there was significant uncertainty for contemporaries about the likely result of an 
election which shaped their planning and conduct of strategy. The experience of minority 
government during the 1970s, whether in office or opposition, was significantly important 
in shaping this planning and the resultant actions of the two main British Political Parties.  
While both main parties publicly rejected any outcome short of an outright victory, 
planning was conducted behind the scenes for the possibility of a future minority 
government or even the formulation of a coalition with the smaller parties. Papers were 
produced outlining possible scenarios for future ‘hung parliaments’, which involved the 
political leadership of both Government and Opposition in greater consideration of 
minority government and coalition questions than has previously been recognised. Limited 
debates within Labour focused around how Callaghan should respond to any indecisive 
result in terms of forming a new Government and potential conditions for cooperation with 
the Liberals, SNP, UUP and/or SDLP. The Conservatives’ multiple CRD papers on a 
‘hung parliament’ considered everything from running a minority government to a full 
coalition with the UUP, as well as admittedly less likely outcomes which might have 
included a Conservative-SNP Coalition or a Grand Coalition with Labour.  
However, clear hostility to the notion of interparty agreement remained strong 
within Labour and the Conservatives, and this work was, although significant, more 
sporadic and less extensive than that done by many of their European counterparts. 
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Planning work was also not translated by the two main parties into measures typically 
adopted in other countries to facilitate better post-electoral interparty cooperation or 
coalition. Such measures, including modification of the parties’ public discourse through 
manifestoes to signpost potential negotiating positions, or establishment of additional pre-
electoral assistance or communication with other parties, were not significantly developed 
by either of the two main parties. 
 Having to address problems of potential minority or coalition government helped to 
shape the thinking of both main political parties after 1979 until the present day. These 
experiences provided a platform on which future leaders would build when faced with 
prospective political realignments, including the emergence of the Social Democrat Party 
in the 1980s, and the prospect of possible minority governments following elections, which 
continued to feature prominently in considerations of General Elections, particularly in 
1992 when most forecasts incorrectly judged that the outcome would be indecisive. The 
experiences of minority government and coalition politics in Devolved Parliaments after 
1999, and, at a Westminster level following 2010, have reinforced the importance of 
strategy-making for parties with regard to participation in prospective minority and 
coalition governments. At the present time of political uncertainty, when another ‘hung 
parliament’ is being considered by commentators as a serious possibility following the 
General Election in 2015, this type of planning by parties is of increasing importance. The 
extent to which these later administrations have learned, or will learn, the lessons of their 
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The Callaghan Government’s defeat in a no confidence motion by 311 votes to 310 on 28 
March 1979 represents perhaps one of the most dramatic moments of recent British 
parliamentary history. As with the Pact, any attempt to comprehend the multiplicity of 
factors which contributed to this defeat, both in terms of the event itself and the backdrop 
of the preceding months, could reasonably be a significant self-contained study. Indeed, as 
highlighted in the introduction, some have produced articles or chapters which concentrate 
solely on explaining the downfall of Callaghan’s Administration, in addition to a book-
length study Explaining the Fall of the Labour Government. However, this latter work was 
primarily a collaborative effort among Labour MPs, produced immediately following 
defeat in 1979 and seeking to challenge Government policies and practices more widely, 
rather than concentrating on parliamentary strategy and the no confidence vote.
1
 
 There were a number of individual instances where the Government could have 
gained the additional vote to avoid defeat, involving numerous devices including, not least, 
the honouring of a gentlemen’s agreement between a Government and Opposition whip 
always to find a pair if needed, signing one of the associated deals on a gas pipeline or gas 
price reduction for Northern Ireland, or getting an ambulance to bring in the Labour MP, 
Sir Alfred Broughton, who was seriously ill. The events surrounding the confidence vote 
itself were retold in a full-length BBC 30
th
 anniversary documentary, The Night the 
Government Fell (A Parliamentary Coup), including interviews with participants from 
different parties. Works considering the causes of the defeat have generally tended either to 
emphasise Government mistakes over handling the outcome of the Devolution Referenda, 
which lost SNP support, or to suggest that the Government’s fate was already sealed by the 
‘Winter of Discontent’, and that the loss of the confidence vote was a foregone conclusion 
or did not have a significant effect in terms of the subsequent election.
2
 
The calling of a no confidence vote in March 1979 and its subsequent loss were by 
no means certain, even after the ‘Winter of Discontent’. The vote was also significant in 
terms of what it highlighted about the British approach to minority government. The state 
of minority government led to Callaghan’s defeat, but not only through the lack of votes. 
Ironically, the defeat also arose from the Government’s experience as a minority 
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administration over the course of the Parliament, conditioning the response of those 
formulating strategy. Additionally, the ‘rational actors’ from different parties did not 
behave in the way that contemporaries and most minority government theory would have 
necessarily predicted. This chapter will reconsider this vote in an effort to examine both 
main parties’ strategy development, and also the distinctive British tradition of minority 
government. In instances where this chapter selectively considers counterfactual outcomes, 
these will highlight some of the choices that were faced by the Government in handling the 
no confidence issue, and will be directed along the lines of attempting to evaluate some of 
the potential calculations that may have influenced contemporary strategy-makers. The 
first stage will be to consider the Government’s efforts to avoid the no confidence vote, 
followed by both Government and Opposition dealing with the no confidence vote, in 
terms of approaches to other parties and certain individual initiatives which highlight 
important aspects of the minority government over the previous three years. Finally, the 
chapter will consider how far the loss of the no confidence vote impacted upon the 
subsequent election. 
 
Avoiding the vote 
 
While the Government had suffered significantly in early 1979 during the strikes and 
economic turmoil of the ‘Winter of Discontent’, the immediate trigger for the confidence 
vote was the outcome of the Referenda on Devolution on 1 March 1979, and the 
Government’s response. While a majority actually voted in favour of Devolution in 
Scotland, the 40% turnout threshold for Yes votes, added through Labour backbench 
rebellions in Parliament, was not met, requiring that the Government repeal the Act. The 
SNP response was to threaten that they would table a vote of no confidence in the 
Government unless a vote was brought forward in the near future on the repeal of the 
Scotland Act, and that Labour committed to voting against the repeal, as a means to 
bringing forward the implementation of Devolution.
3
 
While it may be difficult to see how the Government could misinterpret such a 
statement, contemporary perceptions that the Devolution result would not threaten 
Callaghan’s survival extended beyond the Government to other parties, and affected their 
approaches and views towards any prospective vote. The Opposition were cautious about 
attempting any confidence vote at this stage, considering the SNP’s intermittent backing of 
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the Government over the previous couple of years, and that their own stance on Devolution 
ran the risk of losing the support of some of their own members and the SNP MPs, 
highlighted not least in correspondence between backbenchers and the party leadership. 
One such exchange of communications with Thatcher in the weeks following the 
Referenda involved Conservative MP Anthony Nelson, who warned that any publicly 
hard-line stance against Devolution would potentially not only alienate some 
Conservatives MPs but also “lessen the possibility of obtaining SNP support on other 
matters in the remainder of this Parliament”. The response of the Conservative leadership 
was very much along the lines of seeking repeal of the Devolution Acts, but also not to 
discourage the thought of a further negotiated compromise on Devolution, or to take action 
that would antagonise the smaller parties.
4
 
The Liberals similarly were not certain in the early stages that the Government 
would necessarily lose a confidence vote. Even prior to the Devolution Referenda, when it 
appeared that the 40% threshold would not be met, others among the opposition parties did 
not necessarily consider the SNP likely to bring down the Government. On 23 February, 
Steel reported to the Liberal National Executive Committee that he believed: 
 
“the nationalists would probably not be prepared to vote against the Government 
while there was still a prospect of securing the enactment of the Scotland Bill”.5 
 
When meeting Callaghan on 6 March, the Prime Minister’s suggestion of Liberal support 
being crucial in preventing an early General Election was, in several instances, rebuffed by 
Steel, reiterating his view that the SNP would enable the Government’s survival.6 
In line with the practices outlined in previous chapters, the Government first sought 
in March 1979 to avoid any confidence vote, or, at the very least, to delay one. Some of the 
different attempts by the Government to deal with the issue of the Scotland Act’s repeal in 
a way which would stave off SNP criticism have already been highlighted in contemporary 
reflections, not least Foot’s proposal to use a parliamentary technicality of trying to keep 
the Bill on the statute book without implementing it, which became known variously as 
‘the Frankenstein solution’ or ‘the Frankenstein formula’. Such a move was not accepted 
by Callaghan and others in the Government, fearing that it would be perceived as a form of 
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cheating, and would not satisfy the SNP.
7
 The move did, however, arise in discussion with 
other parties, not least the Liberals. While the Liberals were no longer in any formal 
Agreement with the Government, Callaghan had met with Steel on 6 March, as cited in 
Chapter 7, after the Devolution Referenda but before any confidence motion was set down. 
Steel raised the thought of Parliament voting against the repeal but not implementing the 
legislation until after the election as being “an attractive scenario, particularly since the 
Scottish Liberal Conference was taking place in two weeks time”. Callaghan, however, did 
not directly answer this suggestion, delaying with the response “the Government did not 




In line with the sentiments of Callaghan and Steel’s meeting, the Government’s 
approach was very much one of playing for time, while stipulating that, although they 
would lay the repeal order, it would be for Parliament to decide upon, while the notion of 
all-party talks to resolve the issue would become a focus of this approach. Such a view was 
shared by many of those formulating Government strategy, including among members of 
the Cabinet, and in a Policy Unit meeting of 5 March.
9
 At the 8 March Cabinet meeting, a 
week after the poll, it was recognised that repealing the Act “would have immediate 
consequences for survival of the Government”. In this meeting, Callaghan did raise the 
prospect of an amended Act being implemented, while the proposition put was for talks 
involving all parties to try to consider how to handle the outcome of the Referenda. 
Although there was some suggestion of attempting to achieve a compromise, these talks 
were conceived of by the Government from the outset primarily as a tactical device, an 
attempt to expose differences of opinion between opposition parties, and to delay any no 
confidence motion. In the frank assessment of that Cabinet meeting: 
 
“It had to be expected that interparty talks would be no more productive now than 
when attempted previously, but so long as they continued, the prospect remained of 
avoiding the Scottish National Party voting with the Opposition on any motion of 
confidence.”10 
 
At the same time as this “prospect”, there was an appreciation of the other parties’ 
positions: 
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“It was nevertheless doubtful whether the Ulster Unionists and Plaid Cymru would 
be prepared to abstain on such a motion and the Liberal Party was committed to 
seeking an early General Election.”11 
 
Several options were raised at this point. The above-cited solution of voting against the 
repeal order but not implementing the Act came up, with the suggestion that the SNP and 
Liberals “would be found ready to support such a proposal”. The counter argument to this 
appears to have focused on the pressure immediately to put forward the repeal orders and 
the danger that, if they did not, then the Opposition would put down a censure/confidence 
motion on the issue and probably win. All-party talks were once again stressed at this point 
as providing a viable means of delaying the requirement for Government action. Another 
option put forward was to avoid any such censure motion by the Government putting down 
its own confidence motion “containing a continued commitment to Devolution”. The 
counter to this was that of being unable to ensure Liberal support, and that Labour 
backbenchers opposed to Devolution would find such a move “divisive” and potentially 
vote against it. Rather than firmly deciding upon a course of action, Callaghan summed up 
the discussion by once again playing for time, hoping that a week later: 
 
“some clearer assessment might be possible of the likely attitudes and intentions of 
the Scottish National Party and the Scottish Labour Party”.12 
 
The inability to comprehend the reaction of some of the parties fuelled Government 
hesitation. While in some ways the avoidance of a hasty reaction was not unreasonable, the 
perceived delay also only served to frustrate further the MPs of the SNP, and to increase 
suspicions that the Government intended to avoid tackling the Devolution issue. As such, 
by the time of the next Cabinet meeting on 15 March, the SNP were insisting on debates on 
the repeal order being taken by 27 March “and that the Government should commit 
themselves to the rejection of the Order”. In this Cabinet, it was agreed to lay the repeal 
orders, but, instead of any firm commitment, to make a statement pressing for further 
reflection and an ad hoc forum for all-party talks. Although this time there was at least 
some suggestion of bipartisan consensus being reached, and that a time limit of four weeks 
should be set to avoid charges of delay, the device appears once again to have been aimed 
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at ensuring that the opposition parties remained divided on the issue, and even to 
embarrass the Conservatives if, as expected, they refused to participate in the talks.
13
 
An even more detailed insight into the thinking and internal debates behind the 
Government approach to the Referenda outcome, and in terms of dealing with the no 
confidence vote itself, may be seen in the minutes of the meeting between Callaghan and 




Much has been made of the large number of Labour MPs, up to forty or even fifty, 
being prepared to rebel against the Government if it attempted to enforce a vote along SNP 
lines to prevent the repeal of Devolution. In fact, Whip James Hamilton suggested that, if 
the vote were made an issue of confidence, the number of rebels would be closer to only 
six, out of more than three hundred. While being challenged by some of the other Whips, 
even this estimate was unacceptable to Callaghan, who regarded such a rebellion as 
meaning “a split party”. Callaghan’s mindset was very much in line with how earlier 
confidence votes had been handled, as previously discussed in Chapter 4, where even a 
modest loss of Government members on such a vote was taken to represent a grave 
challenge to the Government’s authority. Although others, including assistant Whip James 
Marshall, supported a quick vote on the Order on the basis of a “Three line Whip”, 
Callaghan rejected this outright, making reference to a previous time in 1969 when he had 
set up the Government to vote against its own Order, and subsequently had had to live with 
charges of “gerrymandering”. One suggestion, raised by assistant Whip John Evans, in 
terms of interparty cooperation, was for a constitutional conference on Devolution as a 
means to retain support of the SNP, but was similarly ruled out by Callaghan as “not 
compatible with setting a date with the votes on the Orders which would lead to an SNP 
censure motion”. In fact, throughout the meeting, Callaghan also took a very harsh line 
against interparty cooperation, talking of his frustrations with “being blackmailed” and 
concluded the meeting with the sentiment that “he would make no bargains”. Most of the 
whips appear to have endorsed such a line at this stage, which encouraged the notion that 
no firm date should be given as the SNP had stipulated. Indeed, assistant Whip Ann Taylor 
suggested that, while a late election would be better, there was “nothing wrong, however, 
with the Government being defeated while it was acting responsibly”, a sentiment which 
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Following on from the Government’s proposal of interparty talks but without a firm 
commitment to a date or rejection of repeal order, the SNP put down a no confidence 
motion on 22 March. Once this motion was tabled, followed quickly by a Conservative no 
confidence motion, the room for manoeuvre of the different parties in Parliament was 
restricted, having to back up their statements of intent in order to maintain their political 
credibility. There was the suggestion by some Labour MPs in the days immediately prior 
to 28 March that the Government should immediately announce a date for the election 
before the no confidence debate, thereby seeking to avoid having to face a parliamentary 
vote. It does not appear that this option was given any serious consideration by Callaghan, 
mindful of the ‘Frankenstein formula’ and other previous innovations to avoid 
parliamentary defeat which might have been perceived as ‘cheating’ by opposing parties 
and the electorate. Having failed to avoid the no confidence vote, the Government now 




The No Confidence Vote 
Approach 
 
There have already been accounts elsewhere that describe the vote itself, and the various 
attempts by the Government and individual Labour MPs to secure a majority. Although 
these will be looked at, to some extent, it is also worth considering the approach of both 
main parties to the confidence vote, in the context of the minority government as outlined 
in the previous chapters.
17
 When looking at the different options explored by the 
Government, it is also worth bearing in mind not only the vote, but also how the methods 
employed might have affected the Government’s subsequent ability to manage Parliament. 
As indicated by Strom, the survival of minority governments depends not only on their 
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While individual cases were important, and may be taken as indicative of wider 
approaches to strategy or issues concerning minority government, care must also be taken 
in any argument that seeks to emphasise the importance of one over another in terms of the 
final outcome. Given that the vote was only lost by a margin of one, it may be tempting to 
suggest, for example, that the Government lost on 2 March, the day immediately after the 
Devolution Referenda, when Labour MP Thomas Swain died in a car crash. Such an 
argument, however, can become an endless exercise in speculation devoid of historical 
analysis, and, even if limited in scope, also runs the potential risk of unforeseen factors, not 
least, for example, not knowing how the potential interaction of members who were not 
present might have changed the votes of those who were.
19
  
As for the prospect of a no confidence vote itself, the Government’s approach 
would, at first glance, appear very much reactive, almost passive. Indeed, Callaghan at this 
point is widely regarded as having grown tired of making deals to keep the Government in 
office, acting out of frustration rather than rational calculation. Ministers and MPs 
similarly made public statements predicting the end of the Government or decrying talk of 
deals.
20
 At the same time, however, there were debates among those formulating 
Government strategy, some of whom, including Donoughue and McNally, argued in the 
days prior to 28 March that more should be done to prevent defeat in the no confidence 
vote. While the frustration with such deals experienced by Callaghan and the Government 
leadership is clear, there was still something of an underlying strategic rationale in their 
thinking, not least along the lines earlier identified in the practice of ‘daring defeat’, 





Deal or no deal – Plaid Cymru, Liberals, UUP, SDLP 
 
Although the Lib-Lab Pact had reflected a significant instance of interparty cooperation, 
the main parties continued to adhere to the British tradition of minority government in 
1978 and early 1979, preferring to eschew public acknowledgement of any deals, while 
media outlets variously characterised such agreements, particularly with reference to the 
Government, as a form of ‘bribe’ or ‘cheating’. The substantial pay settlements made 
during the ‘Winter of Discontent’ almost certainly fed into this notion, and hardened the 
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Government attitude against being seen to do deals with their political counterparts. The 
restrictions imposed by this political environment reduced the scope for such deals, and 
implied that any such arrangements would have to be limited and disguised as far as 
possible.
22
 While interparty meetings were very much in evidence in the days prior to the 
confidence vote, these were often ad hoc, some lacking the participation or support of 
Callaghan, which had been crucial in delivering the Lib-Lab negotiations in 1977.
23
 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that the Government did not give greater 
consideration to interparty cooperation in advance of the no confidence vote. In spite of 
publicly rejecting the notion of deals and Callaghan’s evident frustration, the Government 
continued to be mindful of the smaller parties and reticent about taking actions that would 
imperil their support. Meetings were also subsequently held which, in some cases, led to 
successfully negotiated outcomes in terms of informal interparty cooperation, although 
others did not. The Government’s experience showed that they were in some ways more 
able to handle these negotiations than had been the case in previous years, although there 




In the Cabinet meeting of 15 March the importance of avoiding the quick repeal of 
the Wales Act on Devolution was stressed, “as this would drive Plaid Cymru into 
supporting the Conservative Party”, looking ahead to the possibility of any confidence 
vote.
25
 Foot went on to obtain the support of the Plaid Cymru MPs in return for legislation 
to help those in the quarry industry suffering from the lung disease pneumoconiosis. The 
Government nevertheless presented this as merely giving greater priority to something 
already announced in the Queen’s Speech the previous autumn. In part, this approach 
reflected the above-cited charges that were levied by other parties and the media of the 
legislation being a “bribe”.26  
While the UUP MPs were under pressure from their party to oppose the 
Government after the enactment of the Bill increasing Northern Ireland’s parliamentary 
representation on 15 March, their votes were not considered by either main party as 
guaranteed. When the Cabinet speculated on the likely support from smaller parties on 15 
March, the UUP were seen as potentially pivotal in any vote, but “it was not possible to 
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forecast their likely attitude”.27 Conservative Northern Ireland spokesman Airey Neave, in 
a report to Thatcher during February, had warned that, even after passage of the Bill 
increasing representation “There seems to be no assurance however that […] Enoch and 
his supporters will not make some deal with the Government”.28 Any prospective deal to 
secure UUP support was initially believed likely to include elements of tougher security 
policy and local government reform favourable to the Unionist position. While these 
aspects remained important, the main condition that actually emerged and became reported 
upon was more one of material benefits, in the form of funding the construction of a gas 
pipeline between England and Northern Ireland, at a cost of £100 million. Both main party 
leaderships publicly rejected the idea of any such deal, not least because of the expense, as 
did those in Government’s 21 March Whips meeting with Callaghan. A subsequent 
watering down of the UUP position was the indication that they would be willing to sustain 
the Government in return for a reduction in gas prices in Northern Ireland, at a cost of 
around £10 million. Even prior to the SNP no confidence motion being put down, there 
was talk of the Government trying to do a deal with the UUP, and of Foot meeting with 
Powell, although it appears that Callaghan would not countenance acceptance of these 
demands. The votes of two UUP MPs were eventually gained in a last-minute deal by 
Hattersley, in return for a written agreement on a special prices index for Northern 
Ireland.
29
 Possible implementation of the pipeline was considered by the Opposition, not 
least in a CRD paper by Michael Portillo on 23 February. Portillo believed that it was 
possible the Government would agree to the pipeline, and advised keeping Conservative 
options open. The paper outlined how to attack the Government depending on their 
response. If a Government commitment to the pipeline were only general, the paper 
advised pressing for “explicit” details, while any commitment to legislation would be 
challenged as “delaying the decision”. If the pipeline were rejected, the given response was 
to “denounce the Government […] and pledge to re-examine the question on coming to 
office”. At the same time, however, the paper suggested that Conservative backing of the 
pipeline would not, in of itself, serve as a means to secure UUP support for the confidence 
vote: 
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“it seems unlikely that a very enthusiastic response would actually bring more 
Unionists into our lobby at some crucial time”.30 
 
While some meetings between the Government and the smaller parties were improvised, 
others were given greater attention in terms of the preparation of briefings, witnessed not 
least, for example, in the thirteen page memoranda prepared at Callaghan’s request before 
his appointment to see Fitt on 15 March. Although the document did not represent a 
negotiating brief, it was couched in terms of seeking to address the SDLP’s main concerns, 
including, as discussed previously, the allegations of a secret Government Pact with the 
UUP and hostility to the Government’s particular implementation of policies in Northern 
Ireland.
31
 Another concern was that of the Northern Ireland Secretary, Roy Mason, 
perceived as favouring the Unionists in the implementation of policy. There is some 
suggestion that Hattersley had apparently promised to Fitt that he would replace Mason as 
Northern Ireland Secretary after the election in order to win over Fitt’s support the day 
before the confidence vote, although it is difficult to substantiate this.
32
 It is also difficult to 
tell whether this offer would have been acceptable, Fitt more likely requiring the 
immediate removal or announced removal of Mason at the very least. Such a move, if it 
had become public knowledge, may well have imperilled Hattersley’s position in 
negotiating with the UUP, and pushed the remaining UUP members into opposing, not 
only on this issue, but also any subsequent legislation. No record was kept of Callaghan 
and Fitt’s meeting, and it would appear that, whatever reassurances may have been given 
by other members, these were not sufficient, as Fitt subsequently abstained. During the no 
confidence debate, Fitt’s speech brought out one of the difficulties in terms of interparty 
cooperation that was caused by the state of minority government and has been highlighted 
in previous chapters. At the same time as he severely criticised the Government’s policies 
in Northern Ireland, Fitt also, ironically perhaps, hoped that the Government would be re-
elected “with such a majority that never again will they have to rely on the votes of the 
Unionists in Northern Ireland”. The Government’s pursuit of interparty cooperation with 
the UUP from 1977 onwards in order to ensure their majority had thereby helped to lose 
the vote of a man who had very nearly been invited to join the Government to maintain its 
majority in April 1976.
33
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While the Liberals would ultimately vote against the Government and appear not to 
have been amenable to making further deals in advance of the confidence vote, 
Callaghan’s meeting with Steel on 6 March did also consider further Liberal cooperation 
with the Government in terms of any early election. Callaghan “raised the question of how 
far the Liberals could help in the Government’s desire to put back the date of the election”. 
Steel’s response to this was “the Liberals could not be counted upon in any matter except 
that of the constitution”, in particular if the Government gave a firm commitment to 
preventing the repeal of Devolution. In suggesting a possible way forward, Callaghan put it 
to Steel that such an option would only work “if the Liberals supported them [the 
Government] in any votes of confidence, otherwise there would be a precipitate General 
Election”. Steel could not accept this, the Liberals already having made the position clear 
that they wanted an early election, not least in votes at the Liberal Party Conference. The 
then still recent experiences of, and hostility to, the Pact within the Liberals, and the 
Government’s demonstrated inability to deliver certain Liberal priorities such as PR, also 






A deal with the SNP was considered unlikely by the Government, the nationalists having 
viewed the response to the Devolution Referenda as inadequate and put down a no 
confidence motion. The Government reaction appeared to have been one of daring defeat, 
expressed not least through harsh public rhetoric. An often-cited jibe made by Callaghan 
during the debate itself was that the SNP voting against the Government was “the first time 
in recorded history that turkeys have been known to vote for an early Christmas”.35 This 
statement had even greater significance in the context of interparty cooperation, being used 
previously by Liberal MP David Penhaligon in March 1977, as a statement to his 
colleagues against entering into the Lib-Lab Pact.
36
 Whether or not the use of the phrase 
represented a conscious imitation of this earlier sentiment is unclear. Nevertheless, 
Callaghan’s statement was not only a warning for the SNP, but also a reflection of what the 
Government believed the SNP MPs’ approach to be, divided, uncertain and irrational. In 
the previous confidence vote in 1978, the SNP Parliamentary Party had supported Labour. 
Callaghan at the time had suggested to Cabinet that even without the SNP, “who were 
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known to be anxiously reconsidering their position”, the Government were likely to win.37 
Now in March 1979, the assumption would appear to have been that, once again, the SNP 
would not seek to bring down the Government. When Steel suggested to Callaghan during 
their 6 March meeting that SNP support could enable the Government’s survival, 
Callaghan’s response was to dismiss this idea as being “no solution – the SNP were quite 
irrational”, and that “he would not enter into talks with the SNP on that issue 
[Devolution]”.38 The position of the SNP MPs also appeared to be changing from the 
Government’s perspective on a daily basis, beginning with calls both for setting a 
definitive date that month for a vote on the Devolution Bills and the threat of a no 
confidence motion, but apparently subsequently dropping the requirement for setting a 
clear date. In the March Whips meeting prior to the confidence motion being announced, 
the views were very much that the SNP did not want to commit what was perceived as 
electoral suicide, expressed through such sentiments as “the SNP had put themselves on 
the rack and were now trying to get off it” or “the SNP were wavering”. Similar views 
were expressed in Cabinet, such as, “The SNP were unpredictable and not necessarily 
united”. The Government’s calculation, informed by these views was that, if pushed, the 
SNP would not vote against them, based both upon their previous voting behaviour during 
the Parliament, and the fact that it was not rational for them to do so, suffering from a low 
poll-rating and unlikely to gain anything from a Conservative victory.
39
 While the early 
March Cabinet meetings discussed above had sought to push the line of dialogue on 
Devolution, the Cabinet meeting on 22 March, after the SNP had put down their no 
confidence motion, shows an increased toughening of this position, more along the lines of 
daring defeat, and perhaps even actively wanting to be defeated, with Callaghan’s 
summary of the SNP being that “if they chose to precipitate an election the Government 
would have a strong position on which to take their stand”.40 These calculations by the 
Government were mistaken: firstly, they underestimated the strength of feeling among the 
SNP MPs as a result of the backlash for their supporting the Government in the previous 
confidence vote; secondly, they did not appreciate the extent to which efforts to delay any 
reaction to the Referendum result would only further antagonise the SNP; and, thirdly, they 
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did not fully recognise that once the SNP had announced their intentions to vote against the 
Government they felt compelled to follow through with them, even if it was on a 






Given the breakdown of cooperation with the Opposition which characterised the early 
months of the Callaghan Government, and the adversarial competition between Labour and 
the Conservatives, it is perhaps surprising that there was no similar breakdown towards the 
end of the Government. While the Opposition did seek to wear down the Callaghan 
Administration, there was no wholesale blocking of legislative business, nor any attempt to 
defeat the Government on every piece of legislation. In part, this reflected a realistic 
recognition that it would not be possible to muster a majority along with the smaller parties 
against the Government on every Bill, nor was it desirable to do so where legislation was 
in the interest of both main parties. Wholesale opposition was also recognised as being 
more likely to alienate some of the smaller parties, who were in agreement with the 
Government on particular areas. Even in the days preceding the possibility of a no 
confidence vote in March, the Shadow Cabinet continued to adopt a mixed strategy 
towards legislation, opposing some and abstaining in other cases. In several instances, it 
was even decided that the Opposition would, in fact, support the Government against its 
own rebels, whether, as highlighted in the 7 March meeting that Conservatives “should be 
prepared to vote with the Government against any revolts by their backbenchers in these 
debates”, on a report and motion concerning Prevention of Terror, and, a week later, to 




The Opposition were similarly reticent on Devolution and the question of a no 
confidence vote. The Shadow Cabinet meeting of 5 March decided that the Opposition 
“should not refer to any intention to table motions of confidence for the time being”, and to 
seek repeal of the Devolution Acts in the first instance, but also to “carefully avoid making 
any further commitments”. When subsequently considering the possibility of a no 
confidence motion at the 21 March Shadow Cabinet meeting, it was decided that any 
motion should only be tabled if “the SNP, the Liberals, and, if possible, the Welsh 
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Nationalists gave firm assurances of support”. The meeting similarly emphasised the 
importance of Opposition MPs communicating to Thatcher’s office “any reports they 
received as to the Government’s intentions or the intentions of the minority parties”. Such 
caution reflected previous attempted no confidence motions in 1977 and 1978, the failure 
of which had damaged the credibility of the Opposition. Interestingly, the required 
assurances did not include the UUP, which may have partly reflected Opposition 
considerations that, following passage of the Bill increasing Northern Ireland 
representation and pressure from constituencies, their votes were more likely to be 
deployed against the Government. This is not to say that Ulster Unionist support was in 
any way assumed, meetings being held between the Opposition and the UUP in the days 
running up to the vote. The assurances were also based upon numeric calculations that the 
Conservatives made of the minimum votes required to give the opposition parties a 
majority on a no confidence vote.
43
 
While in some countries the loss of a confidence vote has led to an alternative 
coalition being formed in order to govern, this option was not even considered by the 
leadership of the main parties in the aftermath of the Callaghan Government’s defeat in 
1979. As with the formation of the Government and the beginning of the Lib-Lab Pact, 
there was no question of any attempt to form an Opposition coalition that would 
immediately enter power. Such a practice was unnecessary, British precedents favouring 
an election following the loss of a confidence vote, Parliament being near the end of its 
term, and the Conservatives enjoying a substantial opinion poll lead.
44
 
 Opposition preparations for the no confidence vote itself followed similar lines to 
previous instances, including the preparation of notes for the debate itself by the CRD, 
primarily couched in terms of providing statistics on the comparable economic situation in 
other countries, and seeking to challenge the Government as having blocked previous 
Conservative attempts at all-party discussions on Devolution.
45
 
Following the Government’s loss of the confidence vote, there were some concerns 
over the election date and the passage of a caretaker Budget. Nevertheless, as indicated in a 
previous chapter, this tacit cooperation between Government and Opposition continued in 
terms of tidying up any remaining legislative arrangements, showing that, no matter how 
adversarial the contest may have become, the leadership on both sides remained willing to 
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accept existing conventions of British governance, smoothing the transition to the normal 






It is challenging to comment in terms of overall strategy on individual initiatives that 
would potentially have delivered the extra vote needed for the Government to survive, and 
not possible here, within the scope of this study, to consider in detail all the rumoured 
individual cases, some of which are difficult to substantiate, including hints at peerages or 
some other form of Government patronage.
47
 Instead, it would be useful briefly to examine 
three of these individual cases which relate directly to aspects of minority government 
strategy faced by the Callaghan Administration during the course of its previous three 
years in office. 
One such initiative was the honouring of the pairing agreement between Harrison 
and his Conservative counterpart, Deputy Chief Whip, Bernard Weatherill. This incident 
raised other issues that had come up during the early part of the minority government but 
not been dealt with, not least in terms of the aforementioned efforts to enable pairing for 
members who were unable to attend through illness. At the same time as highlighting a 
functional, indeed constitutional issue, the gentlemanly conduct of Weatherill offering to 
abstain himself in order to keep his word, but Harrison refusing to accept such a political 
self-sacrifice by his counterpart, illustrates something of the ad hoc nature of the British 
political tradition of handling minority government, where such instances of cooperation 
could exist even in the midst of a deeply divided and adversarial setting.
48
  
Similarly, there are challenges when considering the apparent Government offer to 
Liberal MP Clement Freud, which was not acted upon, of obtaining his abstention by 
missing his train back from Liverpool, in return for the Government passing a version of 
his Private Member’s Bill on Official Information.49 The Government had opposed the 
legislation in the past, which undoubtedly presented an additional barrier, but did not, in of 
itself, necessarily make the attempt unworkable. Rather, what prevented success of this 
measure was the way in which it was approached, again indicating something of the 
negative side of the ad hoc nature of handling minority government. The contact with 
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Freud was apparently made by Labour MP Chris Price, on behalf of the Chief Whip, 
through an unscheduled phone call while Freud was out campaigning in Liverpool for the 
upcoming by-election. That this communication was only made in the final hours before 
the vote, contained no clear definition of what any legislation would actually look like, and 
was in such a form as to lack the direct communication of any senior Government figure, 
such as Callaghan or Foot, or even of a written assurance such as was given to the two 
UUP members, inevitably led Freud to question the veracity of the offer. Freud would also 
have approached the issue with the experiences of the Pact and the Government’s failure to 
deliver Liberal priorities including PR on Direct Elections fresh in his mind. The covert 
nature of communications, reflecting the Government desire to avoid acknowledging deals, 
would also potentially have set Freud against his party, which he was unwilling to 
countenance.
50
 The Government’s view of the Bill was evident in Cabinet discussions on 
15 March, before the no confidence vote had been announced, and showed no indication of 
attempting to enlist Freud’s support. Indeed, criticism of the extensive nature of the 
legislation was scathing, albeit with some arguing for part of the Bill being considered in a 
modified form for a subsequent Parliament. Callaghan’s view in the meeting was 
uncompromising, suggesting that, through the Government submitting their own 
counterproposals, even if the legislation could not be defeated, “the Government would be 
in a stronger position to hold back progress on the Bill”. Unlike minority governments 
elsewhere, the Callaghan Administration had not sought greater co-authorship or 
collaboration between Government and opposition members on legislation. While there is 
no guarantee that such measures might have enabled the deal with Freud, the 
Government’s continued majoritarian stance and handling of such offers certainly helped 
to restrict the possibility for successful cooperation with individuals from other parties in 
advance of the no confidence vote.
51
 
The third difficult issue to consider here is that of Broughton, and the decision 
made not to bring him to Parliament by ambulance in order to vote, because of his serious 
ill health. This is perhaps the most widely recognised Government decision on a measure 
relating to the actual night of the confidence vote itself, inspiring a speculative radio drama 
thirty years later centred on Broughton and the events of that evening.
52
 When the Whips 
were meeting after the vote, there were arguments over what could have been done 
differently so as to win, not least on the point of bringing in Broughton, who had been 
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willing to make the journey, even though his wife and doctor did not want him to go, 
fearing for his health. Broughton had been brought in for previously tight votes, going 
against his doctor’s advice, although on this occasion, as indicated by Philip Norton, his 
doctor threatened to go public “if he were brought in for the vote”. Broughton was 
reportedly unhappy in the following days that he had not been able to go. He died five days 
later on 2 April 1979.
53
  
While it is important to maintain a scholarly distance in any historical study, it is 
difficult with what was clearly as much an emotional and very human decision not to risk 
Broughton’s frail health, even if it could save the Government. There are no formulae in 
minority government theory or in political strategy more generally that can claim to be fit 
to judge what the right decision would have been in this instance. Looking briefly at the 
hypothetical outcomes from a rather cold and strategic standpoint, Broughton’s vote could 
have saved the Government that night, assuming that all others were cast the same way, 
but its use would also have extracted an added political price in terms of reliance on ill 
members, and would not have been available in subsequent controversial votes on repeal of 
the Devolution Acts, and the Budget.  
Even in the event that the Government had been able to survive and to muster 
majorities to remain effective over the subsequent weeks, if Broughton had died while 
travelling to or from Westminster, it would almost certainly have been presented very 
negatively in the press, whether fairly or unfairly, feeding into Opposition mantras of a 
dying Government that was willing to sacrifice its own people in order to survive, both 
literally and figuratively. It would also likely have been viewed as a callous act by the 
Labour leadership, and would have weighed heavily upon those who had taken the 
decision, including Callaghan. In discussion between the Whips, one thought raised was 
the dreadful prospect of Broughton dying while within the precincts of the Palace of 
Westminster. While there was some thought of post-rationalising this possibility, that since 
commoners were not permitted to die in the Palace by law he would be regarded as having 
died in the ambulance, or in the hospital, such a cold technicality was not shared by most 
members of the Government. Although there is some suggestion that Callaghan might have 
changed his mind at the last moment, it was too late to transport Broughton for the vote, 
even if this had been desirable. Although it had meant the end of his Administration, 
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Confidence Defeat and the Election Result 
 
Those within the Government who had sought to avoid defeat on 28 March feared the 
consequences of the vote on the subsequent electoral campaign.
55
 It is very difficult to 
establish how far defeat in the confidence vote made a difference to the final electoral 
result for the Government, whether in terms of forcing the election earlier than had been 
intended by Callaghan, or in damaging Labour’s electoral prospects through depressing 
morale and providing a powerful symbol of its parliamentary weakness.  
In terms of electoral timing, it is impossible to say what the impact of the extra 
month or several months would have had. In the event that the confidence vote had been 
won, Callaghan may well have chosen June, September or October as opposed to May as 
an election date, following on from planning discussed in Chapter 7. It is unlikely that 
another no confidence motion would have been proposed by the Opposition in the months 
following March 1979 for fear of a further loss of credibility, unless they could have been 
assured that such a vote would succeed by a reasonable margin. It was more likely that 
Callaghan would have been able to choose to dissolve Parliament one or several months 
later, nearer the absolute deadline of the five year parliamentary term. There were many 
within the Government, not least the Whips and those holding marginal constituencies, 
who preferred going on until autumn. Indeed, prior to the Devolution Referenda, Callaghan 
himself appeared to express such a preference for October.
56
 Changes in opinion polls over 
the previous eight to ten months, oscillating between a Conservative lead of around three 
to eight, to a Government one of five to six in September, followed again by a 
Conservative lead of six to twenty-one, demonstrated to those in any doubt just how 
quickly the situation could be transformed. Another interesting point to note is that, 
although Government polling support dropped during the early months of 1979, it never 
reached the low point experienced during the financial crisis and IMF loan in late 1976. 
Some of the problems of the ‘Winter of Discontent’ would have perhaps lessened given 
more time, but there is no guarantee that an extra couple of months would have changed 
the underlying factors which led to a Conservative victory, whether in terms of the 
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economic situation or frustration with the, in some cases continuing, industrial action.
57
 
The Government would have had the advantage of delivering a pre-election Budget that 
was more than merely a caretaker measure, but would still have had to secure 
parliamentary support for this and other legislation through negotiations with the smaller 
parties. The financial situation had also left limited room for politically advantageous 
Budget measures, an issue raised by Healey in Budget discussions with the Cabinet on 1 
March. According to Donoughue, Callaghan’s preference for an October election would 
also appear to have changed to that of May over the days following 1 March, regardless of 
whether or not the Government won a prospective no confidence vote in Parliament. This 
sentiment was partly borne out of Callaghan’s frustration of dealing with the demands 
made by the other parties following the Devolution Referenda.
58
 
As for the effect of the confidence vote itself on the outcome, the opinion polls did 
not significantly change as a result of the defeat. Those published in the days immediately 
following 28 March showed a Conservative lead of between six and twenty-one points, 
largely in line with the eight to twenty point range in polls during February and early 
March. This trend is consistent even when considering the inaccuracies of polling already 
discussed, and even when discounting the eleven to twenty point Conservative leads 
perceived as overestimates, or polls deviating from the trend such as that showing a 0.7% 
Labour lead on 28 April. Although the Conservatives won the election with a 5.2% swing, 
the largest since 1945, and a comfortable 7% lead over Labour, it does not appear that the 
loss of the confidence vote itself had a significant or lasting negative impact on the 
Government’s poll ratings.59 
It is more difficult to calculate the intangible effects of the confidence defeat on 
Government members and their supporters. Undoubtedly the defeat further depressed the 
morale of Labour MPs and activists, but it could be suggested that it also helped to 
galvanise the campaign in terms of fighting the Conservatives. There is not scope here to 
discuss campaign strategy in full, but, even whether or not surveys that differed widely 
from the trend are discounted, the polls do appear to have narrowed over the course of the 
campaign. The result has also understandably been judged against the losses suffered, or as 
part of a longer term Labour decline, their percentage of the vote falling, as had been the 
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case at every election since 1945, the only exception being the landslide victory of 1966.
60
 
At the same time, the Government actually won slightly more votes overall in 1979, 11.52 
million, than they had in the previous election, 11.45 million. Even although this rise in 
votes may be partly explained by a poorer turnout in 1974, and despite losing fifty seats 
overall, Labour’s performance did not represent a wholesale collapse in support. Although 
there were divisions within the party, these were more longstanding, and do not appear to 
have been exacerbated by the confidence vote defeat itself. These divisions also did not 






Although, to some extent, the Callaghan Government was brought down by the events of 
the ‘Winter of Discontent’ and loss of the Devolution Referenda, both main parties did 
give greater strategic consideration than has previously been recognised to how to 
approach the challenges of the no confidence vote in March 1979, whether in terms of 
either preserving or ousting the Government.  
While attempting to avoid the vote, the Government’s failure to do so, and the loss 
of SNP support, arose from miscalculations based upon previous experiences of dealing 
with the smaller parties during the course of the minority government, and the misreading 
of SNP intentions. Although partly motivated by frustration with previous experiences of 
interparty deals, Callaghan continued to pursue what he considered to be a rational 
strategy, daring some of the opposition parties to defeat him, while simultaneously, albeit 
reluctantly in some cases, trying to facilitate deals that would enable the Government’s 
survival. In some of these cases of deal-making, or the potential employment of a seriously 
ill member to ensure victory, there were prices which the Government leadership, or 
individuals within the Government, were not willing to pay, whether for political or 
principled reasons. These possible initiatives reflected issues that had arisen but not been 
dealt with during the minority government, whether in terms of cross-party cooperation or 
pairing of MPs. 
The Opposition were cautious, given their previous unsuccessful experiences with 
confidence votes, and sought to ensure that they had sufficient support from the smaller 
parties before proceeding with a no confidence vote. Their reticence over issues such as the 
outcome of the Devolution Referenda also sought to avoid unnecessarily alienating the 
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SNP, whose support they recognised as crucial in terms of winning against the 
Government. Opposition preparations included calculations of the numbers required to 
defeat the Government and some consideration of how their actions would influence the 
votes of smaller parties. 
The confidence vote signalled the end of three years of minority government under 
Callaghan, and the beginning of an election campaign that would result in Conservative 
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The previous chapters of this thesis have sought to reconsider the different aspects of the 
Callaghan Government and Conservative Opposition’s experiences of minority 
government, from the Government’s formation in April 1976, to dissolution in March to 
May 1979. This final chapter aims to look briefly at the British experience of minority 
government following Callaghan, before drawing together the different aspects considered 
in the study. In this way, we may attempt to re-conceptualise the place of Callaghan’s 
Minority Government against the broader backdrop of recent British political history up to 
April 2015. 
 
Subsequent British Experience 
 
Minority governments since Callaghan have, at the time of writing, occurred only during 
two brief periods in the 1990s at Westminster and in the new Devolved and distinctly more 
consensual legislatures of Scotland and Wales. While the 2010 Election resulted in the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition, the Callaghan experience of minority 
government and wider British tradition of minority governments continue to exert 
significant influence upon decision-makers and commentators facing new situations in 
British politics. 
On losing their majority in November 1994, John Major’s Conservative 
Government faced the same questions as Callaghan in 1976, opposing MPs challenging the 
new “minority government’s” authority to implement policy, and arguing that opposition 
parties should hold the majority of seats on parliamentary committees. Indeed, these 
challenges were issued making specific reference to the Callaghan Government’s 
experience. The Major Government’s response was also similar to their predecessors, a 
continued adherence to majoritarian principles and a public rhetoric of defiance that 
dismissed there being any alternative Administration, while simultaneously engaging in 
political compromises where necessary (albeit with limited success).
1
  
Questions of interparty cooperation also formed an important part of this 
Government, with Major compelled to rely upon the support of the UUP, particularly in the 
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It is worth noting that there was only one defeat in each of the six-month periods 
when the Major Government lost its majority (November 1994-April 1995 and December 
1996-May 1997), far fewer than the comparative of at least three to six defeats every six 
months under Callaghan. This seems especially ironic when considering the comparable 
embattled state of the Callaghan and Major Governments, which have tended to be cited in 
the same breath as exemplars of parliamentary weakness. At the same time, however, 
Major’s Administration was also in some ways more radical in adopting strategies relating 
to minority government, not least that of deliberately entering what was effectively a 
minority government by withdrawing party membership from eight MPs in November 
1994, and only restoring them six months later. Confidence votes, rather more so than in 
Callaghan’s experience, were employed by Major as a means to reverse actual policy 
defeats, including the adoption of the Protocol on Social Policy as a condition of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993.
3
 
Commentaries seeking to examine the foundations and antecedents of the 2010 UK 
Coalition Government have also looked at many historic forms of cross-party cooperation, 
from recent Conservative-Liberal Democrat cooperation at local council level, or in the 
2005-10 Parliament, to the formative experiences for the Liberals of the Lib-Lab Pact of 
the 1970s, the Social Democrat Party of the 1980s, and the Blair-Ashdown Project of the 
1990s. However, while these influences were significant, the wider experience of the 
minority governments of the 1970s, and the distinct British tradition of minority 
government, may be regarded as having had an equally profound impact. The Callaghan 
Government provides perhaps one of the closest comparable situations to the post-2010 




Experiences of the Callaghan Government were also very much present during the 
coalition formation process in May 2010: whether in historical summaries of British 
experiences of minority and coalition government during media coverage of the campaign 
and negotiations, to some of the insights that have been given into the discussions between 
coalition negotiators within the different political parties. When contemplating the 
possibility of minority or coalition government in 2007, Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s 
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political advisers first turned to examining the civil service files of Britain’s previous 
minority government experiences in 1974 and thereafter, showing the continued influence 
of recent history on current decision-making in the minds of those formulating strategy 
within Britain’s political establishment.5 
The examination of the Callaghan Minority Government in this thesis, its effect on 
more recent British experiences highlighted above, and the post-2010 Coalition experience 
at Westminster, are factors which have opened up many other potential areas for future 
investigation that affect both British political history and wider contemporary 
considerations of minority and coalition governments, both domestically and abroad.  
 
Callaghan Government and Opposition 
 
This study has sought to demonstrate that both the Callaghan Administration and 
Conservative Opposition put far greater consideration into strategies for coping with their 
situation of minority government than has previously been recognised by scholars. 
Through examining the effect of this state of minority government on both main parties, 
aspects of their different approaches have been highlighted in areas including strategy-
making processes, day-to-day operation within Parliament, and future planning. These 
aspects have been contextualised against a wider political science theoretical perspective 
and the experiences of minority governments internationally. The chapters have also 
sought to demonstrate the distinctively British tradition of minority government, firmly 
grounded within and inspired by its own historical majoritarian political culture, yet 
possessing a degree of pragmatic adaptation and development. In this tradition, discussion 
between decision-makers within both main parties led to the contemplation of potentially 
radical courses of action in strategy-making, selectively embracing some of these as 
parliamentary innovations, including formalised interparty cooperation, while consciously 
rejecting others, not least in terms of actively seeking parliamentary defeat. 
Although no new strategy-making group or unit was created solely to deal with 
minority government, existing strategic procedures and methods considered the matter at 
length, and adapted their methods of operating, from the authoring of Government 
contingency planning specifically dealing with responses to potential parliamentary 
defeats, to attempts by both parties to anticipate the timing of an uncertain election. Time 
in Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet discussions devoted to dealing with parliamentary affairs 
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increased significantly, and bodies from the Policy Unit to the CRD were tasked to author 
papers that dealt with specific aspects of the challenges posed by minority government. 
Some groups within the parties that were set up during this period had proceedings of their 
meetings dominated by endeavours to respond to the state of minority government, and 
have provided a useful insight into the planning of decision-makers, including the periodic 
meetings between Callaghan and the Government Whips, or the meetings of Government 
Special Advisers. Even where advice generated in these different fora was not acted upon, 
it formed part of a wider strategic dialogue, indicating potential alternative ‘roads not 
taken’, providing added insight into the mindset of contemporary decision-makers, and, in 
some cases, acted as precursors and precedents for subsequent Administrations dealing 
with questions of minority and coalition governance.  
In terms of drawing upon experience, both main parties were aware of something of 
the international instances of minority and coalition government, and were establishing 
greater contact with their counterparts at a transnational level during the 1970s. However, 
these experiences did not generally feature as part of the main parties’ rationale or internal 
strategic discourse, which was very much couched in terms of contemporary and 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century British experiences of minority and coalition 
government. In this regard, the British experience of minority government was, and 
arguably still is, very much viewed through the conventional majoritarian prism by the 
main parties and most commentators.  
The Government’s formation represented something of an unusual case among 
other minority administrations, coming midway through a Parliament as a result of 
defections rather than following an election or coalition breakdown. Alternatives to 
minority government were given some consideration, whether in terms of the SDLP 
becoming part of the Government, or of calling a snap General Election. That these 
alternatives were not enacted reflected concerns to avoid the appearance of ‘cheating’, and 
recognition of the temporal dimension – considering longer-term political implications for 
a party in minority status beyond merely acquiring a day-to-day majority. The Opposition 
also recognised and sought to exploit the changed political situation, but made no attempt 
to construct an alternative majority coalition within Parliament and to replace the 
incumbent Administration without a vote. The Opposition recognised the difficulties of 
bringing together the smaller parties, and believed that governments changed as a result of 
clear electoral victory or defeat, rather than by shifting political alliances.
6
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In terms of Parliament itself, in the first instance of April 1976, the Government 
paradoxically both recognised the changed state of minority government and 
simultaneously endeavoured to continue along pre-existing majoritarian lines: governing 
only one or two seats short of a majority; relying on their opponents’ disunity; and 
reflecting the notion of ‘almost a majority government’. Relentless pursuit of this policy of 
‘daring opponents to defeat the Government’, and the perception of ‘cheating’ on the 
Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill in 1976, led to significant disruption by the 
Opposition breaking off all cooperation with the Government. Ending the pairing of MPs 
for votes was initially an ad hoc measure, although some Conservatives sought to turn it 
into a broader strategy. The limits of this device in a wider strategic context were, 
however, recognised by the Opposition, including the harm to their own political position. 
Although considered in subsequent Shadow Cabinet discussions, the approach was not 
repeated during the Parliament. Nevertheless, the threat had a potent effect on Labour’s 
approach to minority government, with the breaking of cooperation continuing to be cited 
by the Government in subsequent years as a justification for not pursuing a particular 
course of action. 
 Partly affected by this confrontational atmosphere, Government and Opposition 
responses to the question of legislative committees in 1976 also reflected something of the 
early strategic dilemmas of minority government. In terms of legislative committees, the 
main focus has often been on a handful of high profile committee defeats, neglecting the 
over one hundred reversals suffered by Callaghan in legislative committees, and the even 
higher number of individual elements in Bills that were modified or dropped in 
anticipation of such opposition. The full effect of these defeats, as well as the growth of 
opposition parties’ influence in the minority government context, both represent areas 
worthy of further detailed study. While the Government initially clung to majoritarian 
principles, it subsequently accepted alterations to representation for new committees that 
reflected the changed parliamentary situation, in line with the precedent of the 1974 
Wilson Minority Government. At the same time, alternative means of maintaining 
Government committee majorities were considered, such as committee composition being 
dependent on a Bill’s parliamentary majority rather than the political balance of the 
Commons. This move was rejected on strategic grounds, for fear of the Opposition using 
such a tool to their own advantage in influencing Bills. Over the course of the Minority 
Government, the tactical approach to committees continued, but with no further apparent 
significant innovation. Wholesale reform of the committee structure along lines that would 
strengthen opposition parties’ influence were rejected by the Government, not least citing 
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such a move as detrimental to future minority governments, once again demonstrating the 
continued adherence to a majoritarian political culture. The Opposition also made use of 
the committees to deal with some of the issues of minority government, in some instances 
not opposing legislation in the Commons deliberately, with a view to amending it in 
committee, to avoid charges of being unnecessarily and visibly obstructive.
7
 
The prospect and reality of parliamentary defeat, whether in the Commons or the 
Lords, was perhaps one of the greatest challenges faced by both sides. In the management 
of Bills, the Government initially sought to push forward a full legislative workload, 
regardless of the absence of a majority. Subsequent experience of legislative setbacks 
compelled a reappraisal of this approach, and, while the timetable remained crowded, 
greater consideration was given to legislative defeats. The first reaction of the Government 
was largely to fall back on using its institutional resources to try to compel the passage of 
its legislation in a minority government setting, very much in line with other minority 
governments as studied by De Tsebelis. Such resources, including the timetabling of 
parliamentary business, recesses, Guillotine votes, confidence votes, committee 
composition, patronage, and, particularly, the Government Whips, were used to attempt to 
ensure continued passage of Government business. The limits of these resources were 
recognised over time by the Government, as has already been noted above regarding the 
temporary breaking off of cooperation with the Opposition. Use of the Parliament Act to 
force through legislation blocked by the Lords was considered in the early stages, but 
never invoked, the Government recognising the political disadvantages and likely limited 
success of such an approach. While reform of the Lords to remove an inbuilt Opposition 
majority was contemplated, this option was recognised as not solving the contemporary 
minority government situation, and as being unlikely to succeed when the Government had 
no majority to begin with. Other, more unorthodox institutional tools were considered, not 
least putting the Government’s Devolution Bill to a nationwide referendum when its 
passage through Parliament appeared uncertain, this approach being ultimately rejected by 
the Government as an innovation which would, once again, in itself require a 
parliamentary majority, as well as setting dangerous precedents for future legislation. In 
institutional terms, the Government did not make significant concessions toward long-term 
reform more conducive to the operation of future minority or coalition governments, 
whether in terms of all-party committee representation or PR – facing the prospect of 
significant internal division within its own ranks over such issues, and still viewing 
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majority government as ultimately the only realistic objective to be pursued. Similarly, the 
Opposition, while contemplating such innovations as Lords reform and the use of 
referenda to break national strikes, did not seriously countenance this kind of institutional 
reform along minority government lines. Where changes were subsequently made, in terms 
of the parliamentary committee system after 1979, for example, this was still very much 
justified within the majoritarian political culture, by a first-term Conservative Government 
that possessed a significant working majority.
8
 
As time progressed, the Government approach to legislative defeats came to work 
very much in line with that of other minority governments: legislation was increasingly not 
put forward or dropped entirely if regarded as likely to be defeated; some defeats, 
previously regarded as incompatible with a government surviving in the British system, 
such as over the Budget, were largely accepted; the selective use of successful confidence 
motions bolstered the Administration while trying to avoid tackling issues that would split 
the Party; and legislation was framed in ways seeking to attract the maximum amount of 
support from other parties. While adopting these approaches, the Government also 
remained within the majoritarian mindset, plans sometimes being dropped only following 
the internal assurances that these would be reintroduced following a future election, if and 
when the Government had regained its majority. At the same time, some of the tactical 
approaches used by other minority governments were raised but not adopted. While the 
Government considered engineering its own defeat on certain issues, either as a means to 
criticise the Opposition as obstructionist or even as an excuse for an early election, it was 
ultimately viewed as a step too far, weakening the Callaghan Government unnecessarily.  
The Opposition also sought strategically to manage, and to bring about, 
Government legislative defeats, albeit operating with more limited institutional resources 
at their disposal in Parliament. Their strategic deliberations led to the framing of legislation 
to gain smaller party support, and development of different responses to the media in the 
event of particular Government legislation being either successfully passed or defeated. As 
indicated above in the discussion on committees, sometimes the Opposition selectively 
held back from attempting to defeat the Government, where it was not judged to be 
strategically expedient, would appear unnecessarily obstructionist, or concerned legislation 
that both main parties approved of, such as Direct Elections. At the same time as these 
instances of cooperation, the Opposition’s focus was still largely grounded within the 
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majoritarian framework of seeking to defeat the Government on major legislative items 
wherever possible.  
Both main parties approached questions of interparty cooperation in Parliament, 
albeit primarily on an ad hoc basis, with greater consideration of strategic concerns than 
has usually been appreciated. Although lacking some of the features present in interparty 
coalition negotiations elsewhere – no attempts being made by potential partners to outbid 
each other; an absence of detailed negotiating briefing papers; and no single formalised 
negotiating structure – the Government did engage in some strategic consideration of the 
implications of a Pact with the Liberals. Although the short-term nature of the first phase 
of the Pact was forced on the Government contrary to their desires, this initial period acted 
as something of an ‘experiment’ which better enabled managing opposition to the Pact and 
ensuring its subsequent renewal. The Pact’s renewal, often taken for granted, showed 
greater strategic consideration by the Government than the initial formation, from more 
detailed briefing papers and attempts to control the negotiating process, to discussion 
within bodies including the special June Strategy Cabinet meeting about potential 
alternative forms of cooperation, including month-to-month renewal or a longer Pact 
lasting into 1979. The Government also sought, to varying degrees, to make use of the 
institutions of the Pact to its own advantage: preventing further concessions through 
reference to the original written agreement; using consultation between the two leaders to 
compel the reduction of Liberal demands; and avoiding staged conflicts that would benefit 
the Liberals by withdrawing or conceding points of legislation. These approaches were not 
always successful, and the Government continued to suffer significant defeats during the 
course of the Pact. However, while ending as a result of being unable to deliver the Liberal 
demand for PR in Direct Elections, the Government was able to manage the end of the Pact 
and prevent it from collapsing as has been the fate of so many other interparty agreements 
and coalitions, maintaining the commitment to passing Devolution legislation and leaving 
the door open for future cooperation. The Government was also able to continue other 
forms of interparty cooperation, contemplating, although not widely adopting, more radical 
notions that have been pursued in other countries, such as alternative legislative majorities 
for different parts of the same Bill, not least for fear of the political costs of reliance upon 
the Opposition, and the prospect of damaging relations with the smaller parties. 
The Opposition, confronting questions of interparty cooperation, largely adhered to 
majoritarian principles of rejecting formal deals, their relations with Liberal MPs changing 
to become more antagonistic as a result of the Pact and primarily seeking to convert 
Liberal voters rather than appealing to their MPs. At the same time, elements of the 
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Opposition strategic discourse and day-to-day operation embraced other possibilities and 
requirements for greater interparty cooperation, highlighting the dangers of criticising the 
Liberals over the Pact, maintaining contact with Liberal MPs which helped in the authoring 
of major Government defeats, and recognising the need to avoid unduly angering smaller 
parties over ad hoc cooperation with the Government, in order to gain their support in 
future parliamentary votes. The Opposition sought to obtain such support of smaller 
parties, and even to contemplate more formal interparty links, particularly with the UUP.  
Through these methods and innovations, Government and Opposition did seek 
ways to remove obstacles to cooperation with other parties. However, in other areas of 
interparty cooperation there was no significant progress, and a lack of the formalised 
cooperative mechanisms seen in other countries’ experiences of minority and coalition 
government. Aside from Government agreements with the Liberals and the UUP, both 
Labour and Conservative attempts to reach out to other parties remained very much in a 
British pragmatic tradition, conducted on an ad hoc and limited basis. Although some 
figures in both parties raised the prospect of electoral agreements or alliances, these ideas 
were rejected from the outset. In part, this rejection reflected a continued majoritarian 
viewpoint and earlier strategic consideration of the subject in 1974, leaders not desiring to 
diminish their power by increasing the likelihood of future minority governments. 
The uncertainty over a possible election date arising from the minority government 
situation compelled greater Government preparations for different electoral possibilities, 
and forced a multitude of forecasting efforts by the Opposition, as well as re-examining 
their core assumptions of Callaghan’s strategic mindset. Attempts to plan the best possible 
time for a future election were based on a large number of factors, particularly conditioned 
by the ability of the minority government to pass legislation, overarching economic 
indicators, local factors such as holidays in key constituencies, major sporting events like 
the World Cup, and an attempt to wrong-foot opposing parties and leave room for 
manoeuvre. Callaghan’s decision not to go for a much anticipated autumn 1978 election 
involved a wider strategic dialogue than has previously been examined, from meetings to 
briefing papers. Callaghan refused to countenance an election if it were likely to produce 
another indecisive result (at best, a further minority government), and, also had assurances 
that sufficient support from smaller parties would enable the passage of crucial legislation 
into 1979.  
Short of defeating the Government in a confidence vote, the Opposition had little 
control over electoral timing, but put much effort into their attempts at forecasting the 
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potential date, and putting in place measures that would enable flexibility in responding to 
a changing situation in terms of campaign preparations. 
Although not publicly acknowledged, both parties increasingly sought to consider 
the possibility of future minority governments or even coalitions, and to make contingency 
plans for these potential situations. Even if the development of these plans was more 
sporadic or embryonic in their outline, they represent a significant development from the 
earlier minority government in 1974, and highlight changes within the strategic mindset of 
both sides, attempting to adapt to a changed political reality, while remaining grounded 
within pre-existing British traditions. On the Government side, considerations raised 
included decisions over whether or not the Prime Minister should resign in the event of 
another indecisive result, calculating various hypothetical outcomes based upon precedent 
and past British experience. Wider questions of formalised interparty cooperation did not 
feature significantly, not least reflecting the continued hostility within Labour to coalition 
and interparty deals. A paper prepared for Callaghan immediately preceding the Election 
did raise the prospect of coalition, discussing some of the potential combinations and the 
best way to approach this situation. Although it appears very much as a last-minute 
initiative that never had a chance to be tested, the very consideration of the possibility at 
Prime Ministerial level highlights the extent to which minority government had impacted 
upon future planning.  
On the Conservative side, plans for a future minority or coalition government, 
while similarly regarded less favourably, were given serious consideration as possible 
contingencies by senior Conservatives. Researchers were tasked to write different papers 
considering formal coalitions, including the examination of questions from the pre-
selection of potential coalition partners, to the setting out of possible negotiating positions. 
These papers set out several competing visions and different practical approaches to 
government formation, from notions of a Grand Coalition to some form of coalition 
government with the UUP. 
The approach of both parties to the no confidence vote in March 1979 was 
conditioned by their experiences of minority government over the previous three years. 
The Government engaged in significant discussion of strategy through the Cabinet and 
Whips, as well as seeking a mixed approach of daring defeat and adopting limited 
interparty deals. Ultimately however, the vote was lost through refusal to pay certain 
political prices and the misjudging of smaller parties including the SNP. The Opposition 
avoided the wholesale blocking of Government business and potential danger of alienating 
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smaller party support, while cautiously approaching the Devolution question, and the no 
confidence vote itself. 
 The 1979 General Election delivered a decisive Conservative majority. 
Nevertheless, the potential for an indecisive election result and minority government 
continued to be seriously considered by political parties and commentators in the decades 
following 1979, in an atmosphere of prospective political realignment with the Social 
Democrat Party/Alliance in the 1980s, and seeming inability of Labour to achieve a 
breakthrough in the early 1990s. The Callaghan Government’s experience served as an 
important foundation for future approaches to questions of minority and coalition faced in 
these years, both in terms of the participants who had held high political office, and as an 




The Callaghan Minority Government saw both main parties adopting some of the 
techniques used by governments and oppositions facing minority government around the 
world. In their rationale and the carrying out of their strategies, both considered more 
radical alternative courses of action, from the breaking of parliamentary cooperation as a 
strategy to deliberately seeking defeats or even forming formalised interparty coalitions. 
Nevertheless, both Labour and the Conservatives remained firmly anchored within and 
built upon a distinctly British tradition of minority government, seeking to justify internal 
strategic dialogues through appeal to parliamentary precedents, or, where necessary, 
pragmatic innovation grounded in existing majoritarian principles. Within wider minority 
government theory, the British experience of the late 1970s affirms some long-established 
precepts about the operation of parties in a national Parliament without a legislative 
majority, but, at the same time, provides a unique case study challenging dominant ideas 
and their theoretical bases. The experiences and actions of these decision-makers helped to 
lay the foundations for British political parties up to the post-2010 Coalition, and continue 
to play an important role in the minds of current strategy-makers in Britain’s political 
parties, as they grapple with considerations of how to approach the formation and working 
of prospective minority or coalition governments, in an increasingly uncertain political 
future.  
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